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PREFACE
This is an essay on the self-concept; its origin 
and functions. The term itself, self-concept, is in wide 
use in the psychological literature of today, but this usage 
is very loose, even confusing. In writing this paper it has 
been my intent to make explicit what I consider to be the 
"real" meaning of the term, and then to locate the origin of 
the self-concept, so defined, in the experience of the person 
and to trace its development.
It is of course presumptuous for anyone to take a 
term that is in general use and to state categorically what 
it "really" means. Technical terms mean what the consensus 
says that they mean; it is almost completely a matter of con­
vention, However, there are two grounds on which I justify 
my presumption. The first of these is that the accepted 
meanings of the two terms, self and concept, and the gram­
matical significance of their juxtaposition, must be taken 
into account. One cannot play fast and loose with language. 
The second is that the meaning must have a concrete referent 
in mind activities: that is, it must refer to a particular
phase of the mind at work. If we cannot find such an activ­
ity that meets the demands of language, then the term itself
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is meaningless and should be discarded. But I believe that 
there is such an activity and in my paper I have tried to 
analyze it in some detail.
My approach to the problem no doubt will be considered 
unorthodox by many. I have written in a purely theoretical 
vein, with no reference to the experimental literature, and 
in an essentially subjective tone. Though such an approach 
is not in keeping with the modern scientific temper, it has,
I feel, peculiar relevance to a problem of this kind, I feel 
this way primarily because when I first set to work I had an 
objective study in mind, something on the order of the many 
studies on the self-concept reported in the literature. But 
I quickly became convinced that though these studies are in­
teresting in many ways, they all fall short of measuring what 
I have called the self-concept, and I was unable to develop 
any other technique that could satisfy my own criteria. The 
weakness of these studies, as I see them— that is, the ones 
that employ a Q sort or inventory, or the like— is that they 
equate self-concept with recognition of one’s own traits or 
characteristics. Of course, one can define the self-concept 
in these terms, and be quite operational about it. But it is 
easy to show, I think, that such a definition has little 
meaning. For example, if you ask a man whether a statement 
about honesty applies to him, he may say that it does, and 
he may even go so far as to rate himself at a given point on 
the continuum of honesty that you provide for him. But there
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is no evidence in this self-rating that honesty is at all an 
issue with him— that in the course of the day's activities, 
when not confronted with a questionnaire, he gives time and 
energy to conceptualizing himself in this light. And here 
is the crucial point. If a test of the self-concept is to 
amount to anything, it must reflect a concrete aspect of the 
living person. Perhaps some day such a test will be develop­
ed, but I do not know of any now available. And so, lacking 
such a test, I have taken to a theoretical paper out of 
necessity.
I originally became interested in the notion of the 
self-concept, almost casually to begin with, out of frequent 
contact with the term in the therapeutic practicum that I 
attended my first year in the clinical program at the Univer­
sity of Oklahoma. Both the vague way in which the term was 
used and the impression, apparently shared by everyone, that 
it referred to something important within the self, aroused 
ray interest and set me to thinking. However, I still would 
not have written a theoretical paper at all if this had not 
been suggested to me by Dr. Muzafer Sherif, who at the same 
time encouraged me to make the effort, and who in his concept 
of ego-involvement, provided me with a starting point. All 
of what I have written can be taken, in a sense, as an at­
tempt to analyze this rather generalized concept. I am 
grateful to Dr. Sherif for having launched me. I must thank 
Dr. William B. Lemmon, too, for having whetted my curiosity
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about the place of the self-concept in the personality and 
for some suggestions as to how it operates. And most of all 
I must thank Dr. Louis B. Hoisington for his infinite patience 
and consideration, and for his general influence on my think­
ing in psychology. I did not know that speculative thinking 
was respectable in general psychology until I met him. Fin­
ally, I must thank each member of my dissertation committee—  
Dr. Hoisington, Dr. Lemmon, Dr. Carlton W. Berenda, Dr. Carl 
R. Oldroyd, and Dr. Richard G. Cannicott— for his generous 
consent in permitting me to write a purely theoretical 
paper. They have given me the opportunity to develop my 
thinking in this area in a way that would have been impos­
sible had I been restricted to an experimental investigation.
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SELF-CONCEPT AS A MEDIATING FACTOR 
IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The self-concept is a part function of the self— one 
that is generally of rather central importance, but not nec­
essarily so. It is not, of course, an entity as such, but an 
activity. Self-concept, the noun, is a convenient way of 
referring to self-conceptualizing, the verb, but the use of 
words should not obscure the facts. The real subject of this 
paper is an activity of the self.
Certain features of the activity are obvious in the 
term itself: it is a conceptualizing of the self, thus a
cognitive activity. However, it is never an accurate repre­
sentation of the self. It is evaluative, dramatic, and 
idealized, and it carries with it a unique class of feeling 
states which have been called self-feelings (Cooley, 1910; 
McDougall, 1918). These play a unique and powerful role in 
the motive system of the individual, and in an important way 
set the course of his personal development.
Self-conceptualizing represents a kind of corruption
1
2of the original, spontaneous, un-selfconscious mental activ­
ity that the infant is endowed with. It is not a "natural" 
or inevitable modification of the original structure but 
arises out of a particular kind of relationship with another 
person; one in which the self is made to feel humiliated, 
small, or inadequate, or the like. These are the original 
self-feelings— negative self-feelings— which arouse the self- 
conceptualizing activity. This activity, then represents a 
passive and defensive maneuver in the mind; one which brings 
satisfaction to the person in fantasy as a balm for his 
wounded feelings. This is why the self-concept is never 
truly representative of the self. Though it is a cognitive 
structure, it is seriously distorted by the person's needs to 
hold on to a glorified and dramatic conception of himself, a 
conception which is itself only a reflection of his need to 
present himself in the same light to others. It is because 
of this fact that the self-concept plays such a vital role 
among his psychic processes and that it serves, in one sense, 
as a repository for his personal values.
Though a person's total self-concept can be described, 
for practical purposes it is usually necessary to describe it 
at a particular moment. This is because there are times when 
the self-concept is functioning and times when it is not; and 
times when now one facet of it is functioning, now another; 
all as part of the person's response to a particular situa­
tion, with particular pressures, dangers, and demands. The
3total self-concept can be considered as potential at any mo­
ment, but only that aspect or aspects which have been acti­
vated play any part in the person's life.
With all this, too, it must be recognized that the 
self-concept is not a necessary feature of the self. Not only 
are there times when each person is free of such activity, but 
there are some persons who remain relatively free of it day 
in day out. In this regard there are wide individual varia­
tions.
My paper is in four sections. In the first I have 
presented the views of four source writers : James Mark
Baldwin, William McDougall, Charles Horton Cooley, and George 
Herbert Mead. In the second I have set down my personal con­
tribution to the theory of the self-concept. In the third I 
have brought in for comparison with this view, the relevant 
theories of various modern psychological and psychoanalytical 
writers. And in the last section I have applied the notion 
of self-concept to the therapeutic relationship.
With regard to my source writers, my choice no doubt 
will appear unusual, to say the least, for none of the four 
are represented in any significant way in current psychologi­
cal theory. This, I feel, is unfortunate, and is due, I dare 
say, to the "behavioristic revolution" that took place in 
psychological thinking in the early part of the century and 
which has not fully run its course to this day. These men 
decidedly are not behaviorists— representing, in fact, the
very subjective, introspective tradition against which the 
revolution was launched. This is true of Mead as well as of 
the others, even though he calls himself a "social behavior- 
ist"— witness his analysis of the "I" and the "me." Nonethe­
less, all were very careful and thorough writers, and though 
they were "subjective" in their approach according to today's 
operational standards, they were quite thoroughly empirical. 
And their detailed analysis of the self and the idea-of-self, 
and of its origins in social experience, is unmatched today 
in the intellectual standards maintained except for the writ­
ing of certain isolated, outstanding individuals.
Much of what these men wrote about seems strangely 
old-fashioned today and as having little relevance to the 
problems that interest us. However, the social theory of 
self, which they so carefully and elaborately developed, 
strikes me as being basically sound and as providing a firm 
foundation for further theoretical excursions. It should be 
noted that this "theory" that I refer to is by no means a 
single, unified structure. Each of these men developed his 
own unique view. They formed no school or system and they 
can be brought together in this manner only insofar as they 
represent a more or less continuous intellectual tradition.
I have not, of course, presented the respective the­
ories of these men in their entireties, for such a presenta­
tion would carry us far beyond the scope of my particular 
problem. However, I have gone to some pains to present in
5detail those aspects of each theory that I have deemed rele­
vant to my problem. This has amounted to a good deal of 
theory. Because of this, and because I have made no effort 
to fully integrate the individual contributions, and, 
further, because I suspect that the contributions themselves 
will prove puzzling to the reader who has been brought up on 
modern psychological writing— I present the following brief 
resume to orient the reader for what is to come.
The social theory of self is a theory of self-other. 
That is to say, the basic consideration is that of the self- 
other relationship. Self develops only in relation to others, 
in a process whereby these others are internalized, or car­
ried along in the imagination as invisible companions.
Thinking, according to this theory, is nothing more than 
silent conversation with these others, and self itself 
matures by making successive accomodations to them.
This is a strictly subjective theory, in that the 
other is real only as he exists in the imagination of the 
self; imagined existence is the only criterion of reality.
Self creates other in the imagination (which includes per­
ception) and responds to its own creation. This is the 
essence of self-activity.
Naturally, others are internalized out of social ex­
perience. The kind of others that exist in a man's mind re­
flect the character of the people he has consorted with, 
though of course the reflection is never a mirror image.
6But the self is active and creative, and out of the raw mate­
rial presented to it— concrete others, immediately present—  
it fashions highly generalized and ideal others which serve 
then as internal representatives of society-at-large and 
the moral order.
One thing is of special importance about these others: 
the attitudes they hold toward the self, for and against.
These are the source of self-feeling— a unique class of feel­
ing states distinguished by their reference to self, or what 
is called self-consciousness. These feelings can be either 
pleasurable or painful, but in either instance they are all 
of a kind, and distinct from spontaneous, or un-selfconscious 
feelings. Self-feelings are intensely impelling and are the 
moving force behind most of what we usually refer to as 
social motives. Pride and humiliation (positive and nega­
tive self-feeling, respectively) are examples.
Idea of self evolves as a part of the self in the 
context of the self-other relationship as these ideas and 
attitudes of the others are internalized. It is a reflec­
tion of the ideas held by the others about the self, rein­
forced by the accompanying attitude. This produces within 
the self a self-conscious, reflexive agency which Mead (193^ ) 
calls the "me." It is the cognitive side of self-feeling.
In Baldwin's analysis special emphasis is placed on 
a particular facet of the self-other relationship, which he 
calls the dialectic. This is a very simple consideration.
7yet one basic to the growth process. According to this no­
tion, the relationship between self and other is generally 
one of power. There is an ascendent party and a receptive 
one. This relationship is established naturally, at least 
for the child, who by his nature assumes a receptive attitude 
in the presence of anyone who goes beyond his understanding 
and an ascendent one when faced with an other whom he can 
grasp fully. The receptive attitude is that of humility and 
is the first step in the dialectic process leading to person­
al growth. The dialectic progresses as the person strives 
by active imitation to experience for himself what is unknown 
in his ascendent other and ends when he has expanded his ex­
perience and is able to read back into others this new mean­
ing. There is a natural humility, then, at the beginning of 
the dialectic and a natural assertiveness at its end; and the 
growth of the self continues in this same manner throughout 
life.
For McDougall the main organizing force within the 
self is the self-regarding sentiment, which is nothing more 
than the person's feelings about himself, taken as an organ­
ized whole. McDougall's contribution is to show how the self 
develops as it is made sensitive to successively higher forms 
of social discipline, beginning with physical punishment and 
ending on a moral note with praise and blame. Each stage 
marks a development in the self-regarding sentiment and is 
characterized by a particular kind of self-feeling. And at
8each stage, of course, the self is especially sensitive to 
certain attitudes and holds itself to certain standards. At 
each stage the dependence of self on other is clear and un­
mistakable.
Cooley is perhaps the most articulate of all the 
four men in his analysis of the self-other relationship, and 
especially so in describing the internalizing of conversa­
tions with others and in his accounting of the "looking glass 
self." The latter is a very simple but very important con­
ception of a very common kind of self-other relationship in 
which the attitude of the other works its effects on the self. 
One looks for one's reflection in the mirror of the other, 
sees too how well or poorly it is received, and responds ac­
cording to the reception with the appropriate self-feeling. 
Cooley emphasizes that this can go on in a more or less con­
scious way, but that by and large the person is not aware of 
it except for the resultant self-feeling. We do not very 
often consciously pose before the mirror, but we are con­
cerned with our image more than we care to admit.
As for Mead, his work is profound and many-sided, but 
there is one aspect that is especially relevant to the topic 
at hand. This is his distinction between the "I" and the 
"me," as more or less distinct but interdependent aspects of 
the self. The "me" represents within the self the internal­
ization of attitudes that others hold or have held toward the 
self. It is reflexive : the self objectifying itself, so to
9speak. Whereas the "I" is subjective, spontaneous, and 
naive. According to Mead, the "I" responds to the "me," but 
it is an unpredictable and wholly un-selfconscious response. 
And this is the basis for the distinction: the "me" is ob­
jective, reflexive, self-conscious; the "I" is spontaneous, 
un-selfconscious, free. Of course, the self-concept is to 
be found among the reflexive, "me" activities.
CHAPTER II 
THE SOCIAL THEORY OF SELF
James Mark Baldwin 
The core of Baldwin's analysis of the "social self" 
lies in what he calls a "dialectical" process involving a 
self-other relationship. This is an endlessly continuing 
process, for we are always involved in some relationship 
with an "other," whether he be a concrete person in our im­
mediate neighborhood or an idealized version of a person, 
real or hypothetical, which serves us as a model, or the 
like. But the dialectic is not just a self-other relation­
ship; it is a principle of growth. It consists of three 
stages, the first of which is called the "projective.
This stage is marked by the person's recognition of the other 
as in some way going beyond him, as having qualities that he 
does not possess himself, and, thus, as being unpredictable 
in some ways. It leaves him feeling very uncertain about the
^Projective is used here in a way almost diametrical­
ly opposite to that in which it is commonly used today. To­
day we say that we are "projecting" when we read our thoughts 
or feelings into somebody else, with the connotation of hid­
den motivation. Divorced from the implication of motive, 
this is much like what Baldwin describes as characteristic 
of the third stage of the dialectic, the "ejective,"
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way he stands with this other person and arouses in him what 
Baldwin calls a "receptive” attitude. Another word for this 
is humility.
Thus begins the dialectic; the recognition in the 
other of something that goes beyond the self is the signal 
for the beginning of an active effort to overcome the uncer­
tainty. According to Baldwin this activity is essentially 
one of imitation, through which the person comes to know 
experiences previously unknown to him. Somehow, by imitating 
the other, the person gains a fuller understanding of the 
activities he throws himself into, and he succeeds, finally, 
in enlarging his experience to the point that he can grasp 
this other. This stage, the second in the dialectic, is 
called "subjective.”
The third stage follows immediately, and is called 
"ejective." After expanding his experience, the person now 
turns around and ejects his experience onto others. He reads 
thoughts and feelings into them in this way, and being cer­
tain of himself now, takes on an assertive attitude toward 
them. He now knows how they feel and what they think and 
can predict what they will do, and is in a natural position 
to dominate just as in the first stage he was in a natural 
position to be dominated. The dialectic is now over; the 
person’s growth experience has ended— though of course it 
will be resumed once again the moment he is thrown into the 
the receptive attitude.
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The notion of the dialectic, then, provides a simple 
little paradigm for personal growth, but it has implications 
that belie its simplicity. For it implies not only that self 
and "other" are social products but that each is essential to 
and contained within the other.
The ’ego' and the 'alter' are thus born together.
Both are crude and unreflective, largely organic. And 
the two get purified together by this two-fold reaction 
between project and subject, and between subject and 
eject. My sense of myself grows by imitation of you, 
and my sense of yourself grows in terms of my sense 
of myself (Baldwin, I899, p. 15).
Thus it is impossible, Baldwin writes, to isolate a person's
thought of himself, and to say that in thinking of himself
he is not essentially thinking of the other also. The way
in which he thinks of the other automatically determines the
way in which he thinks of himself.
In any event, the child learns to be submissive, re­
ceptive, imitative when in the presence of certain people, 
and assertive, controlling when in the presence of others.
But this state of affairs is obviously the simplest possible 
case and one which in life is probably never realized. Or­
dinarily we are not as stereotyped as this scheme implies, 
neither in our behavior nor in our perception, or conception, 
of others. With any given other we may be on one occasion 
assertive and on another receptive, as on different occasions 
he presents himself to us in different ways. As an example 
of this, Baldwin cites the child and his mother. "Sometimes 
he tyrannizes over his mother and finds her helpless; at
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other times he finds her far from submitting to tyranny, and 
then he takes the role of learner and obedient boy" (Baldwin, 
1899, p. 28).
In this way there is introduced a kind of flexibility, 
which carries over to all of social intercourse. For this 
advance is in itself only the first stage of another dialec­
tical process. The child adjusts to the varying aspects of 
the others, but then he turns around and reads his own vari­
ability back into them. As an upshot of this, it becomes his 
business to classify not persons but actions. "He learns the 
signs of wrath, of good humor, of sorrow; of joy, hope, love, 
jealousy; giving them the added interpretation all the time 
which his own imitation of them enables him to make by real­
izing what they mean in his own experience" (Baldwin, I899, 
p. 29).
Now it can be seen that this adaptation too takes 
place within the dialectic as originally outlined. As far 
as the process goes there has been no change, but the self 
itself has changed— has developed, we say. To put it simply, 
the self has grown increasingly sensitive to changes in the 
social situation, and thus increasingly flexible in its adap­
tations to it. It is no longer that father as other evokes 
one kind of self, mother another kind, and little brother 
still a third kind; it is now that stern father evokes one 
kind of self, lenient father another, and so on with all the 
attitudes that father typically assumes. And of course, so
1lf
with all remaining others.
But development continues. Up to this point we see 
our child as possessor of two selves, which we have labelled 
the assertive and the receptive, depending upon whether the 
self or the other is dominant. He is, in short, a two-sided 
creature ; both terms of the dialectic play their role on the 
proper occasion as they are called out by the other of the 
moment. There is no sense of unity here5 the child vacil­
lates with each passing influence. He assumes one self one 
moment and the opposite self the next; he is, in a sense, the 
slave of his immediate companions. But conditions conspire 
to a further development.
To get at this development we must bring in what 
Baldwin calls the "socius." This is nothing more nor less 
than the child's awareness, however dim, of a kind of social 
presence which goes beyond the persons with whom at any moment 
he is in contact. He gains this awareness when he finds that 
they relate to him in a manner that is neither purely asser­
tive nor purely receptive. Thus the child
sees the father pained when he has to administer pun­
ishment, . . .  He finds the mother reluctantly refusing 
to give a biscuit when it is her evident desire to 
give it. He sees those around him doing gay things 
with heavy hearts, and forcing themselves to be cheer­
ful in the doing of things which are not pleasant.
He sees hesitations, conflicts, indecisions, and from 
the bosom of them all he sees emerge the indications 
of something which stands toward these higher persons 
from whom he learns, as the family law, embodied pos­
sibly in the father, stands toward him (Baldwin, 1899» 
pp. 50-51).
Of course the child doesnH really "see" anything.
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the matter isn't nearly so clear-cut as this. In Baldwin's 
terms, "he simply feels puzzled at the richness of the indi­
cations of personal behavior which pour in upon him" (Baldwin, 
1899; p. 51). And the fact that he is puzzled means, of 
course, that the two opposing thoughts of self which at this 
time exhaust the possible kinds of behavior he is able to de­
pict to himself in thought, are inadequate. Thus he is once 
again faced with projective material, behavior which he can­
not understand. And so the dialectic is once again set into 
motion. "The self of habit no less than the self of accommo­
dation^ is thrust aside, as he sees his mother's sorrow when 
she refuses him the biscuit; he cannot act aggressively to­
ward her nor yet sympathetically" (Baldwin, 1899; p. 5D.
But now we must take into account the active intelligence of 
the child. From the puzzling evidence given to his senses 
he is literally forced to generalize a "higher law" governing 
human affairs; otherwise he will be lost in the confusion.
And he comes to embody this "law" in the thought of an "ideal 
person," in a generalized thought of an other who behaves in 
this way. And because this new, ideal thought of other now 
serves as "project," the dialectic that follows is thereby 
modified. That is, the progression is no longer from recep­
tive self (when the material is projective) to habitual or
^"Habitual" and "accommodating" selves are the terms 
that Baldwin finally settles on to designate the polar as­
pects of self. For habitual you can read "assertive" or 
"selfish"; for accommodating you can read "receptive," 
"accepting," "imitative," or the like.
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assertive self (when the material has been subjectivized and 
ejected). Instead it is from the partial selves (both the 
receptive and the assertive) to a unified self. And having 
attained such unity the child is thenceforth prepared to dis­
play the so-called "higher" forms of social and moral behav­
ior .
This "higher law" or "ideal person" is given the name 
socius, and it is embodied in the child in the form of an 
awareness of "something always present, an atmosphere, a 
circle of common interest, a family propriety, a mass of ac­
cepted tradition" (Baldwin, 1899» p. 53). In this way is 
constituted a new "other" in the self-other relationship, 
and with it, of course, a new self; there cannot be the one 
without the other. And just as the new other is a general­
ized, ideal other, so too, and because of it, is the new self 
a generalized, ideal self. Now, this new self is a "recep­
tive" self; the child cannot understand the idealized other—  
not fully, at any rate— cannot anticipate it, cannot find it 
in himself. And so it serves him as a "copy" for imitation 
just as any "project" does. The child, says Baldwin, thinks 
of the copy in this way:
It is not I, but I am to become it. Here is my 
ideal self, my final pattern, my 'ought’ set before me.
My parents and teachers are good because, with all 
their differences from one another, they yet seem to 
be alike in their acquiescence in this law. Only in 
so far as I get into the habit of being and doing like 
them in reference to it, get my character moulded into 
conformity with it, only so far am I good (Baldwin, 1899» 
p. 36).
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In this way, presumably, the self reaches what can 
be called the "ethical" level. The child now has an idea of 
what is "good" and feels obliged to behave according to that 
idea. In a sense this is nothing more than what, in the 
dialectic involving only the partial selves, is called his 
tendency to imitate. The difference is that now it is not 
that the child is faced by a concrete person whom he cannot 
understand (though of course he continues to come upon these, 
too), but rather that he is faced by his own idea of what the 
"ideal" person ought to be like. In the former case we say 
that the child is impelled to imitate the other; in the lat­
ter that he feels obligated to behave in accord with the 
ideal.
To summarize; in all of the above 1 have tried to 
present the general outline of Baldwin's theory of the growth 
of self-consciousness in as brief a manner as possible.
Basic to his theory is the self-other relationship, and, 
within this relationship, the endless dialectic according 
to which personal-social growth is attained. According to 
this view, growth of the person is carried in the development 
of self-thought, or self-consciousness, which,in turn, prog­
resses from its organic origins, through the stage of the 
partial selves— receptive and assertive— to the highest de­
gree of the ideal or generalized self.
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William McDougall 
As a social psychologist, McDougall is much more 
modem in temper than is Baldwin. Whereas Baldwin's writings 
reflect a curiously rationalistic approach to the human 
psyche, McDougall's writings reflect the striving, impulsive, 
instinctive aspects which we are still so much concerned with 
today. But aside from this difference the psychological 
theories of the two men are much alike, at least in regard 
to the origins of the concept of self. In fact, McDougall 
acknowledges his debt to Baldwin on this score and draws from 
his freely. There are differences, though; on the one hand 
McDougall's analysis of the growth of the self-idea is not 
as deep or as detailed as is Baldwin's, whereas on the other 
hand he gives more attention to the problem of showing how 
this concept (the self-idea) contributes to an understanding 
of social behavior, and, in largest context, of the social 
structure itself.
McDougall's full social theory is carried in two 
books— the one here considered, and a later, and companion, 
volume called The Group Mind. However, much of this theory 
has little or no bearing on the problem I have set for my­
self, so I disregard it. Actually, the section that follows 
is drawn almost entirely from one chapter of the Social Psy­
chology; Chapter 7, "The Growth of Self-Consciousness and 
of the Self-Regarding Sentiment."
Self-consciousness we can take to mean the idea of
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self and as equivalent to Baldwin’s "thought of self." But 
the "self-regarding sentiment" requires some elaboration.
To begin with, a sentiment, in McDougall's thought, is an 
organization of emotions or, better of emotional disposi­
tions around an object or a class of objects. Note that a 
sentiment is not an emotion as such or even a compounding of 
emotions; it is not a fact or a mode of experience at all, 
but rather an inferred feature of the organization of mental 
activities. Thus, when a man has developed the sentiment of 
love for a person or object, "he is apt to experience tender 
emotion in its presence, fear or anxiety when it is in dan­
ger, anger when it is threatened, sorrow when it is lost, joy 
when the object prospers or is restored to him, gratitude to­
wards him who does good to it, and so on" (McDougall, 1918, 
p. 128). In a sense, then, sentiments mediate emotional ex­
periences, but they are not the emotions themselves.
Now the self-regarding sentiment is just one among 
the person’s repertoire of sentiments, with this difference; 
that the object around which it forms is the self— or, to be 
more precise, the idea of self. In this sense it is unique, 
and it plays a unique role in the social development of the 
individual. At the same time, both the sentiment and the 
idea of self around which it is organized are themselves 
social products. They develop as a result of constant inter­
play between personalities, between the self and society, and 
because of this, "the complex conception of self thus attained
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implies constant reference to others and to society in gen­
eral, and is, in fact, not merely a conception of self, but 
always of one's self in relation to other selves" (McDougall, 
191b, p. 185).
It must be kept in mind that it is not the idea of 
self and the self-regarding sentiment as such that McDougall 
is primarily concerned with, but rather the way in which they 
serve to regulate the individual's conduct as he grows into 
a social being. In this growth McDougall distinguishes four 
levels of conduct, which, though not clearly delineated, seem 
to follow in invariable sequence, in a rough way, with pas­
sage through each necessary before the individual can reach 
the next higher. These four stages are: (1) the stage in
which instinctive behavior is modified only by the experience 
of pleasure and pain incidentally met with in the course of 
instinctive activities; (2) that in which instinctive behavior 
is modified by rewards and punishments meted out more or less 
systematically by the social environment; (3) that in which 
conduct is controlled mainly by the anticipation of social 
praise and blame; and (4-) the highest stage, that in which 
conduct is regulated by an ideal that enables a man to act 
according to his own notion of "right" regardless of the 
praise or blame of his immediate social environment.
It should be clear that there is no implication of 
"idea of self" in the first two stages of this progression; 
there is nothing more than a kind of hedonic modification of
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behavior, which is just as characteristic of lower organisms 
as it is of man. For this reason I have chosen to skip over 
McDougall’s discussion of these stages and to pick up the 
chain at the point at which the idea of self becomes a 
factor, at the point of transition between the second stage 
and the third.
But the idea of self does not emerge full-blown at 
this point; it too has its origins and development, and these 
must be located and traced if we are to grasp the role that 
the idea later plays in social behavior. To begin with, the 
first step, it seems, is for the child to learn to distin­
guish between "self" and "not-self," McDougall doesn't stop 
to inquire how this is achieved; he simply accepts it and 
proceeds. Going beyond this stage, however, he notes that 
those experiences that are not in some way referred to an 
external world of reality remain to constitute the nucleus 
of the child's conception of himself. But, though in a sense 
these experiences are basic to the self-concept, they none­
theless provide only the primitive beginnings of it, which, 
presumably, would remain in this state if it were not for 
the child's subsequent social intercourse.
In any event, after the child has come to distinguish 
between self and not-self he learns further distinctions 
among the latter objects, primarily that between persons and 
inanimate objects. And going further, he learns to distin­
guish different expressions and gestures of people, and, more
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important, to understand them. In McDougall's view, this 
comes about because of a purely instinctive reaction of imi­
tation excited in the child by the expressions of others. 
These are "doubtless accompanied in some degree by the ap­
propriate feelings and emotions . . . /and in this way the 
chil^ learns to understand in terms of his own experience 
the expression of others, learns to attribute to them the 
feelings and emotions he himself experiences" (McDougall,
1913, p. 189).
As his imitations continue the child learns better 
to differentiate the behavior of others, and at the same time 
he grows more aware of the feelings and emotions that prompt 
it. Eventually he becomes aware that he can play upon these, 
to a certain extent, and his interest in understanding them 
grows accordingly, and especially his interest in attitudes 
directed toward himself. In this scheme McDougall describes 
the same kind of "dialectic" process that is basic to Bald­
win's thinking.
Now it so happens that at this early age the attitudes 
of other persons towards the child are rather freely ex­
pressed, as in praise, reproof, gratitude, anger, and the 
like. Hence, and this is the important point,
as he rapidly acquires insight into the meaning of 
these attitudes, he constantly sees himself in the 
reflected light of their ideas and feelings about 
him, a light that colors all his idea of his self 
and plays a great part in building up and shaping 
that idea; that is to say, he gets his idea of his 
self in large part by accepting the ideas of himself 
that he finds expressed by those about him (McDougall,
1913, p. 191).
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So much, then, for the genesis of the idea of self. 
Having come this far we are now, according to McDougall, in 
a position to consider the transition from the second to the 
third stage of conduct, from that "in which conduct is regu­
lated chiefly by the expectation of rewards and punishments 
. . .  to that in which the mere expectation of social praise 
suffices to regulate conduct" (McDougall, 1913? p. 192).
McDougall asks:
Why is our conduct so profoundly influenced by 
public opinion? How do we come to care so much for 
the praise and blame, the approval and disapproval, 
of our fellow-men? This is the principal problem that 
we have to solve if we would understand how men are 
led to control their impulses in a way that renders 
possible the life of complexly organized societies.
For the praise and blame of our fellows, especially 
as expressed by the voice of public opinion, are the 
principal and most effective sanctions of moral con­
duct for the great mass of men; without them few of 
us would rise above the level of mere law-abidingness, 
the mere avoidance of acts on which legal punishment 
surely follows (McDougall, 1913, pp. 193-19'+).
But it obviously isn't enough to say that a man's 
conduct is regulated by his idea of self and that this in 
turn is shaped by the opinion that others have of him. Idea 
of self is a purely cognitive thing, and no one pretends that 
cognitive states, of themselves, prompt us to do anything, 
much less to conform to the norm established by a public 
external to us. Rather, it is because the idea of self is 
so inextricably bound up with the self-regarding sentiment 
that it has any effect on our behavior. The self-regarding 
sentiment provides the motive power that the idea of self
2^
lacks, and it is in this that McDougall finds the answer to 
his question.
But what about the origins of the self-regarding 
sentiment? Granted that it is bound up with the idea of 
self, how can we account for the particular organization of 
emotional dispositions around this idea? This is a difficult 
problem, but to start on it McDougall takes the view that the 
constituent emotions are originally given as components of 
what he calls the two "self-instincts,"3 To put the matter 
briefly, in man's native equipment there is an instinct of 
"self-assertion" (or self-display) and an instinct of "self- 
abasement" (or subjection), and these are accompanied by the 
emotions of "elation" (or positive self=feeling) and "subjec­
tion" (or negative self-feeling) respectively. In McDougall's 
theory, these are the "givens" out of which, with experience 
and the growth of the self-idea, eventually emerges the sen­
timent of self-regard.
There are two principal varieties of the self-regard­
ing sentiment; "pride" and "self-respect," Of these the 
former is the simpler. It is described by McDougall as an 
expression of the self-regarding sentiment in which the
3This is an expression of his familiar view that 
every instinctive process has a particular emotional feature. 
In an earlier chapter he presents a list of such pairings, 
and though today we look down on this part of his theory as 
giving up too much ground to instinct, I don't think that 
any honest reader can deny that he makes a most impressive 
case for his view in the descriptive sense.
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instinct of self-abasement and the emotion of subjection have 
not been made a part. And how does this come about, and what 
are its consequences in social behavior? McDougall answers 
these questions, more or less, by presenting a hypothetical 
example of a child with a strong instinct of self-display, 
with its attendant emotion, who is never checked, corrected, 
or criticized, but who, rather is allowed to lord it over 
those about him.
The self-regarding sentiment of such a child would 
almost necessarily take the form of an unshakable 
pride, a pride constantly gratified by the attitudes 
of deference, gratitude, and admiration, of his 
social environment; the only dispositions that would 
become organized in this sentiment of pride would be 
those of positive self-feeling or elation and of 
anger (for his anger would invariably be excited 
when any one failed to assure towards him the atti­
tude of subjection or deference) (McDougall, 1913, 
p. 197).
Put in terms of that child's experience and character, to say
that he has "pride" means that he
would be incapable of being humbled— his pride could 
only be mortified ; that is to say, any display of his 
own shortcomings or any demonstration of the superior­
ity of another to himself could cause a painful check 
to his positive self-feeling and consequent anger, but 
could give rise neither to shame nor to humiliation, 
nor to any affective state, such as admiration, 
gratitude, or reverence, in which negative self­
feeling plays a part (McDougall, 1913, P. 19#).
This does not mean that such a child would be indif­
ferent to, or immune to, public opinion; far from it. He 
might well
revel in the admiration, flattery, and gratitude of 
others . . .; he would be indifferent only to their 
moral approval. And on the other hand he might well
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be painfully affected by scorn or ridicule (McDougall,
1913, p. 198)
but at the same time be little affected by moral censure.
And all of this because of his incapacity to experience nega­
tive self-feeling, for it is this alone that can give him 
his respect for the superior power of the moral code. In 
this connection, McDougall notes that "for most of us the 
admiration and the scorn or ridicule of others remain strong­
er spurs to our self-feeling than praise or blame, and still 
more so than mere approval and disapproval" (McDougall, 1913> 
p. 198).
But most of us— those of us with a "normally devel­
oped moral nature"— are not "proud" in this sense; rather 
we have what McDougall calls "self-respect," That is, our 
self-regarding sentiment contains an element of negative 
self-feeling; it is the presence of this feeling that dis­
tinguishes self-respect. Now, negative self-feeling (subjec­
tion) is normally evoked as an innate disposition of the mind 
by the presence of "any person who makes upon us an impression 
of power greater than our own, and . . , its impulse is to 
assume an attitude of submission towards that person, an at­
titude that becomes in the child, as his intellectual powers 
develop, an attitude of receptivity, of imitativeness and 
suggestibility" (McDougall, 1913, p. 199). This is what is 
meant by the statement that the disposition to subjection 
has been incorporated into the self-regarding sentiment.
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In this way, then, does McDougall account for the
submissiveness that leaves the child open to the influence
of those about him. But there are wider implications, too,
for what the child learns in one situation he generalizes
to others. Thus the attitudes that he learns out of his
contact with particular persons (in this case, those who
have authority over him) are eventually generalized onto
what it is that they represent; namely, society at large.
Once the child has grown aware of, or learned to represent,
this agency, it continues thereafter to loom up vaguely and
largely behind him— and of course it is there behind all of
us. Now, because society at large is so indefinably vast it
serves better than any individual, or group of individuals,
to evoke this emotion and this attitude. For,
with a collective voice and irresistible power /_ it_y 
distributes rewards and punishments, praise and blame, 
and formulates its approval and disapproval in uni­
versally accepted maxims. This collective voice ap­
peals to the self-regarding sentiment, humbles or 
elates us, calls out our shame or self-satisfaction, 
with even greater effect than the personal authori­
ties of early childhood, and gradually supplants 
them more and more (McDougall, 1913» P* 201).
In sum, then, the exercise of authority over the 
child gives to his sentiment of self-regard the form of self- 
respect that is capable of humility,^  or negative self-
^The distinction between humility and humbleness must 
be made clear. The person with humility is one who is capable 
of "negative self-feeling" but at the same time is one who has 
achieved "self-respect." The humble person is the diametric 
opposite of the "proud" one; he has not achieved self-respect 
but is capable only of negative self-feeling.
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feeling, and in so doing it "renders the developing individ­
ual capable of profiting by example and precept, by advice 
and exhortation, by moral approval and disapproval" 
(McDougall, 1913? P. 202).
But even self-respect does not account fully for our 
great regard for praise and blame; something more is needed. 
To find this "something more," McDougall turns to an ap­
praisal of the impact that praise and blame ordinarily have 
upon us. The effect is complex; praise and blame are not 
like admiration, which brings only satisfaction to our posi­
tive self-feeling. Rather, "insofar as praise is accepted 
as praise, it implies our recognition of the superiority of 
him who praises and an attitude of submission towards him" 
(McDougall, 1913, p. 203). The distinction is brought out 
clearly in this example. We all feel free in our admiration 
of a great man. There is no impertinence felt or intended, 
and he no doubt derives his own kind of pleasure from the 
attention. However, it would be considered a great imper­
tinence if we were to praise him, and he would resent our 
attention rather than find pleasure in it. It is always for 
the "superior" to praise and for the "inferior" to accept 
praise. And for us, in the role of inferior, "since our ac­
ceptance of praise involves the recognition of the superior­
ity of him who praises, praise invokes our negative self­
feeling ; but since it is an acknowledgement by our superior 
of our merit it also elates us" (McDougall, I913, P. 203).
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In other words, it produces in us a state that McDougall 
terms "bashfulness"— a state in which the emotions of the 
two instincts are imperfectly fused, but one which is highly 
pleasant because both are being satisfied simultaneously. 
Moral approval gives us a complex satisfaction of a similar 
kind, with society serving in the superior role.
Blame and disapproval also produce a complex effect.
They check the impulse of self-assertion and evoke 
the impulse of submission._. . . /and the emotional 
state that results ranges^/ according as one or other 
of these effects predominates, from an angry resent­
ment, in which negative self-feeling is lacking, 
through shame and bashfulness of many shades, to a 
state of repentence in which the principal element 
is negative self-feeling (McDougall, I913, p. 20*+).
Now in all of this we can see a considerable range 
of emotions, and we can attribute this to the organization 
of the two orders of self-feeling within the sentiment of 
self-regard. But again more is needed, McDougall asserts, 
to explain the magnitude of the effects that praise and 
blame, or the anticipation of praise and blame, have on us. 
To put the matter briefly, what is needed is that the senti­
ment undergo a process of "moralization." And in this 
process two factors seem to play a part; the first is fear, 
the second is sympathy.
Pear, of course, is fear of punishment, and it is 
normally established during the early days of childhood, 
when, according to McDougall, punishment is the only effec­
tive disciplinary force. This is during the second stage of
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the person's development, before the idea of self has had 
much of a chance to form, at which time conduct is regulated 
strictly by the rewards and punishments meted out by the 
child's social environment. Later, in the normal course of 
things,
punishment is gradually replaced by the threat of 
punishment in the successively milder forms of the 
frown and angry word, the severe rebuke, blame com­
bined perhaps with reproach, and moral disapproval.
. . .  2. But J  all of these owe something of their 
effectiveness to the fact that they retain the na­
ture of, because they continue to produce the effects 
of, the early punishments; that is to say, they evoke 
some_degree of fear. . . . /^ And so, as a consequence, 
fear/ enters into and colors our emotional attitude 
towards authority in whatever form we meet it, ren­
ders us capable of awe and reverence in our personal 
relations, and is one of the principal conditions of 
the effectiveness of moral disapproval as a regu­
lator of conduct (McDougall, 1913, p. 205).
Sympathy also serves as a moralizing influence. In 
its primitive form, sympathy is defined as "suffering with, 
the experiencing of any feeling or emotion when and because 
we observe in other persons or creatures the expression of 
that feeling or emotion" (McDougall, 1913, p. 95). It is a 
kind of induction process and is one of the innate disposi­
tions of the mind.
Out of this primitive sympathy and the "gregarious 
instinct" arises active sympathy, which is "the tendency to 
seek to share our emotions and feelings with others" 
(McDougall, 1913, p. 95). Exactly how this comes about is 
never made quite clear; but in any event the important thing 
is active sympathy itself, and specifically its role in the
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regulation of social behavior. McDougall admits that this 
poses a difficult problem, and he makes no suggestion that 
he has solved it. But as an approach to the problem he 
describes active sympathy in this fashion;
It involves a reciprocal relation between at 
least two persons ; either party to the relation not 
only is apt to experience the emotions displayed by 
the other, but he desires also that the other shall 
share his own emotions; he actively seeks the sym­
pathy of the other, and, when he has communicated 
his emotions to the other, he attains a peculiar 
satisfaction which greatly enhances his pleasure 
and joy, or, in the case of painful emotion, dimin­
ishes his pain (McDougall, 1913, p. 173).
There are those, even, who cannot bear to suffer affective
experiences in isolation; who, in fact, cannot experience
any emotional state without at the same time experiencing
the powerful desire to share it sympathetically.
In its effects on the person, then, active sympathy 
impels him
to seek to bring the feelings and emotions of his 
fellows into harmony with his own . . . /or, when 
this is impossible_j_/ to bring his own into harmony 
with theirs. Hence he finds no satisfaction in con­
duct that is displeasing to those about him, but 
finds it in conduct that pleases them, even though 
it be such as would otherwise be distasteful, re­
pugnant, or painful to himself (McDougall, 1913,
p. 206).
Herein are to be found the primitive and powerful forces 
that lead to conformity.
In McDougall's view, then, the moralization of the 
self-regarding sentiment is accounted for by these two in­
fluences: the fear of punishment and the impulse of active 
sympathy. These give us— most of us, anyhow— "that regard
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for the praise and blame of our fellow-men and for moral ap­
proval and disapproval in general, which is so strong in most 
of us and which plays so large a part in shaping our senti­
ments, our character, and our conduct" (McDougall, 1913, p. 
207).
To summarize McDougall's views; the central concept 
is that of the sentiment of self-regard. This sentiment 
consists in its core of the two self-instincts of self- 
assertion and of self-abasement; and intimately attached 
to these are the self-feelings of elation and subjection, 
respectively. The integration of these polar opposites into 
the self-regarding sentiment produces self-respect; when the 
negative side is not integrated along with the positive the 
result is pride. The former allows for humility and submis­
sion; the latter does not. The cognitive side of the self- 
regarding sentiment is, of course, the idea-of-self, or self- 
consciousness. The individual pretty much accepts as his 
idea of himself the ideas expressed toward him by the sig­
nificant persons in his life.
Once established, the idea-of-self and the self- 
regarding sentiment govern much of the person's social and 
moral conduct, making him sensitive to, or resistant to, 
public opinion. The actual moving forces, however, are the 
self-feelings, positive and negative.
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Charles Horton Cooley 
"It is my general aim," Cooley writes in the second 
sentence of his book, "to set forth, from various points of 
view, what the individual is, considered as a member of a 
social whole" (Cooley, 1910, p. 1). This statement sets the 
general tenor of the book: the individual is the object of
attention, but it is the individual as he is played upon by 
social forces. This amounts to more than just the truism 
that the individual and his society are inseparable; it is a 
very careful and detailed analysis of the particular kind of 
relationship implied by "inseparability." In short, it is a 
serious attempt to show how society acts on the individual 
to make him what he is.
Cooley begins his analysis with the child at play, 
attributing to him the capacity for a vague, undifferentiated 
kind of feeling state in some way connected with’social 
intercourse. He calls this simply "social feeling," and 
locates it at the heart of the child's primitive sense of 
sociability. The child's delight in companionship is said to 
be an illustration of this sort of thing, and as such is said 
to be an expression of an inherited tendency. But it is more 
than just the capacity for such feelings; it is the need for 
them as well, and this, too, is inherited.
Sociability, then, is by nature joyful to the child; 
it gives him "an innocent unself-conscious joy, primary and 
unmoral, like all simple emotion" (Cooley, 1910, p. 51).
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And having tasted of this joy it is natural for the child, 
when left to himself, to continue it, or to re-create it, by 
means of an imaginary playmate. In Cooley's system of thought 
this marks an important step forward.
It is not an occasional practice, but, rather, a 
necessary form of thought, flowing from a life in 
which personal communication is the chief interest 
and social feeling the stream in which . . . most 
other feelings float. . . . these conversations are 
not occasional and temporary effusions of the imagi­
nation, but are the naive expression of a socializ­
ation of the mind that is to be permanent and to 
underlie all later thinking. . . . Speaking broadly, 
it is true of adults as of children, that the mind 
lives in perpetual conversations (Cooley, 1910, 
pp. 52-5^).
Of course there is the problem here of what form 
these "conversations" take before the child is able to talk. 
Cooley wonders about this too, briefly, but then passes over 
it on the grounds that, in any event, "after a child learns 
to talk and the social world in all its wonder and provoca­
tion opens on his mind, it floods his imagination so that 
all his thoughts are conversations. He is never alone" 
(Cooley, 1910, pp. 52-53). Later, as the child grows into 
an adult these imaginary conversations change in character, 
from the thoughts spoken aloud of the child to the silent 
reflections of the adult; but the conversation itself never 
ceases. In this sense, thought remains ever a social process.
But thought, even in this conversational sense with 
an imagined companion, is not complete in itself; the impulse 
to communicate is inseparably attached to it. Just wherein
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the roots of this ’’impulse" lie, Cooley doesn’t state, but 
we can assume, I suppose, that it is in the same "social 
feeling" that we were given to begin with. In this connec­
tion, Cooley remarks on the psychological doctrine that 
"every thought involves an active impulse as part of its 
nature" (Cooley, 1910, p. 56) and, carrying this over to the 
socially developed forms of thought here in question, he ex­
plains that this impulse "takes the shape of a need to talk, 
to write, and so on; and if none of these is practicable, it 
expends itself in a wholly imaginary communication" (Cooley, 
1910, p. 56).
In short, the childlike need to think aloud or to 
somebody never leaves us.
It is only by imparting that one is enabled to think 
or to be. Everyone , . . necessarily strives to com­
municate to others that part of his life which he is 
trying to unfold in himself. It is a matter of self- 
preservation, because without expression thought can­
not live. Imaginary conversation . . . may satisfy 
the needs of the mind for a long time. . . . But, 
after all, the response must come sooner or later or 
thought itself will perish. The imagination, in time, 
loses the power to create an interlocutor who is not 
corroborated by any fresh experience (Cooley, 1910,
pp. 58-59).
On the other hand, in a sense all real persons are 
imaginary creations; "To be imagined is to become real, in 
a social sense" (Cooley, 1910, p. 60). That is, a person 
can be real to us, and we can communicate with him, only to 
the extent that we are able to imagine an inner life (i.e., 
thoughts and feelings), to attribute to him.
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Communication with an imaginary companion, then, is 
the essence of thought, and the kind of communication we have 
depends upon the kind of companion we imagine. This imagined 
person is called a "personal idea." Now, this idea is a 
cognitive thing, as we have considered it so far, but it can­
not be kept divorced from feeling. As the personal idea 
grows, as our imagined companion grows richer in character, 
we experience a corresponding growth (or richness, or com­
plexity) in the character of the emotions that it (he) 
evokes. These higher-order feelings are called sentiments, 
"these finer modes of feeling, these intricate branchings 
or differentiations of the primitive trunk of emotion" 
(Cooley, 1910, p. 80).
With the affective life brought into the picture, 
now, the personal idea takes on a fuller meaning and a new 
kind of relationship becomes possible— that which is called 
sympathy.
The personal idea in its more penetrating inter­
pretations involves sympathy, in the sense of primary 
communication or an entering into and sharing the mind 
of someone else. When I converse with a man, through 
words, looks, or other symbols, I have more or less 
intelligence or communion with him, we get on common 
ground and have similar ideas and sentiments (Cooley,
1910, p. 102).
Thus sympathy is essentially the equivalent of the personal 
idea, with the feeling quality given added emphasis.
As might be imagined, the personal and social impli­
cations of this are great. For, among other things, the 
person's capacity to imagine others— to create personal
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ideas— is a measure of his capacity to understand. "One’s 
range of sympathy is a measure of his personality, indicating 
how much or how little of a man he is. . . . What a person is 
and what he can understand or enter into through the life of 
others, are very much the same thing" (Cooley, 1910, p. 106).
Clearly, sympathy in this sense is a requisite for 
social existence. Without it we have no contact with others, 
and the avenues are closed along which we affect and are af­
fected by the lives of others. Thus, social power depends 
upon sympathetic communication.
A person of definite character and purpose who 
comprehends our way of thought, is sure to exert power 
over us. He cannot altogether be resisted; because, if 
he understands us, he can make us understand him, 
through the word, the look, or other symbol, which 
both of us connect with the common sentiment or idea; 
and thus by communicating an impulse he can move the 
will (Cooley, 1910, p. 108).
With this as background, Cooley turns to his central 
topic; the social self. The reader must keep two things in 
mind as he reads the next few pages. First, that the "social" 
modifier of self is redundant ; in Cooley's view there is no 
self that is not a social product, and his ground for adding 
the adjective is simply that it gives emphasis to this fact. 
Second, that the notions of the conversational basis of mental 
activity are understood to apply throughout. Though Cooley is 
not explicit about this matter, I think it can be said that 
these are the elemental processes out of which the social 
self emerges.
But just what is the "social self"? Cooley defines
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it as "simply any idea, or system of ideas, drawn from the 
communicative life, that the mind cherishes as its own" 
(Cooley, 1910, p. 1^ 7)» It is, then, an idea, but it has an 
accompaniment of feeling— it is, after all, a cherished idea—  
and it is this feeling which appears to be its distinguishing 
feature. Cooley calls it the "my-feeling or sense of appro­
priation" (Cooley, I9IU, p. 137). In any event it is inde­
finable .
There can be no final test of the self except the 
way we feel; it is that toward which we have the 'my' 
attitude. But as this feeling is quite as familiar to 
us and as easy to recall as the taste of salt or the 
color red, there should be no difficulty in understand­
ing what is meant by it. . . . /Thus^/ one need only 
imagine some attack on his 'me,' say ridicule of his 
dress or an attempt to take away his property or his 
child, or his good name by slander, and self-feeling 
immediately appears (Cooley, 1910, pp. I'+O-l^ -l).
However, self-feeling isn't necessarily the feeling of hurt 
or outrage. "Self-feeling of a reflective and agreeable sort, 
an appropriative zest of contemplation, is strongly suggested 
by the word 'gloating.' To gloat, in this sense, is as much 
to think 'mine, mine, mine,' with a pleasant warmth of feel­
ing" (Cooley, 1910, p. 143).
Now, implicit in the idea of self, and thus in self- 
feeling, is the idea of an other. There would be no "mine" 
for the gloating man if there were no recognition, at the 
same time, of a "your" which it serves to offset. In fact, 
Cooley appears to take the position that there can be no 
mental activity at all without some reference to an other 
person. "It is doubtful whether it is possible to use
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language at all without thinking more or less distinctly of 
someone else" (Cooley, 1910, p. 149). This reference to 
others may be "distinct and particular, as when a boy is 
ashamed to have his mother catch him at something she has 
forbidden, or it may be vague and general, as when one is 
ashamed to do something which only his conscience . . . de­
tects and disapproves; but it is always there" (Cooley,
1910, p. 151).
This brings us to the familiar doctrine of the 
"looking-glass self." For in what Cooley calls a very large 
and interesting class of cases, the reference to the other 
takes the form of an imagination of how one's self appears 
in the mind of that other, and the kind of self-feeling that 
is aroused stems from the attitude toward this appearance 
that is attributed to that other mind. There are three 
stages to this process. There is, first, "the imagination 
of our appearance to the other person; s^econd_j/ the imagina­
tion of his judgment of that appearance; ^and thirdj/ some 
sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification"
(Cooley, 1910, p. 1?2).
Actually, Cooley admits, the looking-glass analogy 
breaks down at the second stage. It isn't the reflection of 
ourselves in the mind of the other that evokes our self­
feeling, but rather the attitude we impute to him, the imag­
ined effect that our imagined appearance has upon him. That 
this is so is demonstrated by the fact that the character of
4o
the person in whose eyes we see ourselves reflected has a 
good deal to do with our self-feeling. Cooley's illustra­
tion:
We are ashamed to seem evasive in the presence of a 
straightforward man, cowardly in the presence of a 
brave one, gross in the eyes of a refined man, and so 
on. . . . ^And againj/ a man will boast to one person 
of an action— say some sharp transaction in trade—  
which he would be ashamed to own to another (Cooley,
1910, p. 153).
How do we come to be so sensitive to our reflection 
in the glass? Cooley offers the following genetic explana­
tion.
To begin with, the child naturally observes the move­
ments of the tending adults very closely, and eventually he 
comes to see a connection between his own actions and changes 
in these movements. In short, he grows aware of his power 
over these persons. In Cooley's words, the child then 
"appropriates" these actions over which he seems to have 
control and he tries to do things with his new possession.
In order to achieve this he soon learns to apprehend person­
ality and to foresee its operations. In the very young child 
this takes the form of simple and obvious devices to attract 
attention. In order to do this, of course, the child must 
first learn to please the adult of his choice, and in doing 
this he often gives the impression of "affectation"; that is, 
an undue preoccupation with what the other person thinks of 
him. By the third year, Cooley states, the child "claims 
intimate and tractable persons as mine, classes them among
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his other possessions, and maintains his ownership against 
all comers" (Cooley, 1910, p. 1^ 6). In this way the social 
susceptibility of the character is set; the germ of the so­
cial self is conceived. And from this time on, "strong joy 
and grief depend upon the treatment this rudimentary social 
self receives" (Cooley, 1910, p. 166).
From this point on, development consists essentially
in
a greater definiteness, fulness (_ sic 7. and inward­
ness in the imagination of the other’s state of mind.
A little child thinks of and tries to elicit certain 
visible or audible phenomena, and does not go back of 
them; but what a grown-up person desires to produce 
in others is an internal, invisible condition which 
his own richer experience enables him to imagine 
(Cooley, 1910, p. 167).
And along with this, on the side of social action there is
progress from the naive to the subtle.
A child obviously and simply, at first, does 
things for effect. Later there is an endeavor to 
suppress the appearance of doing so; affectation, in­
difference, contempt, etc., are simulated to hide the 
real wish to affect the self-image. It is perceived 
that an obvious seeking after good opinion is weak 
and disagreeable (Cooley, 1910, p. 168).
In this respect a rather striking difference can be 
observed between young boys and girls.
Girls have, as a rule, a more impressible social 
sensibility; they care more obviously for the social 
image, study it, reflect upon it more, and so have 
even during the first year an appearance of subtlety, 
finesse, often of affectation, in which boys are com­
paratively lacking (Cooley, 1910, p. 171).
But among boys there are great differences in this regard.
k2
Some of them have a marked tendency to finesse 
and posing, while others have almost none. The latter 
have a less vivid personal imagination; they are unaf­
fected chiefly, perhaps, because they have no vivid 
idea of how they seem to others, and so are not moved 
to seem rather than to be; they are unresentful of 
slights because they do not feel them, not ashamed 
or jealous or vain or proud or remorseful, because 
all these imply imagination of another's mind 
(Cooley, 1910, p. 173).
Cooley describes this kind of child as being "non-moral."
He "neither sins nor repents, and has not the knowledge of
good and evil. We eat of the tree of this knowledge when we
begin to imagine the minds of others, and so become aware of
that conflict of personal impulses which conscience aims to
allay" (Cooley, 1910, pp. 173-174).
But there is even more to be said about this state
of affairs, for though simplicity is a charming quality both
in children and in adults, it isn't necessarily an admirable
thing, nor is affectation altogether a thing of evil. In
order to get along in this world, a person has to have
that imaginative insight into other minds that under­
lies tact and savoir-faire, morality, and beneficence. 
This insight involves sophistication, some understand­
ing and sharing of the clandestine impulses of human 
nature. A simplicity that is merely the lack of this 
insight indicates a sort of defect (Cooley, 1910, 
p. 174).
However, he notes that there is another kind of simplicity, 
"belonging to a character that is subtle and sensitive, but 
^whic^ has sufficient force and mental clearness to keep in 
strict order the many impulses to which it is open, and so 
preserve its directness and unity" (Cooley, 1910, p. 174).
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Force of character notwithstanding, the essential 
feature of social growth seems to be not the ordering and 
unifying capacity of the mind, but rather its tendency to 
disequilibrium. Thus, for example, whenever our imagination 
goes out toward another person's point of view our present 
equilibrium is disturbed by his influence. "In the presence 
of one whom we feel to be of importance there is a tendency 
to enter into and adopt, by sympathy, his judgment of our­
self, to put a new value on ideas and purposes, to recast 
life in his image" (Cooley, 1910, p. 175). That is, in a 
sense, a "weakness" in our character, for we unconsciously 
substitute someone else's attitude toward us for a more "in­
dependent" self-appraisal; but at the same time it gives us 
our capacity for growth. In the first instance— with refer­
ence to weakness— Cooley illustrates his point with a hypo­
thetical case of what he calls a very "sensitive" person in 
social contact with another whom he takes to be of importance.
If the other appears to think him well-informed on 
some recondite matter, he is likely to assume a learned 
expression; if thought judicious he looks as if he 
were, if accused of dishonesty he appears guilty, and 
so on. In short, a sensitive man, in the presence of 
an impressive personality, tends to become, for the 
time, his interpretation of what the other thinks he 
is (Cooley, 1910, p. 175).
And the same time, and in the second instance, this submis­
siveness or sensitivity may lead to personal growth.
So long as a character is open and capable of 
growth it retains a corresponding impressibility, 
which is not weakness unless it swamps the assimi­
lating and organizing faculty. . . . Indeed, if one
sees a man whose attitude toward others is always 
assertive, never receptive, he may he confident that 
man will never go far, because he will never learn 
much (Cooley, 1910, p. 1?6),
All of the above pertains to our social contacts with
particular people, especially those who stand ascendant over
us, and to the self-feeling that these contacts generate.
But there is, it seems, a kind of "projection" of this same
process out onto society at large. This gives us a special
kind of self-feeling, "a vague excitement of the social self
more general than any particular emotion or sentiment"
(Cooley, 1910, p. 176). The mere presence of people and
the awareness of their observation of us often arouses "a
vague discomfort, doubt, and tension. One feels that there
is a social image of himself lurking about, and not knowing
what it is he is obscurely alarmed" (Cooley, 1910, p, 1?6),
But Cooley doesn't develop this point any further.
Concluding his discussion, he remarks that social
self-feelings remain "the mainspring of endeavor and a chief
interest of the imagination throughout life" (Cooley, 1910,
p, 177). And this is so despite the fact that many people,
perhaps most, "scarcely know that they care what others think
of them, and will deny, perhaps with indignation, that such
care is an important factor in what they are and do. But
this is an illusion" (Cooley, 1910, p, 177)» as, he avers,
anyone is made keenly aware who has suffered through disgrace
or any kind of social failure.
^5
In much the same manner as Baldwin and McDougall, 
Cooley writes of two self-attitudes; the aggressive or self- 
assertive and the shrinking or humble. "The first indicates 
that one thinks favorably of himself and tries to impose that 
favorable thought on others; the second, that he accepts and 
yields to a depreciating reflection of himself, and feels 
accordingly diminished and abased" (Cooley, 1910, p. 199).
The manifestations of each of these two selves are varied; 
for example, there are many "phases" of the aggressive self, 
which are expressed in the following manner. "First, in re­
sponse to imagined approval we have pride, vanity, or self- 
respect; second, in response to imagined censure we have 
various sorts of resentment" (Cooley, 1910, p. 199). The 
humble self, he adds, may be treated in a similar manner, 
but he leaves the matter untouched. The analysis that fol­
lows is devoted exclusively to the aggressive forms: to
pride (and vanity), self-respect, and self-reverence, which 
form a kind of hierarchy from low to high, though in a way 
not made explicit.
To begin with pride: we know pride, according to
Cooley, when, in an aggressive attitude we imagine approval 
of ourselves in the minds of others. Or, under the same con­
ditions, we may react with vanity, depending upon "the more 
or less stable attitude of the social self toward the world 
in which it is reflected" (Cooley, 1910, p. 200). Pride, of 
course, is more stable than vanity. The person who is proud
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"feels assured that he stands well with others whose opinion
he cares for, and does not imagine any humiliating image of
himself" (Cooley, 1910, p. 201), However, his stability
easily passes over into rigidity, for "he carries his mental
and social stability to such a degree that it is likely to
narrow his soul by warding off the enlivening pricks of doubt
and shame" (Cooley, 1910, p. 201).
In contrast, vanity indicates a
weak and hollow appearance of worth put on in the en­
deavor to impress others. . . .  It is the form social 
self-approval naturally takes in a somewhat unstable 
mind, not sure of its image. The vain man, in his 
more confident moments, sees a delightful reflection 
of himself, but knowing that it is transient, he is 
afraid it will change (Cooley, 1910, p. 203).
He has, writes Cooley, no stable idea of himself, and
will swallow any shining bait. . . . ^He will/ gloat 
now on one pleasing reflection of himself, now on an­
other, trying to mimic each in its turn, and becoming, 
so far as he can, what any flatterer says he is, or 
what any approving person seems to think he is (Cooley,
1910, p. 203).
The vain man is thus rather chaotic in make-up, and emphati­
cally so as compared with the proud one. But in this con­
nection Cooley notes once again that it is disequilibrium 
that brings social growth. And so, "vanity . . . may indi­
cate an openness, a sensibility, a teachability, that is a 
good augury of growth. In youth, at least, it is much pref­
erable to pride" (Cooley, 1910, p. 205).
In any event, what is called self-respect incorpor­
ates both these tendencies. The self-respecting man is
^7
more open and flexible in feeling and behavior than 
one who is proud; the image is not stereotyped, he is 
subject to humility; while at the same time he does 
not show the fluttering anxiety about his appearance 
that goes with vanity, but has stable ways of think­
ing about the image, . . . and cannot be upset by 
passing phases of praise or blame (Cooley, 1910, p. 205).
Because of the stability and continuity of his character,
"he always feels the need to and cannot be guilty of
that separation between being and seeming that constitutes
affectation" (Cooley, 1910, pp. 205-206).
Self-reverence is the highest form of self-respect; 
it is self-respect when the idea of self is that of a higher 
or "ideal" self. Reverence for this self implies resistance 
to any influence that the mind considers to be inconsistent 
with itself. This is illustrated in the man who "must feel 
that the final arbiter is within him and not outside of him 
in some master, living or dead" (Cooley, 1910, p. 211). In 
a sense, then, the self that is revered is a private rather 
than a social self, but in a sense only. For, looking at the 
matter closely, we see that our ideals of character are built 
up out of thoughts and sentiments developed in social inter­
course, largely
by imagining how our selves would appear in the minds 
of persons we look up to. These are not necessarily 
living persons; anyone that is at all real, that is 
imaginable to us, becomes a possible occasion of 
social self-feeling; and idealizing and aspiring 
persons live largely in the imagined presence of 
masters and heroes to whom they refer their own 
life for comment and improvement (Cooley, 1910,
pp. 211-212).
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In time, however, the original models disappear; "the per­
sonal element in these ideals, having performed its function 
of suggesting and vivifying them, is likely to fade out of 
consciousness and leave only habits and principles whose 
social origin is forgotten" (Cooley, 1910, p. 212).
In sum: Cooley makes most clearly explicit the self-
other relationship as the basis of development, and describes 
growth and resulting character in terms of internalized con­
versations with imagined others. Like McDougall, he posits 
polar opposites of self-feeling, aggressive and humble, which, 
apparently, arise naturally with the establishment of the 
idea of self. One very common way in which the relationship 
between self and other is structured is expressed in the no­
tion of the looking-glass self. This term implies a three- 
stage process whereby self first imagines how it appears to 
the other, then imagines how that appearance is judged, to 
which, finally, it responds with self-feeling. Self-feeling 
is the central issue with Cooley; he considers it "the main­
spring of endeavor and a chief interest of the imagination 
throughout life" (Cooley, 1910, p. 177). In his view we are 
thoroughly and deeply immersed in an effort to preserve a 
respectable self-image and are constantly and anxiously ap­
praising our reflection in the "mirror."
George Herbert Mead
Mead is usually connected most intimately with Cooley 
in his point of view, and I think that the grounds for this
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will become apparent to the reader in what follows. There 
are, of course, differences between them, but for the most 
part Mead seems to accept the notion, put forth by Cooley, 
of the continuing conversation of gestures, and of the 
"looking-glass self." In fact, he devotes much of his thought 
to an elaboration and modification of these notions. But 
whereas Cooley is typically discursive and empirical. Mead 
is systematic and profound— characteristics which one might 
expect of a man who is perhaps more the social philosopher 
than the psychologist.
The book itself is divided into three parts, accord­
ing to the headings in the title: Mind, Self, and Society.
Here we shall take up only the first two of these, beginning 
with Mind.
Mind is a social product; it presupposes social inter­
action, without which it would not take form.^ This is Mead’s 
message throughout. Now, social interaction means "communi­
cation," in one form or another— or rather, it demands or 
establishes the conditions for communication. People have 
contact with one another ; that is what is meant by social 
interaction in the most primitive sense. And people in con­
tact with one another must inevitably develop some sort of
^There would be some kind of mental activity, of 
course; we must assume this as an inherent characteristic of 
the human animal. What Mead means is simply that this ac­
tivity would not take the form, or follow the pattern, of 
mental activity as we, with our "minds" know it— without 
benefit of social interaction.
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communicative system. One person makes a "gesture" and others 
about him respond to it; this is the simplest form of communi­
cation, and the meaning of the gesture is given by the re­
sponse to it. Thus, a man may raise his hand in anger, and 
the meaning of this gesture, at this level, is the response 
to it that the threatened man makes, whether it be fear, 
anger, or what not. Communication of this sort goes on with­
out language, of course, but for human social life it has 
serious shortcomings; in fact, without language, social life 
as we know it— and socialized people as we know them— would 
be impossible.
But a distinction must be made between a gesture and 
a significant gesture. A gesture can be defined simply as 
the beginning of a social act which serves as a stimulus for 
the response of another person involved in that act. For a 
gesture to be significant, however, it must be such as to 
call out the same response in the person making it as it does 
in the one to whom it is made. The importance of such a ges­
ture is at once apparent, for it puts the two parties to the 
communication on the same ground— leaves them with a more or 
less identical stimulus to respond to— and thus it is the 
source of what we call "understanding," "sympathy,"^ and the 
like.
^In fact, sympathy as we usually use the term, and sig­
nificant communication, amount to about the same thing. We 
sympathize with another, we say, when we in some way experi­
ence as he does, or when we have "access" to the state he is 
in. This is essentially what distinguishes significant com­
munication.
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To give an illnstration from Mead;
If somebody shakes his fist in your face you as­
sume that he has not only a hostile attitude but that 
he has some idea behind it. You assume that it means 
not only a possible attack, but that the individual 
has an idea in his experience. When, now, that ges­
ture means this idea behind it and it arouses that 
idea in the other individual, then we have a signifi­
cant symbol (Mead, 193'+> p. 5^).
In other words, "we have a symbol which answers to a meaning
in the experience of the first individual and which also
calls out that meaning in the second individual. Where the
gesture reaches that situation it has become what we call
'language'" (Mead, 193^? p. 46).
Language and significant gesture, then, are one and 
the same thing; it is language that carries these ideas that 
exist in both the gesturer (speaker, writer), and the one to 
whom the gesture is directed (listener, reader). And this 
is so. Mead tells us, because language, or the vocal gesture, 
is the one form of gesturing which comes back to the gesturer. 
When we talk we hear ourselves talk, and in this way we are 
put into the position of the person to whom we are talking. 
Therefore, "the import of what we say is the same to our­
selves as it is to others" (Mead, 1934, p. 62).
Now there is consciousness and there is self-con­
sciousness, and it is important to keep the difference between 
the two clearly in mind. Consciousness refers simply to that 
which is subjective— or to experience itself— and is as char­
acteristic of the infant, and, presumably, of the dog and cat.
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as it is of the socialized adult. However, self-consciousness 
is another matter altogether, and it arises, with "mind," when 
we have learned to respond to our own gestures in the same 
way that we respond to the gestures of others (or in the same 
way that others respond to them). As noted above, this con­
stitutes reflective thinking, or reason. "Reason cannot be­
come impersonal unless it takes an objective, non-affective 
attitude toward itself; otherwise we have just consciousness, 
not self-consciousness" (Mead, 193^? p. 138).
The importance of this distinction lies in the fact 
that in our social life we generally experience this "reflec­
ted" kind of consciousness rather than the "direct" kind.
The individual experiences himself as such, not 
directly but only indirectly, from the particular 
standpoints of other individual members of the same 
social group, or from the generalized standpoint of 
the social group as a whole to which he belongs. For 
he enters his own experience as a self or individual, 
not immediately, not by becoming a subject to himself, 
but only in so far as he first becomes an object to 
himself just as other individuals are objects to him 
. . .; and he becomes an object to himself only by 
taking the attitudes of other individuals toward 
himself (Mead, 193^, p. 138).
Thus, our experienced selves arise out of significant communi­
cation, in the same process that gives us reflective think­
ing, or "mind."
The process of thought— or mind— can be described as 
a kind of internalization of the conversation of gestures.
In the beginning we talk to others, and hear what we are say­
ing, and, because we have been brought up with the same
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values as have the others, we respond implicitly to what we 
are saying in much the same way as the others respond ex­
plicitly. In this way we build up an organization of re­
sponses within ourselves, and this organization gives us our 
capacity for thought.
Only in terms of gestures which are significant 
symbols can thinking— which is simply an internalized 
implicit conversation of the individual with himself 
by means of such gestures--take place. The internal­
ization in our experience of the external conversa­
tion of gestures which we carry on with other indiv­
iduals in the social process is the essence of 
thinking (Mead, 193^ ? p. 4?).
Thinking, then, or "mind," is characterized by what 
Mead calls reflexiveness; the individual, in his mind's eye, 
sees himself as others see him. In this way he "objectifies" 
himself, or puts himself in the place of others and assumes 
their attitudes towards himself and his behavior.
Clearly, too, reflexiveness is the essential condi­
tion for the development of self-consciousness as well, or 
of what Mead calls, simply, the self. This, in fact, is 
definitive of self: it is an object to itself, a meaning
that the word, self, is said to imply; for self is reflexive. 
Mead notes, and means that which can be both subject and ob­
ject. The individual with a'keif," then, is an individual 
who can "get outside" himself in such a way as to become an 
object to himself. This is achieved, of course, in the way 
described above, with the development of language and sig­
nificant communication.
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It should be noted that there is in all of Mead's 
writings an emphasis on the cognitive element of self-con­
sciousness, as opposed to the feeling element emphasized by 
Cooley. In this Mead is quite explicit.
Emphasis should be laid on the central position 
of thinking when considering the nature of the self. 
Self-consciousness, rather than affective experience 
with its motor accompaniments, provides the core and 
primary structure of the self, which is thus essen­
tially a cognitive rather than an emotional phenome­
non (Mead, 193^ , p. 173).
In fact, emotion, when it enters the picture, seems only to 
interfere with significant communication. Ordinarily, when 
we are in an emotional state we do not use language to call 
out in others the state we are in. When we shout angrily at 
someone, for instance, we do not intend to call up anger in 
him; and conversely, we are not frightened by a tone which 
we may use to frighten somebody else. In brief, "on the emo­
tional side, which is a very large part of the vocal gesture, 
we do not call out in ourselves in any such degree the re­
sponse we call out in others as we do in the case of signifi­
cant speech" (Mead, 193^? p. 14-9). The emotional response 
is the antithesis of rationality which requires that we 
"know what we are saying, and ^tha;^ the attitude of the 
other which we arouse in ourselves should control what we do 
say" (Mead, 1934-, p. 14-9).
Now the self as it has been described so far con­
sists essentially of the organization of social attitudes, 
the attitudes that the individual takes toward himself for
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having taken the position, or role, of the generalized social 
other. However, this is not the whole story; the full self 
is a larger organization than of just these attitudes; there 
is in addition, at least under certain conditions, a response 
by the person to them. This response is what Mead calls the 
"I" as over against the organization of attitudes, which con­
stitutes the "me." The "me" is the self-conscious person, 
or, in other terms, the objective phase of the full self; 
the "I" is the further response of the individual to his ob­
jective self, or the subjective phase of the full self.
The "me" is the experienced part of the self; it is 
the self-conscious part; and it is, moreover, the predictable 
part inasmuch as it is the incorporation of the attitudes, 
values, etc., of the social group, or groups, of which the 
person is a member. But the "I" goes beyond this; it is the 
person's response to what he has incorporated into his self- 
consciousness, and it is not predictable, not even by the 
person himself. The "I" is always coming into being, and 
since it is the person as "subject" rather than as "object," 
it never comes into consciousness in the same way that the 
"me" does. It is only after the "I" has acted that it comes 
into experience at all, and then in the form of a memory.
We can say, then, that the "I" and the "me" are dis­
tinct but inseparable phases of the self. The "I" responds 
to the "me," and thus it is the latter, the particular or­
ganization of attitudes, that gives the basic structure to
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the self, to which the "I" adds the element of novelty or 
freedom. The "me” is conventional by definition; the "I” 
unique. But the ”1" would never arise at all without a "me" 
of some kind to respond to. "Taken together they constitute 
a personality as it appears in social experience. The self 
is essentially a social process going on with these two dis­
tinguishable phases" (Mead, 193^ > p. 178).
To summarize; Mead's main contribution I take to be 
his concept of the "significant gesture" and his distinction 
between "I" and "me." The former designates gestures which 
call out similar responses in both the one making the gesture 
and the one to whom it is directed. This is a necessary con­
dition for real communication and sympathy, a condition which 
is realized most effectively through use of the spoken word. 
It is for this reason that the word is so important in human 
and social development.
The "I" is the subjective self; the "me" is the ob­
jectified self. The "me" is constituted by the attitudes of 
others toward self that have been internalized. It is the 
socialized side of the self, the side in which the conven­
tional social values are carried. It is the part of the 
self that is under view in the state of self-consciousness. 
The "I" is spontaneous and unself-conscious. It is the re­
sponse that the self makes to the "me," The "me," then, 
provides the basic structure of the self; the "I" provides 
the individual variation and gives the sense of personal
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freedom.
Summary
On the preceding pages I have presented selected 
aspects of the self-theories of my four source-writers. My 
own ideas about the self-concept are derived in their general 
measure from these theories, and are to be taken as a modifi­
cation and, I hope, as a development of them. I think that 
there is much in these theories to recommend them despite 
their old-fashioned flavor and their obvious inadequacies 
when viewed in the light of present day "dynamic" literature. 
The following points, especially, I take to be valid and 
significant.
1. The self-other relationship and the internalized 
conversation of gestures. This is perhaps the most basic 
concept in the theory of the social self. According to this 
concept, the self is constituted by a pattern of internalized 
self-other relations, carried on within the mind as a conver­
sation. In these conversations the other may be explicitly 
recognized or he may be only vaguely implied; he may be a 
concrete presentation of a real other, or a generalized and 
ideal representation of one. The self internalizes and cre­
ates its others in its imagination and proceeds to carry out 
its life in intimate relationship with them. In one form or 
another the other is always present to self; self implies 
other.
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2. The power relationship: assertion and receptiv­
ity. Typically, self-other relationships are structured in 
a hierarchical way with either self or other ascendant, the 
other party receptive. This is a natural structuring based 
upon the perception of the other either as "going beyond" 
the self in his qualities or as being readily comprehensible. 
Power, in this sense, means only the extension of influence, 
and of course it proceeds from the ascendant party to the 
receptive.
3. The dialectic process and humility. Personal 
growth proceeds according to a dialectic process whereby 
felt inadequacies are overcome and the experiential range 
of the person is extended. The dialectic originates in the 
state of humility, or the recognition of one's own limita­
tion with respect to the "other" or to the situation. With­
out humility, which is the experiential counterpart of the 
receptive attitude, there can be no growth.
4. The "looking-glass self" and self-feeling. These 
concepts place special emphasis on certain rather powerful 
effects that are worked on the self in relationship with its 
other. It is a three-stage process: self perceives its ap­
pearance as mirrored in the other; it perceives also the 
other's judgment of that appearance; and to this judgment 
self responds with the appropriate self-feeling, either posi­
tive or negative. The term self-feeling designates a unique 
kind of affective state which has powerful effects on the
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workings of the self-machinery; it is self-conscious feeling.
5. The "I" and the "me." These terms convey the 
fact that self is expressed both as subject ("I") and as its 
own object ("me"), and brings to point a basic distinction 
among self-activities and modes of experience. "I" is spon­
taneous and free, and unaware of its o\m activities. "Me" 
is self-conscious. "Me" is constituted by the attitudes of 
others towards the self, and gives the self its basic struc­
ture. "I" is the self's response to the "me," and cannot be 
said to be structured at all. The distinction between "I" 
and "me" can perhaps best be conveyed in the distinction be­
tween consciousness ("I") and self-consciousness ("me").
CHAPTER III 
THE SELF-CONCEPT: ORIGIN AND FUNCTIONS
In the section that follows, I have presented my 
views on the self-concept, taking as a starting point the 
general theory of self as propounded by the four source 
writers. In essential features, though not in all details,
I hold to the theory they have developed; my notion of the 
self-concept serves only to modify and extend it.
Of course the term self-concept is roughly equivalent 
to what they have called the idea-of-self. It is my posi­
tion, however, that the self-concept does not arise natural­
ly and inevitably out of the self-other relationship, as they 
imply, but out of a more or less clearly defined kind of self- 
other relationship. I hold that the self-concept arises spe­
cifically and only as the self perceives in a significant 
other an attitude held by that other toward the self.
According to the four source writers, the self is 
born unself-conscious, or spontaneous, and grows reflexive, 
or self-conscious, out of social contacts. In this view of 
the matter, spontaneity is taken as the primitive, raw mate­
rial, and the reflexive as the more developed and mature 
state. Mead is the only one of the four who takes the
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spontaneous aspect of the self seriously (his "I"); the 
others remain engrossed with the reflexive aspect and there­
by present a one-sided picture of the self.
It is my thesis that the self develops along its 
spontaneous course until it has to contend with attitudes 
from its significant others. Faced with these attitudes the 
self cannot hold on to its spontaneity, for these attitudes 
arouse self-feeling, or, what is the same thing, make the 
self self-conscious. Self-feelings are of two rather dis­
tinct kinds— feelings of heightened self-esteem (as pride) 
and feelings of self-abasement (as humiliation). The proto­
type of self-feeling is the latter— self-debasement— which is 
the natural response to the rejecting attitude of the other.
The self concept arises in response to this feeling 
of debasement. The self creates a conceptual self possessed 
of whatever qualities are required for it to gain in fantasy 
the satisfactions denied it in real life. The self-concept, 
then, is a compensatory device, created out of a debased 
self-feeling and giving rise to self-satisfaction. It is 
necessarily a glorified and dramatic conception of the self.
Once it is established the self-concept serves as an 
objectified, and, in a sense, "ideal" version of the self.
It carries with it the most intense personal values and for 
this reason serves to regulate the person’s moral and social 
life. At the same time, and in so doing, it destroys his 
natural spontaneity, because it creates within him an
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objective standard to which he must refer his thoughts and 
impulses and by which he judges his conduct. This intro­
duction of a reflexive process in the workings of the mind I 
take to be a very basic modification in the self-structure.
It is part and parcel of the same view that self- 
concept is not an inevitable outcome of the social process.
It is at least theoretically possible for the person to at­
tain maturity still preserving his original spontaneity; 
moreover, it is apparent that some people do in fact preserve 
a good deal of it, others less. The secret of spontaneity 
is an internalized accepting other— that is, one devoid of 
attitudes. So long as the person grows up in such an atmos­
phere and carries around within him only the image of such 
others, he literally does not have the raw material out of 
which to create a self-concept. This is a fact with inter­
esting personal and social consequences.
The Self-Concept
What, then, is the self-concept? First and foremost, 
it is a conceptual representation of the self: a word pic­
ture created in its imagination by the self and to which it 
attends with warm personal interest. It is, obviously, an 
objectified version of the self, even though very much a 
subjective creation. The self-concept is the object of at­
tention in those states that we refer to as self-conscious­
ness. It is interesting to note that in fact it is not con­
sciousness of self that is realized in these states, but
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consciousness of a conceptual representation of self instead. 
Consciousness of self, pure and simple, in the sense of self- 
awareness , is a spontaneous state and a different matter al­
together. This latter state is more accurately described as 
consciousness, with no self-reference, even though, of course, 
the experience is all a creation and a constituent of the 
self.
In this, two features of the self-concept immediately 
show. The first is that it is a cognitive entity; the second, 
that it is reflexive. It is cognitive in that it is descrip­
tive of the self; a word picture carrying with it certain 
qualities held as important by the self. And it is reflexive 
in that the self thereby turns around on itself in the sense 
that it makes this representation of itself its own object.
The self first creates the representation and then fastens 
its attention on it. With this, thinking, feeling, and act­
ing continue apace, but all in the context of, and affected 
by, a continuing reference to the objectified self. This 
creates the effect of the self as spectator, watching its 
own performance.
The self-concept is a cognitive entity, then, and 
it is reflexive. A third feature is that it is evaluative.
It is not simply a description of the self as, say, a dis­
interested observer might describe it. It is a distorted 
picture : the self made dramatic, noble, romantic. It is an
imagined self possessing all of the qualities that the self
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most dearly would love to possess. It is the kind of self 
that would bring from its audience the admiration and ap­
proval that the real self finds vital to its self-esteem.
In this intensely personal, egocentric way the self-concept 
thus represents the person's version of the ideal self—  
though it may not accord in any respect with the ideal that 
he acknowledges in public or the ideal that, even in private, 
he may sincerely feel that he upholds. It is the self of 
wish-fulfillment and fantasy and it is the source of deep 
self-satisfactions. Thus, though it is a cognitive thing it 
has close ties with the emotional life.
Considering these three points together, then, we 
can say that the self-concept represents a unique kind of 
mind activity; the self conceptualizing itself. There are 
various guises that this activity takes. The most clearly 
discernible, perhaps, is what is ordinarily referred to as 
self-styling. By self-styling we refer to the trait of 
labelling the self according to supposed qualities and then 
advertising it is this way. For example, a man may be a 
self-styled individualist, a liberal or progressive, a he- 
man, a Don Juan, a good sport, and so on— even a self-styled 
ne'er-do-well, isolate, or fool. The range of styles a man 
may assume for himself extends full across the range of human 
values, but in one sense all styles are the same: they are
all more or less transparent devices intended to appropriate 
certain qualities to the self. That a good deal of personal
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value is attached to these qualities can readily be deter­
mined, for the style that the person sets for himself is his 
most sensitive point, and he will be intensely disconcerted 
if you are not duly impressed by it and either crushed or 
enraged if you shatter, or even threaten to shatter his pre­
tensions.
But self-styling is only one of the guises that the 
self-concept takes, and the most naive. The self-styled per­
son is under the illusion (perhaps a forced one) that others 
take him seriously in his pretentions. A more perceptive 
person would only be embarrassed by such self-exposure, and 
even though he may entertain the same fine concept of himself, 
and gain the same self-satisfaction from revelling in it, he 
is restrained from advertising the fact by his premonition of 
what would happen if he did. He would become the laughing 
stock of all who knew him. And so, with this to face, the 
concept goes underground, so to speak. That is, it finds ex­
pression in more covert, less easily detected mind activities. 
Daydreaming is one of these activities, and probably the most 
common. The usual daydream, I take it, is a fairly simple 
kind of fantasy which follows a more or less typical pattern. 
James Thurber’s The Secret Life of Walter Mittv (1942) is 
probably as good an example of this as can be found. Subject 
to continued snubs and real and fancied abuses from his wife 
and passers-by on the street, Mitty fills his free time with 
fantasies of himself as a courageous ship’s captain, a cool
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and expert marksman, a distinguished surgeon, and so on--all 
figures of gallant proportions in marked contrast to his own 
humble and inadequate character. And in these roles Mitty 
does great deeds; and, an important point, he does them in 
front of an audience; and this audience recognizes his great 
character for what it is and defers to him with the deepest 
respect and admiration, even with awe and reverence.
But the daydream is still a relatively open expression 
of the self-concept: if not to the public, at least to the
self. There are other forms which are more deeply rooted in 
the self and which do not appear to be at all closely related 
to these rather fanciful and amusingly infantile forms of 
self-indulgence. Thus, the self-concept is to be found at 
the bottom of many of the moral principles by which so much 
of our daily lives are regulated. The man of principle is a 
man with a self-concept, a self-concept that is so well- 
integrated and is so "deep," as we say, that for the most 
part it serves its guiding purposes without drawing attention 
to itself. Also it is individualized, so to speak, in the 
sense that the audience, so visible and important in self­
styling and daydreaming, has disappeared. It is the person’s 
own values that he expresses. And yet, to the extent that a 
man’s moral values are bound up in moral principles to which 
he must adhere on the pain of losing his self-respect, to 
this extent is he only reflecting the moral attitudes of the 
others who are or who once were significant to him. Much
67
that is found in the open self-conceptualizing of the self- 
styler or the daydreamer is abridged in this moral activity; 
yet it is in essence the same process, with the same social 
origin and the same function within the self.
As an example of this, consider the man who is honest 
out of principle. He is honest because his self-respect de­
mands it; because, in the last analysis, he conceives of him­
self as an honest man, and any falling away from his standard, 
either in thought or deed, fills him with anxious unrest; his 
self-esteem is lowered. This appears to be purely a private 
matter; it is only the person's self-respect that is in­
volved ; there is no visible audience. And yet the audience 
is there, even though hidden; for self-esteem based on hon­
esty is only the internal reflection of an earlier self-other 
relationship in which the attitude (esteem) of the other to­
ward the self hinged on honest behavior. In the last analysis 
the principle of honesty, however well internalized and ac­
cepted as a personal value, always has its origins in a social 
relationship and always operates in exactly the same manner 
as other aspects of the self-concept.
So much for moral principles. From these, one could 
go on into the field of social conduct— etiquette, propriety, 
etc.— and show that the same kind of analysis holds, with, 
of course, the appropriate substitution of social for moral 
values, and an adjustment for the special qualities of self- 
feeling which distinguish the social from the moral sphere.
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And no doubt one could go even further to find other expres­
sions of the self-concept, but for present purposes we can 
be satisfied with those I have mentioned. They should give 
the reader a concrete idea of what I have in mind when I use 
the term, and that is all I am concerned with at this point. 
In passing, it should be emphasized that self-concep­
tualizing is a concrete mind activity, and, like all mind 
activities, that it has temporal boundaries and is never 
exactly the same from one moment to the next. The self-con­
cept does not exist as an abstraction or as a permanently 
fixed, continuously functioning agency of the mind. Though 
of course a man's concept-of-self will show a more or less 
consistent pattern over a period of time, the particular 
form that it takes at any particular moment depends in good 
part on the situation he finds himself in— its pressures, 
dangers, and demands. Thus, though it is permissible to 
speak of a man's self-concept, taking it as a whole, what 
is self-concept at any particular moment is generally only a 
relatively small portion of the whole, or he may have none 
at all. From moment to moment the content of the self- 
concept changes, and it may disappear altogether. The "he- 
man" may give up his pretensions temporarily; the self- 
righteous person may occasionally relax; and the "he-man" of 
one moment may be self-righteous the next. There is pattern 
in this, but there is also constant change, so that it is 
always necessary to describe the person's self-concept at
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the moment in question if its function within his personality 
and if his behavior are to be understood.
As a final point here, it is important to note that 
in this view the self-concept is always a positive thing; 
always a concept that raises the self-esteem. One often 
hears it said that a person has a terribly poor picture of 
himself— that he conceptualizes himself as weak, debased, 
unworthy— and observations such as this may be offered to 
refute my contention. In fact, there are philosophies of 
psychotherapy which hold that the goal in therapy is to help 
the client progress from a negative self-concept to a posi­
tive form. Rogers, for example, seems to hold this view. 
However, the words here are misleading. Of course people do 
feel weak and inadequate and do belittle and berate them­
selves, but these do not constitute their self-concept; 
rather, these are the internalizations of the way that their 
others conceive of and feel about them. These are the nega­
tive self-feelings out of which the self-concept arises, but 
they are not the self-concept itself. The latter has a par­
ticular place in the self-structure; it arises in response 
to a particular condition and serves a particular purpose 
and it is always positive.
Attitudes
In current psychological parlance the term attitude 
is used in the most general sense to denote a disposition.
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or "set," to act in a particular way, or in another sense 
as any kind of orientation toward a person, event, idea, or 
the like. But the term is to be used here in a much narrower 
and more specific sense.
First of all, attitudes attach only to people or to 
their institutions or values and are either for or against.
A so-called neutral attitude is no attitude at all; it simply 
bespeaks a man's indifference, or his inability to commit him­
self one way or the other. But beyond this, attitudes are 
for or against in a rather unique way. One can be for a 
person— as in love— or against him and still not hold an at­
titude toward him. We have our likes and our dislikes and 
not all of these are attitudes by any means. What is unique 
about an attitude is that it conveys either approval or dis­
approval. It is, then, a special way of being for or against, 
and it has a special significance both to the self and to the 
self-other relationship.
An attitude is always directed at the self, or ego, 
of another person (or indirectly, at his values and institu­
tions); it is a judgment which in its intent either tears 
down that self or builds it up. Attitudes are either deroga­
tory or enhancing, a debasing of the other or an uplifting.
In the negative sense the best illustration of what I mean is 
the attitude that whites traditionally hold toward the Negro, 
or, to generalize, the feeling that any prejudiced or bigoted 
person has toward the object of his prejudice. This is not
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just a feeling of "being against"; there is hostility in it, 
and rejection. The negative attitude has about it the air 
of sneering or contempt; it belittles the other, and, by 
comparison, aggrandizes the self.
On the other hand, positive attitudes, so-called, 
serve to aggrandize the other— to enhance or support his 
self. In this they are simply the converse of negative at­
titudes. It is a point worth noting, however, that the en­
hancing of the other is not achieved at the expense of the 
self. On the contrary, it serves the self in exactly the 
same way as does the negative attitude: the enhancing of
the other reflects back and enhances the self. One simply 
cannot hold a positive attitude toward a person who embodies 
qualities which, if given appreciation, imply a de-preciation 
of the self: that is, a person who threatens the self. The
person who threatens our self-esteem is never welcome; our 
attitude toward him must be negative; to pretend that it is 
otherwise is hypocricy. On the other hand, we express a 
positive attitude toward the person who has been, or is, re­
sponsible in some way for the raising of our self-esteem.
Thus we may feel flattered by something he has said to or 
about us, or, in a more complicated way, we may feel that he 
represents the triumph of certain social or moral virtues 
which we like to ascribe to ourself, or the triumph of a 
point of view that we identify with. In the former instance, 
the enhancement of self is clear and direct; in the latter
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it comes back to us by reflection, out of identification.
It appears, then, that despite the obvious fact that 
positive and negative attitudes are opposite in nature, they 
have as a common bond the fact that they serve the self in 
much the same way. And their partnership extends beyond 
this, too, for in one important way they are alike in the ef­
fect they have on the self-other relationship. Both bring 
to this relationship the atmosphere of threat and struggle. 
With regard to negative attitudes the effects are striking 
and obvious. It is against human nature to be unaffected by 
scorn and contempt, and especially when it issues from a 
person who is held in high regard or who is in a position 
of authority. Thus the child who is attached to and depend­
ent upon his parents cannot face their expressions of disap­
proval with equanimity. Their attack on his self, however 
unintentional or disguised it may be, is a catastrophic ex­
perience to him. It is not merely an intensely unpleasant 
or painful experience; it is intolerable. And though for 
the adult the effect of such a blow is generally lessened 
by reason of his greater independence and wider attachments, 
he too must find something intolerable in this kind of rela­
tionship. Sorrow and suffering and disappointment, however 
acute and painful, nonetheless have nothing about them of 
this order. They can be accepted, faced up to. They do 
not leave the self feeling demeaned or debased; thus they 
do not arouse within the self any frantic measures for
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defense or retribution. Attitudes do.
Positive attitudes are, of course, much easier for 
the self to accept. To be approved of, praised, especially 
by someone who is important to the self, is an exalting ex­
perience, and one that is far from intolerable. So obvious 
is this that it is easy to overlook the fact that the posi­
tive attitude, too, has certain unsettling effects on the 
self. For though we may bask in the warmth of approving 
glances now, we do not find security in this way, for ap­
proval implies disapproval. This is not a matter of logic 
but one of fact, and a fact that sooner or later makes its 
imprint on every consciousness. The approving person under 
one set of circumstances is the disapproving person when 
these circumstances are not met. The two are simply opposite 
sides of the same coin. Approval and disapproval are psy­
chologically the nearest of kin, and in the heady experience 
of being approved there is always the lingering doubt that 
it will last and the vague apprehension or dread that dis­
approval will follow.
In short, though positive and negative attitudes may 
in some ways be as contrasting as black and white, they pro­
duce certain effects in their object which are much alike. 
When we are subjected to negative attitudes we suffer what 
is called rejection; to positive attitudes, a more subtle 
insecurity.
It is worth noting in passing that what we ordinarily
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refer to as acceptance stands in contrast to both positive 
and negative attitudes. Acceptance is like love; an extra­
ordinarily difficult state to put into words. But the ac­
cepting person does not attack or demean the other's self, 
nor for that matter does he enhance it (though he may give 
it support), nor does he put it under any pressure to perform 
in an acceptable manner. In effect, the accepting person is 
free of attitudes of any sort. This does not mean that he 
is lacking in values or standards or that he uncritically 
accepts all behavior as good, or to his taste. It means only 
that he does not have to preserve or defend his values by de­
basing someone else. One can be opposed to the conduct of 
another person, resent it, feel that it is silly or stupid, 
and still relate to that person in an accepting way. One 
can, in fact, berate him soundly, criticize him with vigor 
and heat, and still, so long as one has no scorn or contempt 
for his self, continue to accept him. One does not reject a 
man simply for thinking him a fool, or a heel, or even an 
ass. One rejects him only when the judgment is accompanied 
by a derogatory attitude, and it is important to note that 
judgment and attitude are quite independent of each other.
Self-Feeling
Self-feeling is the natural response to the percep­
tion of an attitude-toward-self. This holds whether the 
attitude in question is positive or negative.
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By self-feeling I refer to a unique class of feel­
ings, different from what can be called spontaneous feelings 
in origin, in quality, and in their effects on the self. As 
with attitudes, we can speak of positive and negative forms 
of self-feeling. Characteristic of the former is pride, of 
the latter, humiliation.
Spontaneous feelings are those in which there is no 
self-reference, as in anger, joy, satisfaction, and the like. 
In these states the welfare of the self, the way it is being 
received by others, is not at stake. The self is neither 
seeking glory nor praise, nor fearful of humiliation. It is 
unself-conscious, given over completely to participation in 
life's affairs, totally unconcerned with whatever impression 
it may be making on others, not at all involved in building 
up or preserving a good picture of itself either in the minds 
of others or in its own mind. Spontaneous feelings are ex­
perienced by the self only when it "loses itself" in life, 
as we say, when it abandons its need for self-conscious con­
trol and exposes itself— its ideas, feelings, impulses—  
freely to the world.
Self-feelings, on the other hand, always bespeak an 
awareness of the self as it is perceived by, and received by, 
others. And there is in self-feelings always an element re­
flecting this awareness. The self is elated, proud, humili­
ated, smug, ashamed, etc., according as it senses the recep­
tion it gains. Self-feelings always are either an inflating
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of the self-esteem, or a deflating, and they accompany what 
is often referred to as ego-involvement. Self-feelings are 
aroused only by the successes or failures of the self in its 
social struggle with others; its struggle to be recognized 
as outstanding, noble, grand, and the like— as better than 
the next fellow, or at least as good. In short, they are 
egotistical feelings, the feelings of personal worth or 
worthlessness, personal adequacy or inadequacy, personal tri­
umph or defeat. They are the essence of self-consciousness.
Perhaps the difference between the two classes of 
feelings can be shown most clearly by a simple comparison. 
Take, for example, anger, which is spontaneous, and compare 
it with indignation, which is self-feeling. Or compare joy 
with elation, or, perhaps most revealing of all, satisfaction 
with self-satisfaction. These are comparisons between states 
which are roughly equivalent in their feeling-quality except 
for the presence or absence of self-reference.
Consider satisfaction and self-satisfaction. Typical­
ly, we are satisfied when we have achieved some sought-for 
goal. We have worked hard and we have succeeded, and we have 
gained the object of our desire. It is a good feeling, one 
of purest well-being. This is satisfaction, not self-satis­
faction. It would be self-satisfaction only were we to take 
the successful completion as a symbol of our competence and 
worth. We are self-satisfied when we appreciate not our 
achievement and the pleasure it brings us, but ourselves for
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having achieved. Self-satisfaction is a feeling of self- 
enhancement, a pleasure derived from a contemplation of the 
self as a commendable figure. It is, then, a self-centered 
feeling in the strictest sense of the term. Pure satisfac­
tions, on the other hand, contain no reference to self at 
all.
In a sense, then, self-feelings are richer in con­
tent than are spontaneous feelings, and, when positive, add 
a pleasurable excitement that spontaneous feelings cannot 
provide. Unhappily, though, self-feeling always is contam­
inated with a kind of uneasiness which can best be described 
as apprehensive: always— even in its most intensely posi­
tive forms, as, for example, elation. Self-feeling and 
anxiety go hand in hand.
I do not refer here to anxiety in the sense of a 
vague fear, but very specifically as an anxious anticipation 
that the self is going to be debased and rejected. This 
gives to self-feeling a peculiar quality than can only be 
described as intolerable. Such an effect is most clearly 
seen, of course, in negative self-feelings— as the feeling 
of humiliation— but it pervades all self-feeling with a 
greater or lesser intensity. This is psychic pain of a 
unique and powerful sort, and it has unique and powerful 
repercussions on the workings of the mind.
Of course, spontaneous feelings can be painful, too. 
Sorrow, fear, disappointment, grief— all of these are states
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of suffering, but the self can accept them, face up to them, 
with relative equanimity. Self-feelings, on the other hand, 
do not sit so easily. Humiliation, as an example, simply 
cannot be accepted. The self must ^  something to assuage 
the smarting; it cannot sit by quietly and suffer such abuse ; 
the depreciation of the self must be met with some attempt 
at self-defense, self-enhancement, or retribution.
Naturally, positive self-feelings are not such acute 
states of anguish. Nonetheless they too have their unsettling 
effects. Thus elation— perhaps the most intensely positive 
form that self-feeling can take— is distinguished from joy 
specifically by the load of apprehension that it carries.
The elated person is as intensely anxious as he is pleased 
with himself, for he is aware that the glorious self-feeling 
of the moment is a precarious thing, and that the unstinting 
approval he is revelling in may quickly and unaccountably 
change to outright rejection. This awareness is always part 
and parcel of positive self-feeling. It is what contaminates 
the feeling and what distinguishes it so strikingly from pure, 
or spontaneous feelings.
I have stated that self-feelings have a unique and 
powerful effect on the workings of the mind. I shall have 
more to say about this on subsequent pages--beginning in the 
section that follows— but for now let me point out just a few 
things in passing. First, self-feelings are implicated al­
ways in what are referred to, in the clinical world, as ego
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defenses. Pure feelings, on the other hand, never are associ­
ated with these mechanisms. Second, self-feelings provide 
the internal force for the social motives of convention and 
conformity. Again, pure feelings never serve in this way. 
Third, self-feelings give rise to the self-concept, and this, 
once established, is responsible for the evocation of subse­
quent self-feeling. In the next section we turn to a state­
ment of how this comes about.
The Self-Concept; Origins
I have stated that the perception in an "other" of 
an attitude-toward-self gives rise to self-feeling. This 
sequence continues as self-feeling in turn gives rise to the 
self-concept. In the present section I shall try to describe 
this sequence, putting it in the general terms of a hypothet­
ical— and more or less typical--youngster responding to the 
socializing influence of his parents and the adult world.
We go back again to the self-other relationship: the
child as self, and his parents (or other adults, or society- 
at-large) as other. In this relationship the child is almost 
continuously at the receptive pole and thus is subject to in­
fluence. That is to say, his self is in large part what is 
"called up" by these others; what he is at a particular 
moment is in response to, and thus is determined by, the 
features that they present to him. He is, then, in a very 
dependent and vulnerable position, and he is necessarily 
sensitive to the way these others relate to him. In turn,
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these others are usually a good deal concerned with the task 
of molding his young self into the approved social form. For 
parents, this task often raises ticklish issues, especially 
insofar as they construe it as a moral one. Parents vary 
widely in this matter, but in general— at least in our soci­
ety— they perceive a good deal of their child's behavior as 
having moral implications, and they bring their heaviest 
forces to bear on him to see to it that he grows up "good." 
There are, too, a great many issues not exactly moral in 
nature— more properly, social— which nonetheless arouse much 
the same feelings in and much the same efforts from parents. 
Thus, their child must be socially acceptable, he must not 
appear odd, or inadequate, or uncouth, and the like. Parents 
on the whole feel obliged to implant certain values, certain 
standards of conduct, in their children, and whether these 
be moral, in the usual sense, or more generally social, they 
must implant them or face censure from neighbors and society 
at large, and feelings of shame and guilt from within.
Parents are deeply involved, then, in the decency 
and propriety of their children. Their self-esteem rises 
and falls in good part with their child's conduct, either as 
it meets or surpasses the moral and social standards of their 
community, or as it more or less flagrantly violates or falls 
below them. Clearly they perceive their child's potential 
for indecency and impropriety as a grave threat, and they 
muster all of their resources to keep it in check.
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One of the most powerful of these "resources" is 
the attitude that is called forth by their child's behavior 
and brought to bear against him. I think that it is safe 
to state that on no other issues are attitudes so univer­
sally aroused in parents as they are on these issues of 
moral-social behavior. Just why this is so is beyond the 
scope of this paper ; we can be content here with the simple 
observation.
In any event, the child ordinarily does have to con­
tend with the attitudes of his parents; and as I have noted 
above, he naturally and inevitably responds with self-feel­
ing. Praise and blame, admiration and belittling, applause 
and derision— any glimpse that the child may get of his par­
ents' approval or disapproval of him, whatever guise it may 
take, arouses his self-feeling, positive or negative.
The self-concept arises directly out of negative 
self-feelings. In order to find relief from the intolerable 
apprehension that they cause him, the child turns to the 
world of imagination and creates a conceptual version of 
himself— a version in which he finds a measure of self-satis­
faction. It is a simple and relatively straightforward se­
quence. Negative self-feeling gives rise to self-concept, 
which in turn elicits positive self-feeling. It is all an 
imaginative, creative bit of mind-work, with no regard for 
the hard facts of reality. The self creates the kind of 
conceptual version that suits its fancy, and naturally the
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qualities it attributes to itself vary with the nature of 
the self-feeling that it suffers. In a sense, the self-feel­
ing creates a need, and the self-concept satisfies it. Thus, 
the feeling of inadequacy gives rise to a self-concept that 
is gloriously adequate; the feeling of humiliation to one 
that is grandly triumphant; the feeling of shame to one that 
is dramatically vindicated; and so on. Thus, the self-con­
cept is in a sense directly the opposite of the real self, 
and it serves as a more or less adequate cover-up for what 
the latter feels most acutely as its real defects.
It should be noted that in all of this one can detect 
the presence of an audience. The entire sequence revolves 
around one, and is a more or less deliberate play at winning 
its applause. At first this audience is the immediate pres­
ence of the parents, or other significant adult figures, but 
as these are internalized, and as other persons take on sig­
nificance to the child, the audience itself grows imaginary 
and increasingly complex. The other then becomes a pattern 
of others, some real, others generalized and ideal, some 
immediately present, others removed, and sometimes present 
only in the form of vague injunctions and demands. Nonethe­
less, despite the very elaborate growth in the structure of 
the audience, and thus in the particular qualities assumed 
in the self-concept, the nature and the function of the lat­
ter remain constant. And so long as the child— and later 
the adult— has to contend with an audience which disapproves.
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he will resort to it. Naturally, the person who is saddled 
with others all of whom continuously and stridently express 
their disapproval will resort to it most of all.
In this sequence it is important to note the crucial 
role of the attitude. It is the perception in the other of 
an attitude-toward-self that originally creates this se­
quence, and which precipitates it later on (though in the 
latter instance it often is the imagined attitude of inter­
nalized others). Should, then, a child be fortunate enough 
to grow up among adults, all of whom accept him without 
qualification, such a sequence should never be established. 
Thus it is conceivable that a child could grow into manhood 
entirely lacking in self-concept, with a mental life totally 
free and spontaneous. But of course the chances of anyone 
meeting with such charmed circumstances are highly unlikely, 
to say the least.
Personal and Social Implications
Once established, the self-concept serves as a 
powerful regulatory agency within the self. Whatever the 
self does, whatever its thoughts, feelings, impulses, or 
actions, it does with one eye on its idealized version of 
itself; and the quality of the self-feeling that it experi­
ences is determined by how well these standards are met. 
Self-concept, then, places the self under obligation to 
comply with its own demands, and the punishment that it metes 
out to itself should it fail is severe: shame, humiliation.
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■guilt, self-contempt, and the like. The danger of punish­
ment then remains a constant threat and it keeps the self 
always on the alert lest it should impulsively incriminate 
itself.
The self-concept works thus from within. But it also 
makes the self quite sensitive to public opinion and thus 
serves in a second way as a form of socialized self-control. 
For the self, issues relevant to the pretensions of the self- 
concept are especially touchy, and criticism in these areas 
has especially devastating effects. This is so because all 
of the qualities attributed to the self in the conceptualized 
version actually cover up sore spots; where the person pre­
tends to be strongest he is actually weakest, so that even 
a hint of criticism or suspicion is enough to cause him great 
alarm and to make him re-double his efforts to demonstrate 
to himself and his public that his pretension is the real 
thing.
In sum, then, the self-concept applies a more or 
less continuous pressure on the self to control its activi­
ties on pain of self-disapproval: shame, self-contempt,
and the like. However, the control it achieves is a very 
shaky thing, for the pressure exerted in this way often is 
not great enough to exact compliance. In the determining of 
self-activities other factors play a role, and often they 
are so impelling that the self-concept may appear completely 
ineffectual.
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One of these factors is shame, or modesty. Much of 
the time what we like to think about ourselves in private 
we modestly declaim in public. Part of this, no doubt, is 
due to a realistic appraisal of ourselves and a recognition 
that however much we may like to see ourselves as noble and 
dashing or otherwise impressive, in day to day actuality we 
are usually anything but. But there is more to the matter 
than this, for often there is something surreptitious about 
the way we hide the concept which we hold. We would be em­
barrassed if we were found out, for we know that if others 
were aware of our pretensions they would greet us with hoots 
of laughter. And so for the most part the self-concept is 
kept pretty well hidden from prying eyes, even though, para­
doxically, in the imagination it flourishes most virogously 
in public view.
Another factor working to undermine the regulating 
effects of the self-concept is our remarkably well-developed 
capacity to see ourselves and our behavior according to our 
idealized conception of ourselves, no matter how poorly we 
may act. It must be emphasized here that the self-concept 
is a subjective thing, and that it is not our behavior— as 
seen objectively by others— that must accord with it, but 
rather our private accounting of our behavior; which is an­
other matter altogether. There is a subjective cycle estab­
lished in this. The same forces that originally led to the 
creation of the self-concept continue to operate within us
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to distort our self-observations so that from our own point 
of view our behavior usually seems to give credence to our 
cherished views.
It so happens, then, that grandiose self-concept and 
patently inadequate and shabby behavior may co-exist within 
the same self with surprising comfort. And of course to the 
extent that this is true, the controlling and directing force 
of the self-concept is weakened, and no doubt there are some 
people in whom it has almost no effect whatever. Nonethe­
less, despite this important qualification it remains true, 
in general, that ^  some degree the self-concept does have 
a regulating effect on the self-activities and that in most 
instances this effect is considerable.
On the social scene, a significant part of this self­
regulation goes under the names of convention and conformity. 
The internalizing of social conventions and the disposition 
to conform to the current norm provides much of the cement 
which holds societies together in the day to day contacts 
of their peoples. These are the hidden— for the most part—  
values and the basic psychological agreements which not only 
permit social affairs to run smoothly, but also serve as the 
grounds for much of society’s common emotional life.
In ordinary usage the terms conventional and conform­
ist are often used interchangeably, and, from the strictly 
social viewpoint there is perhaps some justification for 
this. Any attempt at psychological analysis, however, must
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begin with a clear distinction between the two.
As applied to the psychological make-up of the in­
dividual, the term conventional implies a rather thorough 
identification with the traditional values of society. The 
conventional person accepts these as his own, believes in 
their ultimate validity or meaningfulness, and commits him­
self to their support. The essence of conventionality, then, 
is a subjective state, something not readily visible from 
the outside. It is a particular kind of internal dynamics, 
and not to distinguish between it and the external manifes­
tation only blurs the issue. Thus, the man who dresses ac­
cording to the prescribed "convention" and who follows the 
typical daily routine of business and social activities is 
not necessarily conventional for so doing. What decides the 
issue is the motivation that underlies the behavior, and the 
feeling that accompanies it. The truly conventional person 
gains a certain feeling of security and of self-satisfaction 
out of the socially conventional act just in knowing that it 
is conventional, and, what is perhaps even more important, 
is made uneasy at the thought of any deviation from it, or 
any impulse toward the unconventional. He is self-conscious 
about the act and feels, though usually in only the vaguest 
way, that his self-respect depends on it. In short, he is 
tied down to his conventional behavior by powerful forces 
within him from which he cannot easily escape.
Once a particular convention has been accepted it
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persists with great vigor, even though the person may change 
social circles and live among those who hold to different 
standards. The conventional person has a certain strength 
of character; he can hold to his convictions against the 
force of public opinion. It is not a life-or-death matter 
that those around him give allegiance to different values.
He may not enjoy his predicament; he may feel uncomfortable 
and resentful, and may harbor great prejudice against the 
outsiders; yet he does not feel crushed by his isolation nor
feel self-contempt for his seeming oddity. He maintains his
old standards, holds on to his "principles," and does not
suffer undue temptation to compromise.
The conforming person, on the other hand, has no 
such enduring qualities. To conform is to take on the qual­
ities appropriate to the immediate situation, with no other 
consideration. The only standard to the conforming person 
is consensus. The act of conforming is one in which the 
mind process is dominated by the need to have reached cer­
tain conclusions, to have identified with certain values or 
opinions or feelings; in short, to have taken on an appear­
ance of accord with those significant people who are on the 
scene now. This is not merely a superficial accord, for the 
appearance deceives the self as well as observers. Real 
conformity is a deep and pervasive way of responding to a 
social situation; it engulfs the self; the self is what it 
pretends to be, heart and soul. Thought, feelings, impulses;
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all of these are subjected to amazing transformations, with­
out any seeming disturbance in the psychic apparatus. The 
critical faculty is suspended and consistency with the past 
is never even considered. In a sense, the conforming person 
has no history; he is what the situation of the moment makes 
of him.
Actually, then, the difference between the conven­
tional person and his conforming brother is striking. The 
conventional person is strong, in a sense, but rigid. The 
conformist is weak but flexible. But the difference goes 
deeper than this; the conventional person is strong but 
rigid and the important issues in his life are moral; the 
conforming person is weak but flexible and the important is­
sues in his life are social.
The difference, then is profound, amounting almost 
to an opposition in the person's orientation to life and its 
values. The conventional person lives in a world of right 
and wrong and tries to tread the straight and narrow path of 
righteousness. Everything he does has some moral implication 
and he remains always more or less aware of this fact even 
though he often may be unable to state just what the issue 
is. The standards he has internalized are arbitrary and ab­
solute and he does not challenge them. He is conscience- 
driven, and suffers his worst punishment— self-condemnation 
— when he fails to obey its demands.
On the other hand, the conformer has little problem
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with his conscience. Righteousness is not an issue with 
him.' He is a social animal; his standards are social stand­
ards, and his joys and displeasures all are social in origin 
and character. The conventional person is, of course, a 
social being too, but his is a social world shot through 
with moral commands and sanctions, and relative to the con­
former he is much more concerned with his moral principles 
than with social rewards. The conformer, on the other hand, 
is relatively free from the moral problem, and thoroughly 
engrossed in the quest for social approval. Naturally, this 
freedom relieves him of much of the burden that the conven­
tional man carries. Yet it is doubtful that he enjoys an 
easier life, because in escaping the moral predicament he 
creates a new one in the social sphere. In a sense, he 
"moralizes" his social life. That is to say, he interprets 
his social experience in a way analagous to the moral inter­
pretation that the conventional person makes of his experi­
ences. His social life becomes not just a means for attain­
ing pleasure and relaxation, but a means for proving himself 
or for finding security. His self-feeling hangs in the bal­
ance, attached to his social prowess— his popularity, his 
belongingness— just as in the conventional person it is at­
tached to moral achievement. Thus, the conventional person 
who is isolated or unpopular may be lonely and uncomfortable, 
but that is all. The conforming person in the same predica­
ment suffers acute distress, bordering on the catastrophic.
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Such a state is analagous to guilt in its impact on the 
sufferer and in its repercussions on his mental life, though 
of course the strictly moral quality is lacking. Thus, 
though the conforming person in his rampant sociability 
makes himself relatively free of moral issues and moral 
pressures, his freedom is illusory. The very emphasis he 
places on social life transforms it into something that is 
more than social, and makes him prisoner to it. And so, in 
one way at least, the conventional person actually has the 
easier time of it, for though he has absolute and arbitrary 
standards to live up to, he knows what they are, for the 
most part, and gains a measure of security in his awareness 
that they will never change. And once he has established 
the proper controls over his impulses he can usually live a 
fairly free life, without fear of consequences. He knows 
security. But the conformer has no security, and by the 
nature of things never can have it. His only standard is 
consensus, and as this shifts with each change in fashion 
so too must he if he is to avoid rejection, or being left 
out. His, then, is a life of eternal and anxious vigilance.
It is my contention that both conventional and con­
forming behavior is mediated by the self-concept, and that 
the differences between them stem from a difference in the 
structure of the self-concept and in the experiences trirough 
which it was internalized.
With the conventional person, the self-concept is
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relatively solid and enduring. Though in its particular 
qualities it is dependent upon the stimulation of the im­
mediate situation, in its general features it is well-estab­
lished, and independent of the situation. This means simply 
that for the person in question the others whom he has in­
ternalized, and his general and idealized version of the 
other, dominate his mind. They are the ones he must please, 
the ones whose response to him is most responsible for the 
rise or fall of his self-feeling. The other immediately 
present is less important. Probably no one can ever be com­
pletely immune to the attitude that any other person may ex­
press toward him, yet for the conventional person the effect 
that the immediately present person has can be understood 
only in the larger context of his relationship with his in­
ternalized, generalized others. Thus, being sneered at is 
never a pleasant experience; however, if the person who 
sneers is one whom the internalized others themselves would 
sneer at, the effect of his attitude is significantly al­
tered. In fact, the experience may be taken as evidence to 
be presented to the internalized others that the self does 
in fact have the qualities that they desire him to have.
This does not make the sneer a pleasurable thing to bear, 
but it does lessen the sting and it even provides support 
for the self-esteem.
In any event, the conventional person has internal­
ized a generalized other, or a pattern of others, who
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represent very definite values and who play a very active 
part in his mental life. They are important to him, and 
his self-concept has been shaped in accord with their stand­
ards. It must be assumed that their standards have been 
conventional standards, for the most part, and that they 
ordinarily expressed their disapproval of him on evidence 
of unconventional behavior. Out of repeated expressions of 
this kind arises a self-concept claiming, and proclaiming, 
just those conventional qualities for the self as had earlier 
been so frequently questioned and under suspicion. In this 
way is a more or less conventional self-concept handed down 
from generation to generation, and convention itself per­
petuated.
What is characteristic of the conventional person, 
then, is the persistence in his mind of a powerful other, 
or group, or pattern, of others, on whom he remains depen­
dent; that is, to whom his self-feeling is most profoundly 
sensitive. It is this internalized relationship, this es­
sentially unchanging conversation with respected superiors 
who know where they stand, that gives him his consistency 
and his convictions. Because they remain important to him 
his self-concept remains through his life essentially as it 
was originally cast.
With the conforming person the development clearly 
follows a different course. The act of conforming obviously 
indicates the enormous power of the person immediately
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present, and the relative lack of influence of the internal­
ized others. The self-feeling of the conforming person seems 
to hinge directly on how he is received by the person in 
front of him now, or the particular group he is in at the 
moment. It is not that he is any more sensitive to, or re­
sponsive to, the person immediately present than is the con­
ventional person, rather, it is that his self-feeling is 
more directly and more exclusively determined by the concrete 
presence. The matter here is quite a bit simpler than with 
the conventional person. The latter, I have said, takes 
final refuge, finds ultimate support and justification, in 
his internalized others, and the scorn of the person immedi­
ately present, if he is of the wrong sort, may only add to 
his self-justification. The righteous man who is laughed 
at by the sinner is more than ever convinced of his right­
eousness, and his virtuous self-concept is only strengthened.
The conforming person, however, has no such remote 
and basic support. He depends almost completely upon the 
person available to him at the moment; his self-feeling is 
almost altogether at the mercy of this person. He has no 
stable self-concept with definite and usually virtuous quali­
ties; rather it is indiscriminately and amorphously social. 
Any sign of disapproval from anyone will touch it off, and 
it will assume whatever guise appears acceptable to the par­
ticular audience. This is a very infantile stage, in a 
sense; it is as if the conforming person has never attached
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himself to any one person or group, never given himself over 
to anyone to be shaped, never committed himself to anyone.
In any event, his self-concept shows no indelible imprint 
from any particular relationship. It has no individuality, 
no striking emphasis or dominant theme.
As a result, the self-concept of the conforming 
person serves as a regulating agency only in a most irregu­
lar and "unstable" way. As the qualities of the self-concept 
change more or less willy-nilly with changes in the qualities 
of the others immediately present it naturally cannot promote 
consistency or adherence to lasting standards. The potential 
self-concept of the conforming person is almost limitless; 
whatever value is adopted by or accepted by his group is 
quickly reflected in his self-concept. In its workings, the 
self-concept of the conforming person serves in exactly the 
same way as does that of the conventional person; it differs 
only in its chaotic lack of structure, its indiscriminate 
responsiveness to all others and all values.
But this statement is obviously an exaggeration, and 
so is much of what else I have written about the conventional 
and conforming character. I have written so far about hypo­
thetical persons, and of course no such persons exist. In 
the case of conventionality, no one ever internalizes a con­
ventional code for every single aspect and incident of life. 
His self-concept never incorporates all of the qualities re­
ferred to in his society as conventional. He may be utterly
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conventional in one sphere of life and yet completely free 
from the conventional in others. Some situations may arouse 
the self-conceptualizing activity within him, whereas others 
do not, the pattern, of course, being an individual matter. 
What the particular pattern is depends upon the values that 
the person has internalized, on how he has taken his experi­
ences with the various people who have been important to 
him, resolving the conflicts between their respective points 
of view and integrating them into a unity of his own. It 
is a unity for the person, but from society's point of view 
it invariably will be incomplete, and full of gaps, and con­
taminated with distortions. This is a process that depends 
upon the attitudes of others for its raw material, and 
naturally the specific content of the self-concept, the 
particular range of values that it covers, depends upon the 
particular set of attitudes that the self has had to contend 
with. Thus, even the most convention-bound person, the one 
most thoroughly indoctrinated with the traditions of his 
society, one whose self-concept most nearly represents the 
conventional values of that society— even such a person will 
have his individual side, his non-social quirks and uncon­
ventionalities.
Similarly with the conforming person. No one is 
completely flexible in his standards, completely indiscrim­
inate in his sensitivity to others. The notion of a person 
whose self-concept changes chameleon-like with every change
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in social context is of course absurd. For one thing, prob­
ably no one grows into any culture without undergoing some 
of the experiences that create the stable self-concept of 
conventionality. Compared with the fully developed concept 
of the truly conventional person, this may appear as only a 
primitive or infantile remnant, yet to the extent that it 
has been incorporated, certain absolute standards will be 
maintained and complete social relativity avoided.
But beyond this, even the full-blown conformer has
his limits. He is sensitive to the fashions of the times;
this is his support and justification and the social model 
for his self-concept. He is, therefore, relatively inde­
pendent of the attitudes of those who are out of fashion.
In fact, to the extent that his self-feeling is attached to
the fashionable he will have disdain for the unfashionable.
This is simple prejudice, but it serves the useful purpose 
of providing the conforming person with some standards, some 
values to which he can commit himself, even if the standards 
are temporary and the commital subject to immediate with­
drawal (with the change in fashion). The conforming person 
characteristically is loyal to the group in which he achieves 
his identity— and for this reason— but he is more or less 
indifferent to outsiders.
Non-Conformity, Un-Conventionality
The terms, nonconformity and unconventionality, de­
scribe the social rebel, the person who refuses to be cast
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in the usual social mold; who, in fact, chooses a social 
mold of a strikingly different nature. Thus, non-conformity 
is not simply the absence of the impulse to conform; it is 
the impulse to behave in an unfashionable way. Unconven­
tionality is not simply the absence of the impulse to accept 
and support tradition; it is the impulse to oppose them and 
to set up new standards against them. In both there is a 
reaction against the socially accepted, and this reaction is 
so striking— in many instances even flamboyant— that it is 
easy to overlook the fact that in his reaction the rebel is 
still as much governed by the code he rejects as are those 
who accept it without a murmur. The dynamics of the rebel­
lion— at least of this kind of rebellion— are thus not the 
dynamics of freedom. Real freedom is another matter alto­
gether, one which we shall turn to in the next section.
Here our concern is with the two forms of stereo­
typed social rebellion: non-conformity and unconventional­
ity, and in particular with the specific qualities of the 
respective self-concepts which distinguish the one from the 
other. With the out-and-out non-conformer these are not any 
set qualities, but are those which, at the moment, set him 
apart from (and in his own mind— above) the crowd. His self- 
feeling is invested in uniqueness; his greatest pride is in 
his individuality, which is the dominant theme of his self- 
concept. This is so strong in him that the thought of being 
absorbed into, or identifying with, a popular cause or with
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commonly held values threatens his very existence. The ob­
session with differentness is such a powerful force in his 
makeup that he is impelled to reject any idea or value he 
has held— any concept-of-self he has stood by— should it be 
accepted by the general populace. This is a most amazing 
reaction, and it indicates the depth of his involvement in 
a kind of relationship that demands isolation from others 
as the price for self-esteem. His self-concept thus forbids 
real contact with people.
The truly unconventional person has a different out­
look. He lives by principle, just as the conventional man 
does; they are part of his self-concept, too. It is just 
that his principles are anti-conventional principles. How­
ever, unlike the non-conformer, the unconventional person 
takes his pride in his principles as such, not in their 
uniqueness, and he would find great self-satisfaction should 
his principles gain general acceptance; he would not be im­
pelled to change them. Thus, he is not a self-perpetuating 
recluse; he continues to seek the approval of the public, 
even though he makes no concessions to them.
Because of this, the non-conforming person suffers 
less from his isolation than does the unconventional person. 
In fact he really isn't seeking to gain general approval, 
and actually is repelled by the very thought of it. His 
self-feeling is supported by his isolation; he prefers to 
reject and disdain and to be rejected and disdained in turn.
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The Tinconventional person, on the other hand, continually 
strives to belong. What is unique about him is that he 
takes the most difficult course to his goal. That is, he 
tries to change the conventional mass to his views. He is 
under a continuous strain, then, for not having their ap­
proval, for appearing odd and unattractive in their eyes; 
he does not have the marvelous protection that the non-con- 
former has. But, on the other hand, neither is he as "lost" 
as the non-conformer. He retains the potential for gaining 
pleasure from social acceptance; he can still relate to 
people in a positive way and can afford to be hopeful, even 
optimistic, in his outlook. For the non-conformer there is 
no happy way out; his style of life is his guarantee against 
it.
It may prove interesting to speculate about the ex­
periences— the self-other relations— which give rise to these 
two anti-social self-concepts. With the unconventional the 
development sometimes may be fairly simple. Thus, any ex­
perience with a powerful and significant person, himself 
unconventional, and making the usual demands on the young 
person to identify, will naturally lead to such a formation. 
This development is exactly analagous to the establishment 
of the conventional self-concept, with the exception that 
the significant other stands for unconventional qualities.
But in most instances the development is probably a more 
complicated affair, one in which the self creates a notion
101
of a generalized other different from any particular other 
it has experienced. The concept of the ideal other is of 
this character. Depending upon the experiences the self has 
had, the concept of an ideal other may be built up more or 
less naturally out of satisfying relations with respected 
and loved others, going beyond each of the contributors but 
showing the same general scheme of values. Or it may be 
created in fantasy out of disappointing relations, as a 
romantic notion of a significant someone who gives the self 
the support and justification it so desperately needs.
Unfortunately, in the latter instance the idealized 
version of the other is designed not only to provide secur­
ity for the self, but also to get back at the others who 
have brought pain to the self, and, consequently, it is 
usually unconventional in no uncertain terms and with un­
compromising vigor. It is an ideal of striking qualities, 
one that is strong and highly romanticized, but in most 
cases is probably one that has no real humanity. This is 
the kind of ideal self-concept that harasses the recognized, 
and usually self-styled idealists (who are almost always 
unconventional in one way or another), and it is what forces 
them into, and gives them justification for, their lonely, 
unconventional styles of life.
The rabid non-conformer is probably in an even less 
enviable position than the unconventional idealist. His 
self-concept, accentuating just one thing— difference— is a
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personal trap which effectively prohibits any real inter­
course with others. Non-conformity in its essence is the 
ultimate in individuality, with everything else sacrificed 
in its favor, but, as attested by the zeal, it is an indiv­
iduality with a curious and tragic twist. It is personal 
isolation, the impulsive rejection of what someone else 
stands for just because he stands for it. It is automatic 
rejection of the other, automatic scorn. It is a perpetual 
struggle against the other, and against society, to preserve 
the self-respect. At bottom it is little more than a cha­
otic, crazed turning-away from geniune human contact. It 
is a terrible position to be reduced to, and in my view the 
only thing that can bring the self to such straits is a 
completely relativistic and intensely anti-social self- 
concept .
And clearly such a self-concept, and such an anti­
social disposition, could arise only from a background of 
extremely painful and disappointing self-other relationships. 
As the non-conforming dynamic is in its essence a dynamics 
of rejection, it would appear that the early experiences of 
such a person must have been so forbidding as to have made 
him turn to an active and indiscriminate rejection of others 
for his satisfaction. This would amount to an outright de­
nial of his dependence upon anyone else, a refusal to accept 
the receptive pole in any relationship, and so would elimin­
ate all others as models for identification. His self­
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feeling would of course be very much involved in all this, 
but not in the ordinary way. For the other's acceptance 
and approval of him would make him uncomfortable, cause him 
humiliation and self-contempt ; just the reverse of what is 
ordinary and normal. Out of such a painful experience he 
could create only one kind of self-concept— an amorphous 
thing, changing with the situation, but at all times directly 
and bitterly opposed to whatever is accepted, by whomever is 
present, as right and proper.
It is a senseless creation, the creation of a des­
perate nature. Without anyone to identify with, and yet 
still craving support and justification, which he cannot ob­
tain from his social relations, the non-conformer finally 
creates a self-concept exactly on the order of that of the 
conforming person except that it is diametrically opposed 
to, rather than an image of, the qualities assumed by the 
person immediately present. In a sense, it is not a unified 
self-concept at all, but rather a disposition to create one, 
whenever personal values become an issue.
The intolerable position of the non-conformer is 
made clear with the consideration that by his nature he is 
denied companionship with, and the comfort of support from, 
even fellow non-conformers. Because, though he may be one 
with them in their mutual rejection of the conventional and 
the fashionable, this communality lasts only so long as their 
feud against society can be maintained. Whenever the feud
10^
is dropped and the non-conformer is thrown back upon his 
relationships with his fellow non-conformers, the latter 
too must be rejected and those aspects of the self-concept 
brought into focus which emphasize the difference. The great 
hostility and the profound isolation expressed in this 
process can hardly be exaggerated.
Another facet of this performance deserves note— one 
which is as characteristic of the conforming person as it is 
of the non-conforming. This is the amazing blindness of the 
self to inconsistencies and turn-abouts. In this there is 
no reflection on the intellectual capacity of the person in­
volved; there is only evidence of the great force of the 
internal pressures which prohibit him from bringing his vari­
ous selves (self-concepts) into contact with one another.
In a sense he is compartmentalized; at any given moment his 
thinking begins and ends in his self-concept, and it is 
enough that it be consistent with this. Further implica­
tions simply are not drawn. This, it should be noted, is 
true of his thinking on personal issues. On purely intellec­
tual matters he may be consistent and profound, but as a 
person he is necessarily irrational and "shallow."
Spontaneity
It has been my thesis that despite the obvious dif­
ferences in internal dynamics and in overt expression between 
the conventional and the unconventional, between the conform­
ing and the non-conforming— that despite these differences
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there is a basic similarity to them all. They are all medi­
ated by the self-concept, and what differences there are in 
the respective guises that the self-concept takes are over­
shadowed by the fact that it does, in fact, play a part. 
According to my view, the real distinction to be drawn is 
that between these socially stereotyped expressions of self 
on the one hand, and spontaneity on the other.
Spontaneity is a much used and much abused term. In 
common parlance, the impression conveyed is one of a contin­
uously bubbling enthusiasm, a free-wheeling exuberance, a 
charming disregard for self-controls; in short, an unli­
censed and irrepressible indulgence in self-expression. But 
here I am using the term in what I believe must be its 
strictest meaning, simply to designate any mind process that 
gains expression directly without reflexive self-involvement. 
Spontaneity is mselfconsciousness; it is Mead's state of 
subjectivity, or "I-ness." It is the self when it is com­
pletely absorbed— or, as we say, "lost"— in its involvement 
in some life activity.
It is a profoundly different state of mind from the 
self-consciousness of the reflexive mind process, and per­
haps it can best be described by contrast to the latter, and 
put into terms of what it is not. It is not the self con­
trolling its own activities by reference to an objective in­
ternal standard; it is not an embarrassed self-awareness; it 
is not self-centeredness. On the other hand, what it is can
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be stated only in the most general of terms. It is a free 
expression and exposure of the self, an open relationship 
with the world, and an involvement with the world that is 
so absorbing as to exclude all concern about how the self 
is supposed to behave or how it can make the best impres­
sion. The spontaneous self is a self without defenses, a 
self which freely accepts the world and as freely offers 
itself to the world. It is a naive self, in the sense that 
it lacks preteneions, and thus, a self with natural humil­
ity.
And no doubt, too, the spontaneous self is one of 
unusual charm and warmth. But the stereotyped notion of 
spontaneity, as I have described it above, certainly is a 
serious distortion of the real thing. For the self can be 
spontaneously thoughtful as well as carefree, spontaneously 
sad as well as gay, spontaneously determined and persistent 
as well as casual and indifferent. Spontaneity itself is 
not a particular feeling state or mood; it is a kind of mind 
process, and in its content it can run nearly the gamut of 
human experience.
It is limited only in that it is associated exclus­
ively with what I have designated "pure" feelings. The 
spontaneous process can create only feelings of this kind, 
and the presence of self-feelings— pride, indignation, smug­
ness, and the like— is certain evidence that spontaneity has 
been destroyed. Spontaneity is the absence of self-involve-
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ment; therefore the two can never co-exist; it is either 
the one or the other.
In this connection, and perhaps to emphasize the 
point, it is conceivable that a person may incorporate the 
doctrine of spontaneity into his self-concept. In fact, I 
suspect that this is a fairly common occurrence these days, 
and perhaps accounts for the popular conception of the term. 
Of course such a state of affairs makes a travesty of gen­
uine spontaneity. It is tantamount to reflexive, or self- 
conscious spontaneity, which is certainly a contradiction 
in terms. It is also, incidentally, a compulsive spontan­
eity, another property which stamps it as spurious. Spon­
taneity is the absence of compulsion. Compulsion stems 
from the self-concept.
Seen in this way, spontaneity is clearly divorced 
from the internal states which govern conventional and con­
forming behavior, and their opposites. The spontaneous per­
son is neither conventional nor conforming, nor unconven­
tional nor non-conforming. He is free, in the only meaning­
ful sense of the term, to become a true individual, free to 
attain real maturity. The spontaneous person makes no fetish 
out of "individualism"— nor out of any other "ism," for that 
matter— because he is not burdened with a self-concept that 
demands recognition as such a person, and, thus, he is under 
no compulsion to act in the approved "individualistic" man­
ner. Lacking the pressure to react in any one of the
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socially stereotyped ways he is free to work his problems 
through in his own way.
This is the only way by which real maturity can be 
attained— or, in the terms that are so often used these 
days, this is the only road to self-actualization, or self- 
realization. Development in the spontaneous mode is the 
only development that deepens the person's understanding 
and enlarges his capacity to experience. The so-called 
"rich" or "deep" personality is created only in this way.
This is so despite the fact that the self-concept 
is an idealized conception of the self, and despite the 
fact that it creates pressures within the self to live up 
to its standards. Unfortunately, it is ironic but true 
that the self of the self-concept is never realized, and 
never can be. Of course, it can be approached in behavior, 
if a constant watch is kept over the self, but in the pro­
cess the internal structure of the self never is one whit 
changed in the direction of the ideal. Though it may be 
accepted in this form as a personal value, it can never be 
achieved until the self-concept itself disappears. The 
self-concept promotes within the self nothing more substan­
tial than the pretense of possessing a quality. And indeed, 
this is all that the ideal-of-self, as expressed in the 
self-concept, really aspires to. With the ideal of spon­
taneity, again, the person who has incorporated this value
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into his self-concept does so not because he has tasted of 
the unique joys and satisfactions that the spontaneous mode 
brings, and not because he seeks more of these, but because 
he wants to be known as a spontaneous person; his self-feel­
ing depends on it. Nor does the self-concept encourage the 
person to make an effort at honest self-appraisal, to face 
up to the source of his anxieties and fears; rather, it ag­
gravates his self-contempt for being the kind of person he 
is, and, in effect, actually turns his eyes away from him­
self and his problem. In short, the ideal, as it is ex­
pressed in the self-concept, leads the self in a direction 
that precludes real growth. It serves its purpose in doing 
this, but it clearly stands in the way of geniune personal 
development,
CHAPTER IV 
CDRRENT VIEWS
The fourth chapter of my paper is devoted to the 
pertinent work of writers who are more "modern" in their 
psychological viewpoint (if not in fact) than the four 
source writers. Each has, in his way, written something 
that I feel is relevant to my topic. Naturally, I have not 
attempted to present the entire systematic view of any among 
them but have contented myself with selected aspects of the 
whole. Nor have I attempted to integrate all of the views 
presented into one unified and comprehensive system of my 
own. I have been profoundly impressed with the enormous 
scope and complexity of the psychological problems contained 
within the simple term— self-concept— and I do not pretend 
even to have begun to bring all of the loose ends together.
I have tried, however, to point out disagreements and con­
sistencies, where important, and at the end I have made 
some general and more or less systematic interpretations of 
my own. Finally, I have not included all of the modern 
writers who have published in this area. I have tried, 
rather, to choose representative writers from each of the 
more or less well-defined "schools of thought." This method
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has seemed proper and adequate to me, inasmuch as my purpose 
is specifically to develop an idea, not to give an exhaustive 
account of its current standing.
I have organized the chapter in a rather arbitrary 
manner for purposes of convenience and continuity. I begin 
with Sherif because it was with Sherif that my own thinking 
on this topic had its beginnings. Otherwise, I have grouped 
together Gordon Allport, A. H. Maslow, and Carl Rogers as 
representing contemporary psychological views, and then 
Sigmund Freud, Anna Freud, Fromm, Sullivan, Horney, and 
Munroe as representing psychoanalytic views. I have in­
cluded Munroe (a psychologist) in the latter group because 
her point of view is so closely allied with analytic theory.
The concluding section of the chapter is given over 
to the consideration of certain general problems, relevant 
to the notion of self-concept, which have grown out of the 
preceding accounts.
Sherif
As I have already noted in the préface to this paper, 
I am indebted to Dr. Sherif for the original inspiration to 
write on this topic. For in large part my interest in the 
self-concept grew out of a curiosity that had been whetted 
by the term, ego-involvement. This term was elaborately 
developed in The Psychology of Ego-Involvements (Sherif & 
Cantril, 19 7^) and was carried even further in the later 
book— ^  Outline of Social Psychology (Sherif & Sherif,
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1956). The self-concept as I interpret it is ordinarily 
implicated in reactions that are ego-involved,
Sherif and Cantril (19^ 7) refer to ego-involvement 
as the entering of ego-attitudes as a determining factor 
into the experience and behavior of the individual, Ego- 
attitudes, themselves, are a special brand of attitudes—  
those specifically which "are related to the delimited, dif­
ferentiated, and accumulating "I," "me," "mine" experiences" 
(Sherif & Cantril, 19^7} p. )^. This is a highly general­
ized statement that I find hard to grasp, A more concrete 
statement asserts that
the most important attitudes formed in relation to 
one's body, to surrounding objects, person, institu­
tions, and groups, are ego-involved, , , , ^Thus, 
for example^/ inevitably one becomes somehow ego- 
involved when his intimate friends, his superior, 
his inferior, his school, his church, or his flag 
are in question. Gratifications and frustrations 
connected with such persons, groups, or institutions 
are felt as ego-gratifications and ego-frustrations 
(Sherif & Cantril, 194-7, p, 156),
Or again, ego-involvement is described as "a general 
term that can have many specific and more precise meanings" 
(Sherif & Cantril, 194-7, p, 153). Among these meanings are; 
ego-enhancement, ego-gratification, ego-frustration, ego- 
support, Ego-involvement always seems to imply a kind of 
moving force, or ego-striving, which is the effort the person 
expends to maintain or to enhance his ego, "In one way or 
another we try to feel good about ourselves" (Sherif & Can­
tril, 194-7} p. 100), the authors write, and this affactional 
and motivational aspect, with the clear-cut self-reference.
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may be taken as the essential and distinguishing aspect of 
ego-involved reactions, or ego-striving.
It seems proper to state, then— in brief— that ego- 
involved activity is oriented around the need to "enhance" 
the ego, or to "feel good about" the self. According to 
Sherif and Sherif (1956) this need pervades all of the per­
son's feeling and motivational life. Thus they write that
hunger, sex, and sleep do not function in insulated 
ways. They are the hunger, sex desires, or sleepi­
ness of the organism of a person who has claims to 
be 'a man of good taste,' 'an honorable man,' one 
who is in dead earnest to maintain his standing in 
life, to raise the value of his own name in the eyes 
of his fellow man and in his own eyes (Sherif &
Sherif, 1956, p. 584-).
The discrepancy between such personal values, or ego-atti­
tudes, and the biological drives catches the person in 
conflict and sets up within him what the authors refer to 
as ego-tensions.
Ego-tension is used as a generic term to cover such 
painful, unpleasant experiences as anxiety, insecurity, per­
sonal inadequacy, aloneness, shame. Specific painful, un­
pleasant experiences can be attributed to specific ego- 
tensions. For example,
when ego-tension is caused by failure or potential 
failure threatening our sense of adequacy, our sense 
of self-esteem, or by blockage of our ego-involved 
goals, the appropriate designation may be anxiety.
/Ând another/ When ego tension is aroused by a seri­
ous discrepancy between our actions and the level of 
our ego values, the resulting product may be re­
ferred to as shame. /_And still another/ In the 
cases in which the deviation is related to our few 
most central fundamental ego values, the resulting
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ego-tension may be termed the experience of guilt
(Sherif & Sherif, 1956, p. 602).
These are the basic ideas, as I see them, in the 
"psychology of ego-involvements," There can be no question­
ing the general validity and importance of these ideas, nor 
the fact that in a general way they account very nicely for 
"the established conformities" which regulate so much of 
our social living. The need to enhance the ego, or to feel 
good about the self, unquestionable plays a large role in 
both the private as well as the social life of the ordinary 
individual. But there is, I think, a serious limitation in 
this way of thinking, in that ego-involvement (and ego- 
attitudes, and ego-striving) is taken as the natural and in­
evitable accompaniment of self-development. Despite the 
emphasis that Sherif and his co-authors place on the genetic 
nature of the ego, their analysis is lacking in just this 
particular way. True, there is recognition of the fact that 
there are individual differences in the degree and intensity 
of ego-strivings. Moreover, these differences are attri­
buted in part to differences among the particular constella­
tion of social relationships experienced by different indiv­
iduals. These, however, are isolated observations, and in 
the specific account offered of the genesis of ego-involve­
ment s there is only the most casual reference to the actual 
experiences which create them. And though the authors refer 
repeatedly to attitudes and, in fact, attribute enormous 
importance to them, their concept of attitude lacks the
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unique and intensely personal flavor that accounts for the 
profound impact that they have on the person and on social 
relations. Attitude, as they use the term, refers to some­
thing so highly generalized as to he almost meaningless in 
the context of individual experience.
In short, the theory seems to hold that the ego (or 
self) is a structure of personal-social values (attitudes) 
to which the person is committed and which bring him either 
"ego-enhancement” or "ego-frustration" according as he meets 
or fails to meet the standards they represent. Any value, 
presumably, no matter what its origin, possesses this same 
dynamic significance; as far as I can make out there is no 
room in the theory for any other eventuality. But this is 
an indiscriminate and indefensible view, as it fails to take 
into account the nature of the actual experiences out of 
which "ego" arises.
My position on this point is clearly different. 
"Ego-involvement" becomes an issue only in connection with 
those values represented in the self-concept. And these are 
the values taken on by the self as an attempt in the imagin­
ation to escape the humiliation experienced as a result of 
contact with a concrete attitude directed toward it by a 
significant other. Such values become ego-involved, because 
self-feeling is attached to them. But only values that 
arise in this way become ego-involved, and it is a mistake 
to assume that the ego, or self, has no other constituents.
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The spontaneous or subjective self is disregarded altogether 
in this formulation, and though this is understandable in a 
theory designed for and by social psychologists, interested 
primarily in "established conformities," it has serious 
limitations as a social theory of the self.
Allport, Maslov. Rogers 
Gordon Allport. Allport's recent little book. Be­
coming (1955)5 is offered in protest against some of the 
simplifications of modern psychology which, in the author's 
view, may have succeeded only in caricaturing human nature. 
In its positive aspect it is an attempt to lay down a con­
ceptual groundwork for a psychology that begins to do jus­
tice to the depth and complexity of human existence and to 
its active and spontaneous achievements.
The central concept in Allport's scheme of things 
is the proprium, by which he refers to that part of the per­
sonality which seems warm and important to us and as pecul­
iarly ours, and which makes for inward unity. The proprium 
is a hierarchical structure of activities or awarenesses, 
with the bodily sense of being at the bottom and idealistic 
striving at the top. Allport is concerned in this book 
mainly that these uppermost aspects of the proprium get just 
recognition as representing the highest reaches of human 
growth, or becoming.
One of the aspects of the proprium is the self-image.
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and it is in this that Allport seems to find the key to 
all of higher development. The self-image itself is divided 
into two parts; one is the awareness of the self as it is 
while the second is the image of the self as one aspires to 
be. Both are essential to maturity, but growth, self-real­
ization, self-consistency, and conscience all depend in 
rather direct manner on the presence of the idealized self- 
image. In all of these higher level functions. Allport 
finds the person referring his impulses and thoughts to his 
idealized image of himself, and, presumably, without this 
latter agency of the mind no such high-level functioning 
would be possible.
I take it that Allport's self-image, in its "aspir­
ing" form, is roughly equivalent to what I call the self- 
concept. One difference is that in Allport's view the self- 
image frees the individual from the compulsions of the in­
fantile super-ego, based on fear. Whereas my notion of the 
self-concept describes it as arising directly out of a feel­
ing of humiliation, or anxiety, or the like, and as giving 
the individual no "freedom" at all. I agree with Allport 
that there is a different kind of adult "conscience," or, 
as he writes, an "experience of value-related obligation" 
(Allport, 1955» p. 71); but I hold that this is a spontan­
eous activity of the mind, with no self-reference. So long 
as our morality, our self-consistency, our course of "self- 
realization," is mediated by this external (though internal­
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ized) standard, it is not a natural, direct expression of 
our deepest feelings, nor does it bring us the satisfaction 
that we ultimately seek. Moreover, by providing us with a 
shortcut solution to our moral problems, it eliminates the 
need for an honest and painful attempt to understand our 
full dilemma. In effect, it subverts geniune moral strug­
gle.
In sum, then. Allport holds to the notion that the 
mature mind is characteristically reflexive in make-up, and 
seems to equate spontaneous expression with the primitive 
and immature. In contrast to this, my point is that the 
most significant kind of self-development— the enrichening 
of feelings and the sensitizing of perceptions— takes place 
only within the spontaneous mode. Allport is undoubtedly 
right in stressing the dynamic and creative forces of the 
ego, or self, but he is wrong in describing the form that 
these forces take. The self can get along quite nicely 
without an ideal self-image, and, in fact, it escapes neu­
rotic conflicts and guilts only so long as it does.
A. H. Maslow. Maslow*s theoretical position can 
best be introduced, briefly, by way of two basic proposi­
tions: the doctrine of self-actualization and the theory
of a hierarchy of motives.
In his doctrine of self-actualization, Maslow allies 
himself with Allport, Goldstein, Rogers, Fromm, Horney, and
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other modern theorists who explicitly emphasize what might 
be called the "positive" side of human nature, Man is not 
by nature "bad," nor is he simply a structure of stimulus- 
response connections; he is basically "good" and probably 
above all else, he is self-determining. This means, simply, 
that man has a basic need to realize his human potential. 
What a man can be, he must be. Some men, at least, are 
moved by this need, and they represent, in Maslow's opinion, 
the highest reaches of human development.
Maslow says nothing about the personality structure 
of such persons, and therefore a direct comparison of his 
views with mine is not possible. However, it is interest­
ing to note that one of the characteristics that he attri­
butes to the self-actualizing person is spontaneity. This 
is spontaneity taken in the ordinary sense and not explic­
itly in the specific sense in which I use the term; yet 
there is great similarity. The spontaneous person has no 
"controls," in the sense of external standards; impulses 
and feelings are expressed freely and directly. What con­
trols he does have arise from his noble and generous im­
pulses, which are themselves spontaneous and natural. Thus 
Maslow sees man as complete and as reaching his fullest 
potential without recourse to reflexive mind-activities or 
reference to idealized standards.
But the need for self-actualization is not seen in 
all men, in fact, in very few. This is because in most
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people the lower, more basic needs are not fully satisfied, 
so they remain fixated at a lower level of development.
These needs, from lowest to highest, are: the physiological
needs, the need for safety, the need to belong and for love, 
the need for esteem, and, finally, the need for self-actual­
ization. It is at the level of the need for esteem (self­
esteem) that the notion of the self-concept can be brought 
in for comparison. The esteem needs are said to be made up 
of two subsidiary needs. These are, first, the need for 
achievement, mastery, competence, independence, and the 
like; and second, the need for prestige, status, importance, 
etc. In my view, these two sub-needs do not belong together 
in the same class. Self-esteem as a motive is always a sign 
that the self-concept, in some form, is operating; the need 
for mastery is altogether spontaneous.
Moreover, I see mastery and achievement as a geniune 
form of self-actualization, but the need for self-esteem as 
a block in the road toward this goal. Maslow writes that as 
the need for self-esteem is satisfied, then, and only then, 
does the need for self-actualization arise. But the need 
for self-esteem is never satisfied, at least not by the re­
sponse in others that it craves; it is insatiable. The so- 
called "secure" person (who is in position to go on to the 
level of self-actualization) is not the one in whom self­
esteem needs have been satisfied; he is the one in whom 
they have never been aroused in the first place, or in whom
121
they have been worked through. Self-esteem becomes an is­
sue to the extent that approval has been an issue in the 
person's life, in place of acceptance, and once established 
it disappears only when the meaning of acceptance has been 
learned.
Carl Rogers. So far as I Icnow, Rogers is the only 
one among clinical psychologists who has committed himself 
in print to a systematic accounting of the self-concept, 
and I have no doubt but that both the current popularity 
of the term and the meaning generally attached to it derive 
pretty much from him,
I have taken the following account from his Counsel­
ing and Psychotherapy (Rogers, 1942). He writes:
As a result of interaction with the environment, 
and particularly as a result of evaluational inter­
action with others, the structure of self is formed 
— an organized, fluid, but consistent conceptual 
pattern of perceptions of characteristics and re­
lationships of the 'I' or 'me,' together with 
value attached to these concepts (Rogers, 1942, 
p. 498).
The genesis of this "conceptual pattern of perception" is 
then summarized.
As the individual interacts with his environ­
ment he gradually builds up concepts about himself, 
about the environment, and about himself in relation 
to the environment. While these concepts are non­
verbal, and may not be present in consciousness, 
this is no barrier to their functioning as guiding 
principles . . . Intimately associated with all 
these experiences is a direct organismic valuing 
which appears highly important for understanding 
later development. The very young infant has little 
uncertainty in valuing. At the same time there is 
the dawning awareness of 'I' experience, there is
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also the awareness that 'I like,' 'I dislike,'
'I am cold and I dislike it,' 'I am cuddled and I 
like it,' 'I can reach my toes and find this en­
joyable'— these statements appear to be adequate 
descriptions of the infant's experiences, though 
he does not have the verbal symbols which we have 
used. He appears to value those experiences which 
he perceives as enhancing himself, and to place a 
negative value on those experiences which seem to 
threaten his self or which do not maintain or en­
hance himself.
There soon enters into this picture the evalu­
ation of self by others, 'You're a good child,'
'You're a naughty boy'— these and similar evalu­
ations of himself and of his behavior by his par­
ents and others come to form a large and signifi­
cant part of the infant's perceptual field. Social 
experiences, social evaluations by others, become 
a part of his phenomenal field along with experi­
ences not involving others— for example, that 
radiators are hot, stairs are dangerous, and 
candy tastes good.
As one particular instance of these social evalua­
tions;
One of the first and most important aspects of 
of the self-experience of the ordinary child is that 
he is loved by his parents. He perceives himself as 
lovable, worthy of love, and his relationship to his 
parents as one of affection. He experiences all this 
with satisfaction. This is a significant and core 
element of the structure of the self as it begins to 
form. At the same time he is experiencing positive 
sensory values, he is experiencing enhancement, in 
other ways. It is enjoyable to have a bowel move­
ment at any time or place that the physiological ten­
sion is experienced. It is satisfying and enhancing 
to hit, or to try to do away with, baby brother. As 
these things are initially experienced they are not 
necessarily inconsistent with the concept of self as 
a lovable person (Rogers, 19^ 2, pp. 4-98-499),
Rogers has a good deal more to say about these self­
experiences, but it all follows along pretty much the same 
line as the above. For present purposes, then, we can set­
tle upon the above excerpt as representing the general tenor
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of his accotint, and it will serve, I hope, to point up a 
particular feature of my own.
According to Rogers, when a child's parents are 
"loving" he soon comes to "perceive himself as lovable, 
worthy of love." He develops what Rogers calls a "self­
experience," which is that he is loved by his parents.
This, then, is his self-concept: he is lovable. Presum­
ably, if he were less fortunate in his choice of parents 
he would emerge with a less lovable self-concept; that he 
is inadequate, perhaps, or worthless, evil, or the like.
In either case, however, whatever the treatment he receives 
he should emerge from it with an established self-concept: 
meaning a habit of conceptualizing himself more or less con­
sistently in an evaluative way.
All of this seems straightforward and reasonable, 
and in accord with everyday clinical observations. However, 
the matter is not nearly so simple as Rogers' account makes 
it appear. We can assume, I think, that at birth the infant 
is sheer subjectivity. Granted this, we are left with the 
problem of how it is that the person (infant) comes to give 
up this mode of thinking in favor of self-objectification, 
which is so radically different. No doubt a certain develop­
ment of this kind is inevitable, for after all the child can 
see and feel and hear himself, etc. But to perceive oneself 
and to hear oneself is not to think about oneself as lovable, 
worthwhile, or the like, and it is this particular form of
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self-objectification with which we are here concerned.
Rogers asserts that the child who is loved is naturally 
going to conceive of himself as "lovable," and I think that 
most clinicians of my acquaintance would agree. But what 
they mean, I think, is that the child will develop what is 
called a "feeling of security" and that he will not be in­
clined to conceive of himself as inadequate, worthless, bad, 
etc.
The feeling of security, so-called, is not self­
objectification at all; indeed, there is no self-reference 
of any kind in it, nor any self-feeling. And so it is not 
at all accurate to say of the loved child that he comes to 
conceive of himself as "lovable." For the experience of be­
ing loved— a subjective state— is one of sheer pleasure and 
completely satisfying in itself. And so there is no call 
for the mind to have recourse to any other mode of activity, 
and self-objectification would strike it as a thin and hol­
low substitute. In fact, I take it that the more the child 
conceptualizes himself as "lovable" the more is he unsure of 
his place in his parents' affections.
Perhaps I can make my point clearer by starting from 
another of Rogers' ideas; that about self-enhancement, The 
infant, he states, "appears to value those experiences which 
he perceives as enhancing himself and to place a negative 
value on those experiences which seem to threaten himself 
(Rogers, 194-2, p. 4-98). It strikes me that a statement such
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as this takes an enormous lot for granted about the infant's 
mental apparatus. The infant seeks to enhance himself and 
is sensitive to threats to himself? This is surely a seri­
ous misapplication of terms. Why should an infant seek 
self-enhancement? To say of anyone that he seeks self-en­
hancement is to say of him that he is suffering from feel­
ings of self-debasement. But self-feeling of this latter 
kind surely is not in the infant’s make-up; you cannot ap­
peal to his pride and he is insensitive to your scorn or 
reproach. These become effective only at a much later time, 
and as I have tried to show, only as a result of a particu­
lar kind of experience. To assume, as Rogers apparently 
does, that these unique feelings are part of the equipment 
that the infant brings into the world with him is terribly 
presumptuous and tends to distort by simplification a learn­
ing and maturational process that is complex in its unfold­
ing and profound in its implications. Certainly it is true, 
as Rogers states, that the infant values certain sensory 
experiences in his own primitive way, and this certainly is 
a function of the mechanism he is born with, but self-en­
hancement and threat are far removed from pure sensory ex­
perience of pleasure and displeasure, and the distinction 
must always be kept in mind.
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Psychoanalytic Views ; Sigmund Freud,
Anna Freud
Sigmund Freud. The notion of self-concept as I have 
put it forth makes contact with Freudian theory at just one 
more or less clearly defined point. Self-concept bears some 
resemblance to what Freud designates as ego-ideal.
As I understand Freudian theory, super-ego evolves 
out of, or splits off from, the ego, which is a more elemen­
tary agency of the mind. Before the splitting occurs the 
ego of the child lives in a kind of narcissistic splendor. 
Freud writes about this existence in terms of libido— the 
basic mental energy— and observes that the infant is pri­
marily self-centered: his libido attaches to his own ego,
so to speak. This is primary narcissism. As the child be­
comes involved with the outside world, and especially with 
his parents, he transfers some of his libido from his own 
ego to certain outside objects. There is, then,
an original libidinal cathexis of the ego, part of 
which cathexis is later yielded up to objects, but 
which fundamentally persists . . . /[There is main­
tained a certain reciprocity between ego-libido 
and object-libido. The more that is absorbed by
the one, the more impoverished does the other be­
come. The highest form of development of which 
object-libido is capable is seen in the state of 
being in love, when the subject seems to yield up 
his whole personality in favor of object-cathexis 
(S. Freud, 1953: P* 33).
The development from primary ego-cathexis to object- 
cathexis takes place, of course, as a result of the infant's 
traffic with the outside world, and especially with his
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parents. He establishes emotional ties with them of one 
kind or another. According to Freud, the earliest and 
original form of emotional tie is what he labels identifi­
cation. In its simplest guise, identification is repre­
sented by the small boy's outspoken desire to be like his 
father. He takes his father as his model, imitates his be­
havior; in short, sets him up as his ideal.
In this form, identification is an innocent enough 
kind of relationship. There is nothing in it to portend 
later strain and conflict. However, identification appar­
ently takes on new significance when the relationship be­
tween child and parents becomes imbued with the spirit of 
moral training, and the mechanism whereby it is achieved 
becomes significantly more complex and difficult to grasp. 
Identification in this latter sense is said to be the means 
whereby the super-ego is created, and to have the purpose 
of repressing the Oedipus Complex.
As far as I can make out, Freud posits two rather 
distinct forms of identification. In one sense it is said 
to be a regressive reaction to the loss of a love object. 
That is, every time the child, say, is forced to disavor 
his libidinal attachment to another person, he compensates 
for his loss by introjecting certain features of the object 
into his own ego, and, so to speak, falling in love with 
himself instead. This results in a modification of the 
child's ego-structure and is a step forward in the shaping
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of his character.
Now, a -unique situation is created when the objects 
of the child's love are his parents, and especially when it 
is the parent of the opposite sex. At a certain stage in 
his development this love brings him into the Oedipal rela­
tionship, at which time he is forced to relinquish his ob­
ject-cathexis for the parent in question. He resolves his 
problem by identification, but not, it seems by identifica­
tion with the lost object. Rather, it is a more general 
identification with what Freud calls the parental function. 
"When the Oedipus Complex passes away the child must give up 
the intense object cathexes which it has formed toward its 
parents, and to compensate for this loss of object, its 
identification with parents, which have probably long been 
present, become greatly intensified (S. Freud, 1953? p. 91).
But in another context (S. Freud, 1933), Freud offers 
a rather different account of what takes place when the boy—  
as an example— enters the Oedipal situation. Typically he 
is forced, out of fear of his father, to give up his object- 
cathexis towards his mother ; his sexual desire for her must 
be repressed out of fear of "castration." Whether the boy, 
as he succeeds at his task, identifies with his mother ac­
cording to the above formula Freud does not say. For here 
his emphasis is on the boy's relationship with his father.
Out of his fear of castration he must repress his sexual 
feelings for his mother. This is a catastrophic situation
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for him, and to resolve it, Freud asserts, he identifies 
with his father’s authority and thereby gains the necessary 
strength for self-control. He identifies with his father 
out of fear of him.
In brief, then, the combination of the child’s 
disposition to identify with his parents, and their deep 
concern with his moral upbringing, leads to the establish­
ing within the child's self-structure a new agency: the
super-ego. It is the creation of this agency that gives 
the mind its capacity to objectify its own ego. Indeed, 
this agency is set up exactly according to that principle 
and for that purpose. Where formerly parents had kept a 
close and critical watch over his behavior, now the child 
gains the capacity to do this on his own. It is only nat­
ural that he should apply the same standards to himself as 
did his parents previously.
Super-ego functioning has two more or less separate 
aspects. One of these is represented by what ordinarily is 
referred to as conscience; the other by the ego-ideal. 
Super-ego as conscience is of course the term in its con­
ventional and widely understood meaning. However, the basic 
facet of the agency appears to be the ego-ideal, the concept 
of a perfect self which the ego holds itself up to. It is 
from this ideal version of self that the functions ordinarily 
attributed to the super-ego may be seen to flow. It is the 
perceived discrepancy between ego and ego-ideal which arouses
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guilt, and it is also this which institutes repression.
The notion of ego-ideal again brings us to the con­
cept of narcissism, though now it is a modified, "secondary" 
form. The conditions for secondary narcissism are estab­
lished with the creation of the ego-ideal.
To this ideal ego is now directed the self-love 
which the real ego enjoyed in childhood. The nar­
cissism seems to be now displaced onto this new 
ideal ego, which like the infantile ego, deems it­
self the possessor of all perfections. As always 
where the libido is concerned, here again man has 
shown himself incapable of giving up a gratifica­
tion he has once enjoyed. He is not willing to fore­
go his narcissistic perfection in his childhood; and 
if, as he develops, he is disturbed by the admoni­
tions of others and his own critical judgment is 
awakened, he seeks to recover the early perfection, 
thus wrested from him, in the new form of an ego 
ideal. That which he projects ahead of him as his 
ideal is merely his substitute for the lost narcis­
sism of his childhood— the time when he was his own 
ideal (S. Freud, 1933? P. 51).
With libido thus fastened to it, the ego now assumes 
an attitude of self-regard, or, in everyday terms, becomes 
imbued with self-respect. And it is the self-respect of 
the ego, Freud asserts, which specifically is responsible 
for repression. Our concern here, however, is not with re­
pression but with the nature of the self-regarding attitude
as an expression of secondary narcissism.
First of all, the feeling of self-regard ap­
pears to us a measure of the ego; what various
components go to make up that measure is irrele­
vant. Everything we possess or achieve, every 
remnant of the primitive feeling of omnipotence 
that experience has corroborated, helps to exalt 
the self-regard (S. Freud, 1933» P. 55).
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Self-regard is thus taken as an instance of ego- 
libido; that is, mental energy that is fastened not upon 
some outside object but upon the internal representation of 
the self. This is true self-love.
The self-regard has a very intimate connection 
with the narcissistic libido. Here we are supported 
by two fundamental facts: that in paraphrénies? the
self-regard is exalted, while in transference neu­
roses it is abased, and that where the erotic life 
is concerned, not being loved lowers the self-re­
garding feelings, while being loved raises them 
(S. Freud, 1933> P. 55).
As has already been pointed out, the discrepancy 
between ego and ego-ideal is experienced as tension, spe­
cifically as guilt. One might suppose that such tension 
would naturally cause the ego to restructure itself more in 
keeping with its ideal of itself, and that success in this 
venture would provide the sought after relief. However, if 
I read Freud correctly, the tension of itself is not enough 
to effect such a change. As he puts it, the sublimation of 
instinct— the directing of instinct away from sexual aims 
and onto another and "higher-level" aim— is not achieved by 
"worship of" a high ego-ideal.
A man who has exchanged his narcissism for the 
worship of a high ego-ideal has not necessarily on 
that account succeeded in sublimating his libidinal 
impulses. It is true that the ego-ideal requires 
such sublimation, but it cannot enforce it; sub­
limation requires a special process which may be 
prompted by the ideal but the execution of which 
is entirely independent of any such incitement.
7
Schizophrenics, in modern parlance.
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It is just in neurotics that we find the highest 
degree of tension between the development of this 
ego-ideal and the measure of their sublimation of 
primitive libidinal instincts (S. Freud, 1933, 
p. 51).
I think that it is not unreasonable to compare my 
notion of the self-concept with the Freudian ego-ideal.
The facts of self-observation (reflexiveness), idealiza­
tion of the self, tension between real and imagined self, 
and fluctuation of self-regard (self-feeling)— all are as 
pertinent to the functioning of the self-concept as to 
that of the ego-ideal.
It may prove of interest, then, to compare self- 
concept with ego-ideal on certain issues of general impor­
tance. To begin with, let us take the concept of identifi­
cation. I have already presented the Freudian view, in 
brief. In my view, identification is carried in the self- 
concept. We can say that a son identifies with his father 
to the extent that his self-concept is identical to that of 
his father. Thus, for example, the father may be contemp­
tuous of his son's fearfulness and timidity. The perception 
of this contempt is intolerable to the child; it humiliates 
him and arouses him to defensive self-activity. This activ­
ity may take many forms, but generally outright aggression 
against the offender is impossible, for father is too 
threatening. Therefore, he may readily resort to the cre­
ation, in his imagination, of a version of the self that is 
strong and brave: the self-concept of the moment. With
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this, his humiliation gives way to pride; his ego has been 
debased but now it is exalted.
With the creation of the self-concept, then, the 
boy is able to find some satisfaction in what is otherwise 
an unbearable relationship with his father. But in the 
process he has taken into himself precisely the same atti­
tude he sees in his father, and herein lies the identifica­
tion, Father extolls strength and courage; so too does 
son; to this extent they are identical in their respective 
self-concepts.
It will be seen from this account that identifica­
tion, in this sense, is essentially a defensive maneuver of 
the self— one which is undertaken in the imagination as a 
means of escape from an attack on its self-respect. It is 
a way of joining the enemy by molding the self in his image. 
By taking over the values implied in the attacking party, 
the self is thereby assured that the attack will stop. And 
of course, when the relationship is internalized the attack­
ing party is perpetuated within, making it necessary to 
maintain the same self-concept more or less indefinitely.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that 
social cohesiveness— the easygoing companionability, the 
spirit of camaraderie, the air of congeniality, the inti­
mate feeling of belongingness, that mark harmonious group­
ings— demands essential congruence in the self-concepts of 
the individual members (or else, in the rare instance, a
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substantial freedom from self-concept all the way around). 
Ordinarily, in order for social intercourse to proceed 
smoothly and intimately, it is necessary for each party to 
feel secure that he will find his own self-feeling reflected 
and supported by that of the other members of his group.
One can feel secure in a social setting only when one knows 
one can express one's prejudices and lurking animosities to 
the approval of all those present. No social affair can be 
more deadly than one in which basically conflicting self­
conflicts try to establish free, informal contact. No one 
can be comfortable; the best that can be hoped for is a 
dreadfully strained politeness that fools no one. This, I 
take it, is in line with Freud's assertion that the cohe­
siveness of a group is to be found in the fact that the 
members "have introduced the same person into their super­
ego, and on the basis of this common factor have identified 
with one another in their ego" (S. Freud, 1953? P* 96).
This holds, Freud states, only for groups with a leader, 
yet it no doubt can be made to apply equally well to more 
amorphous groups with the simple consideration that the 
identification be extended from just one person to a group 
of persons who represent more or less the same social values 
and attitudes.
A second point of general interest is found in the 
notion of "splitting" the ego with the creation of the ego- 
ideal and in the self-objectification that this makes
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possible. It seems to me that this development is one of 
the most important in the history of the individual, trans­
forming, as it does, his original spontaneity and giving 
rise to a whole new class of emotional experiences: those
called self-feelings. Freud refers to these experiences as 
the feeling, or attitude, of self-regard, and considers them 
to be the concomitant, in the feeling-life of secondary 
narcissism. Secondary narcissism itself is in a sense a 
return to the state of self-love and belief in the self's 
perfection as found originally in infancy.
In this connection, my point is that in describing 
secondary narcissism as a return to an earlier narcissistic 
state, a very important differentiating feature is obscured. 
This is that before the creation of the self-concept (ego- 
ideal) the self experiences only in the subjective mode; 
there is no reflexiveness except insofar as the infant sees 
and feels its own body; there is surely no self-love (or 
self-respect) as we understand the term in its adult mean­
ing. The creation of the objectified version of the self, 
then, does not lead to a regression to an earlier state of 
self-love; the creation alone makes, self-love possible. 
Subjective self cannot love itself; by definition it is 
lost to itself; cannot take itself as object. It can, of 
course, take its own physical body as object, as I have 
noted, and can "love" it, in a sense, but this love rela­
tionship has no overtones of self-respect as does the later
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love for self. For the infant, the body has not yet come 
to represent, through certain affective experiences, social 
grace or moral virtue, or their opposites, and so the "love" 
is purely sensuous. Love of self takes on its typically 
adult character— pride, vanity, conceit, etc.— only after 
the ideal version of self has been established, when the 
imagined qualities attributed to the self give one the 
luxurious feeling of being approved.
A third point has to do with psychic growth, a sub­
ject which apparently still is very poorly understood. As 
far as I know, Freud never wrote about this subject direct­
ly, but it is my understanding that in his system of thought 
the concept of sublimation conveys the meaning of the matur­
ation of the primitive libido into affection for others, 
interest in ideas and activities, and the like. The nature 
of the conditions that are favorable to this development is 
of course an important issue in its own right. But in the 
present context I am concerned only to point out that ten­
sion between ego and ego-ideal is not among these. I have 
already noted Freud's position on this point. He states 
that the man who worships a high ego-ideal has not neces­
sarily on that account succeeded in sublimating his libidinal 
instincts.
My view is somewhat different. I hold that the func­
tioning of the self-concept (ego-ideal) makes geniune growth 
(sublimation) difficult if not impossible, not merely that
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ego-ideal and sublimation are independent of each other.
It is clear that self-concept does imply tension, and this 
I take to be the same tension that Freud describes as exist­
ing between ego and ego-ideal. However, the self-concept 
being what it is, the tension which it generates is relieved 
specifically only when the self acts in a way that is con­
sistent with it, or makes an appearance that impresses the 
significant others that their code is being adhered to. The 
tension does not represent real dissatisfaction with self or 
the longing for greater satisfactions; it has, in fact, 
nothing to do with this kind of awareness and, what is more, 
effectively keeps the self from it. The tension generated 
by the self-concept is in the form of shame, guilt, etc., 
and these only make the pain of self-awareness so acute as 
to induce the self to shy away from it. The self-concept, 
then, causes the self to seek anxiously to "improve" it­
self, yet drives it away from the kind of self-awareness 
necessary for real change. The Freudian picture of the 
idealistic neurotic who suffers from very primitive libidinal 
impulses is, it seems to me, characteristic.
In passing, and as a final point, let me note again 
that I do not argue that the holding of an ideal automatic­
ally impedes true personal development. It is only the par­
ticular form of the ideal that we are here considering that 
works in this unfortunate fashion. Actually, I feel that 
real growth proceeds according to the primitive identifica­
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tions that the infant makes, with the same patterning of 
the ego according to the chosen model. The infant, how­
ever, has no ego-ideal to conform to; he is merely trying 
to understand his world and to get along in the best way 
possible, and he no doubt uses his imitations of adults in 
a very discriminating way, as they best serve his interests. 
Real growth demands humility as a starting point. The in­
fant has it (and sometimes, too, so does the adult); unfor­
tunately, the ego-ideal or self-concept is a conspiracy 
against humility, and this is wherein the trouble lies.
Anna Freud. It is generally said that in recent 
years psychoanalytic theory has shown increasing interest 
in the workings of the ego as one of the agencies of the 
mind. According to Munroe (1955)? this interest has been 
channelled in two directions. One of these is in the clar­
ification of the process whereby the reality-adapted aspects 
of the ego mature. Munroe includes among the leaders in 
this direction Hartmann, Kris, Loewenstein, and Rappaport.
The other has to do with the elaboration of the concept of 
the mechanisms of defense, and the leader in this direction 
is said to be Anna Freud. I have arbitrarily dismissed the 
first group of writers from consideration on the grounds 
that their contribution has no relevance to the self-concept. 
The concept of defense mechanisms does.
.In Anna Freud's accounting of the defensive opera­
tions of the ego three stages, or structures, are to be
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found. The first of these, and the most primitive, is de­
fense motivated by dread of the power of the instincts.
This defense is said to grow out of a fundamental and in­
nate opposition existing between the primary processes of 
the id and the secondary processes of the ego.
The ego is friendly to the insticts only so 
long as it is itself but little differentiated from 
the id. When it has evolved from the primary to the 
secondary process, from the pleasure-principle to 
the reality principle, it has become . . . alien 
territory to the instincts. Its mistrust of their 
demands is always present (A. Freud, 1946, p. 63).
To id and ego, then, are attributed conflicting aims, which
are held to be inherent in the structure of the human mind.
This finds expression in the ego in the fear that it will
be "overthrown" or "extinguished" by the instincts, and its
defenses are intended to prevent this from happening.
In the earliest stage of defense operation there 
apparently is little or no splitting of self into subject 
and object, for the differentiation of ego from id, at this 
stage, is accomplished by internal forces entirely, without 
the urging of an outside agency. But in the second stage 
the ego's defenses are motivated by objective anxiety: that
is, by the ego's awareness that danger lurks without, gener­
ally in the guise of parental disapproval and punishment. 
"The infantile ego fears the instincts because it fears the 
outside world. Its defense against them is motivated by 
dread of the outside world, i.e., by objective anxiety"
(A. Freud, 1946, p. 61). This stage thus marks a structural
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change over the first. Ego contends with id with its eye 
on the outside world, and its strongest feelings hinge upon 
how the outside world receives it. There is as yet no ob­
jectification of the self, but in this relationship the 
seeds of objectification are sown.
In the third stage the motivation for ego defense 
is anxiety stemming from super-ego. The super-ego itself 
represents the internalization of certain features of the 
outer world, to which the ego "identifies"; these features 
are constituted mainly by the example set by the parents 
and their educational methods. With internalization ef­
fected, a new agency is created within the mind to supple­
ment the original id and the derivative ego. This agency 
(the super-ego) in turn alters the defense process, owing 
to the ideal standard which it represents and which is set 
over against the ego as moral and social demands.
Some instinctual wish seeks to enter conscious­
ness and with the help of the ego to àttain grati­
fication. The latter would not be averse to admit­
ting it but the superego protests. The ego submits 
to the higher institution and obediently enters in­
to a struggle against the instinctual impulse (A.
Freud, 19%, p. 58).
In this sequence the ego itself is said not to find anything
dangerous in the instincts; it fears them only because it
fears the super-ego.
This, briefly, is Anna Freud's interpretation of 
the defensive activities of the ego. It will be of interest 
now to consider what she has expressed or implied about self­
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structure in the light of my earlier remarks on the self- 
concept and of the fundamental distinction between the sub­
jective and the objectified modes. To do this we go back 
to her account of the differentiation of ego from id and 
of super-ego from ego.
As I understand this account, ego evolves out of id 
as a matter of innate internal dynamics, independently of 
social experience. This is because the infantile mind oper­
ates simultaneously according to two irreconcilable princi­
ples: the pleasure and the reality. The chaotic primary
process co-exists with the reasoned and measured secondary 
process, and the distinction between them is that between 
id and ego. This differentiation, it should be noted, is 
accomplished without at the same time splitting off ego 
from id, and without altering the original non-reflexive 
nature of the process in.which impulse is transformed into 
idea, intent, and action. Ego no longer is "merged" with 
id, but its relationship to id is one of co-operation.
With a simple structure such as this— with the mind 
process proceeding in a straight line, so to speak, from its 
inception in impulse to its termination in thought or deed, 
no true defense mechanism is possible. This, at least, is 
my belief. Anna Freud, however, speaks of defense at this 
stage, as I have noted above, and posits ego's innate dread 
of the strength of instincts as the motivating force. There 
may indeed be some inchoate response mechanism of this kind
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In the infantile ego. My conviction is, however, that at 
this stage, ego can abandon or "lose" itself with rather 
complete freedom, and that fear of overthrow by the in­
stincts is not, and cannot be, an issue until the first 
signs appear of the internalized standards (attitudes) of 
others. In this connection, it is probably wise to distin­
guish between ego-control and ego-defense. The ego that is 
aware of impulse and aware of reality is able to respond 
appropriately, even to the point of suppressing action.
But this is not ego-defense, as the term defense is ordi­
narily used. The latter arises only when the impulse (or 
feeling or thought) itself becomes unacceptable, and this 
occurs only as an internal agency is present to pass judg­
ment on it. The structure of id-ego simply is lacking the 
dynamic "leverage" to effect defense mechanisms.
All of this is changed with the differentiation of 
super-ego from ego. The creation of super-ego— or rather, 
of ego-ideal— is an art of self-objectification, and in this 
creation the heretofore direct, spontaneous id-ego process 
is given a reflexive turn. It is self turning back on self, 
so to speak, in a way alien to and impossible for the simpler 
id-ego process. Actually, the self that is objectified in 
this creation is not the original id-ego structure— not the 
self itself— but an idealized version of the self, and it is 
not a perception of the self but a conceptual creation (as 
a drama or a novel).
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The establishing of super-ego does not merely add 
another agency, and another function, to the original self 
constituted by id and ego. It changes the relationship be­
tween these two agencies in a very significant way.® The 
earlier differentiation becomes— in part, at least— a split; 
conflict between the two is aroused, out of which come the 
mechanisms of defense. Super-ego is able to cause such 
profound effects between ego and id because of the unique 
nature of the feeling that it wields. This feeling is what 
I have called self-feeling. Guilt is perhaps the most wide­
ly acknowledged feeling of this kind, but the forms are 
legion: shame, humiliation, self-contempt, elation, smug­
ness, pride, are some of the more common. These are the 
only feelings that precipitate defense reactions— which is 
why defense is strictly the business of the reflexive self.
Anna Freud appears to hold to somewhat the same view 
with regard to certain of the defense mechanisms, but makes 
exceptions to the rule. Thus, in suggesting a chronologi­
cal classification of defense mechanisms she quotes Freud 
to the effect that, "It may well be that before its sharp 
cleavage into an ego and an id, and before the formation of 
a super-ego, the mental apparatus makes use of different
O
This is a basic tenet of Gestalt psychology. Super­
ego is not simply "added on" to an already existing struc­
ture. With its creation the entire structure is modified in 
all its parts. It strikes me that in the analysis of mind- 
functions this point is often overlooked.
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methods of defense from those which it employs after it has 
attained these levels of organization*' (A. Freud, 1946, 
p. 55). And she adds, by way of example, that it is mean­
ingless to speak of repression where the ego is still merged 
with the id. On the other hand she suggests that the de­
fenses of projection and introjection may indeed precede 
the internal development noted above. For my own part, I 
cannot see the justification in classifying these processes 
as defenses to begin with. Both have a place in Baldwin's 
accounting of the dialectic growth of the normal self and 
both are taken as innate workings of the mind. Especially 
is this true of projection: we interpret or "read into"
others what is in ourselves. What is labelled as projection 
in the pathological sense is simply the same process in ef­
fect when the private feelings are hostile or otherwise per­
verse. This often makes for a dramatic example when it is 
so blateritly a misrepresentation of the other, but the pro­
cess itself is no different from those instances in which 
the reading of the other is perfect.
At the other end of the suggested chronological 
classification Anna Freud puts sublimation, which is a 
"normal" rather than a "neurotic" defense mechanism. "Sub­
limation, i.e., the displacement of the instinctual aims in 
conformity with higher social values, presupposes the ac­
ceptance or at least the knowledge of such values, that is 
to say, presupposes the existence of the super-ego" (A.
Ik5
Freud, 1946, p. 56). According to this view, personal 
growth to the so-called higher levels requires defense 
against instinctual impulses, and, thus, the reflexive type 
of psychic structure, which makes such defense possible. 
Social and moral values are contained in the ego-ideal 
(super-ego) and they can be realized only by first prohib­
iting the free expression of the impulse-life.
This, it strikes me, is the same theme to be found 
in many of the modern writers who show an interest in the 
higher reaches of personality. Allport (1955)» for one, 
explicitly takes this position; however, Horney (19^ 5,
1950) makes a very vigorous attack on it. But it is clear 
that such a view takes no account of the observation made 
by Freud (see p. I3I) to the effect that worshipping a high 
ego ideal does not necessarily go hand in hand with sublima­
tion, that it is especially in neurotics that the greatest 
discrepancy is found between the two: lofty ego-ideal
along with "primitive libidinal instinct." I have already 
presented the view that there is always this discrepancy 
whenever ego-ideal exists. Let me add here for emphasis 
the point that the larger the role played by ego-ideal in 
the person's psychic life, the greater is this discrepancy.
Sublimation, in the sense described here, is simply 
another defense measure, and it follows the typical pattern 
of such measures. Instinctual impulses are denied direct 
expression and ego contrives to find some indirect channel
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of expression that meets the approval of the ego ideal.
This no doubt does result in conformity to higher social 
values, as Anna Freud notes, but it is a conformity enforced 
by the person's fear of the punitive power of the super-ego 
and one which leaves the basic id-ego structure unchanged, 
or at least without modification in the way desired.9 Sub­
limation thus has serious shortcomings as a conveyor of 
social and moral values; it "encapsulates" these values 
apart from the person's basic psychic structure; it prevents 
their real integration. It provides only the well-known 
"thin veneer" of civilization that by reputation collapses 
so quickly in crisis.
"Neo-Freudian" Views; Fromm, Horney, Sullivan
Fromm. In the books Escape from Freedom (1941) and 
Man for Himself (1947), Fromm's main objective, as I make it 
out, is to offer a social interpretation of character devel­
opment in place of Freud's essentially biological interpre­
tation, and to give emphasis to certain positive features 
of personality said to be overlooked in the Freudian view.
Thus, for example, he rejects the Freudian explana­
tion of the "oral" character as being the result of certain 
rather well-defined early-year experiences centering around
^Actually there is a modification and a very impor­
tant one, but it is never in the direction of higher per­
sonal and social values. It is always a malevolent trans­
formation.
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the mouth. Instead he turns the explanation around, so to 
speak, and views the dependent character's interest in the 
mouth and its functions as being expressive of (or symbolic 
of) a generalized way of relating to people, one which has 
been learned in the course of a host of social experiences. 
As another example, he posits a kind of conscience (which 
he calls "humanistic"), different in its make-up from the 
Freudian super-ego— one which is said to develop indepen­
dently of the internalization of authority-figures. And as 
still another, he writes extensively about the nature of 
self-love and about its place in the mature and productive 
mind.
There are just three of Fromm's ideas that 1 shall 
discuss here. These are, first, the notion of conscience; 
second, that of self-love; and third, that of spontaneity.
According to Fromm, there are two kinds of con­
science: authoritarian and humanistic. The first of these
is equivalent to the Freudian super-ego: "the voice of an
internalized external authority" (Fromm, 19^ 7, p. l44).
But there is another form of conscience, in Fromm's view: 
one which has its origin not in external authority but in 
the fullest expression of the self.
Humanistic conscience is the reaction of our 
total personality to its proper functioning or dys- 
functioning; . . .  It judges our functions as human 
beings. . . . Actions, thoughts, and feelings which 
are conducive to the proper functioning and unfold­
ing of our total personality produce a feeling of 
inner approval, or 'rightness,' characteristics of
1^ 8
the humanistic ’good conscience.’ On the other hand, 
acts, thoughts, and feelings injurious to our total 
personality produce a feeling of uneasiness and dis­
comfort, characteristic of the ’guilty conscience.’ 
Conscience is thus a re-action of ourselves to our­
selves. It is the voice of our true selves which 
summon us back to ourselves, to live productively, 
to develop fully and harmoniously— that is, W  be­
come what we potentially are (Fromm, 19^ 7, p. l5^).
Fromm contrasts his notion of self-love with Freud's 
secondary narcissism, in which the ego is said to attach its 
libido back onto itself— or rather, back onto its idealized 
version of itself (ego-ideal). According to Freud, love of 
self, in this sense, is antithetical to love for others, and 
he describes the latter state as an "impoverishment" of ego- 
libido. Fromm rejects this antithesis and insists that love 
of self is a necessary pre-condition for love of another.
He makes much of the concept of spontaneity. Spon­
taneity, he notes, is given to all of us as children, but 
ordinarily it is soon covered over by controls and pretense, 
accrued during the process of socialization.
Spontaneous activity is not compulsive activity, 
to which the individual is driven by his isolation 
and powerlessness; it is not the activity of the 
automaton, which is the uncritical adoption of pat­
terns suggested from the outside. Spontaneous ac­
tivity is free activity of the self and implies, 
psychologically, what the Latin root of the word, 
sponte. means literally: of one's free will. . . .
One premise for this spontaneity is the acceptance 
of the total personality and the elimination of the 
split between 'reason' and 'nature’; for only if 
man does not repress essential parts of his self, 
only if he has become transparent to himself, only 
if the different spheres of life have reached fun­
damental integration, is spontaneous activity 
possible (Fromm, 19^ 1, p. 258).
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As I see the issue, the distinction that Fromm makes 
between the humanistic and the authoritarian conscience is 
conveyed in a more general sense in the distinction I have 
made between the subjective mode of experience and being, 
and self-objectification. The authoritarian conscience is 
internalized external authority. This is as far as Fromm 
goes. What I should add to this is that the process of in­
ternalizing the outside authority is accomplished by the 
setting up within the self of a concept-of-self which sat­
isfies in all significant respects the demands of the 
authority. The original process of internalizing— typical­
ly of parental authority— disrupts the subjective mode, cor­
rupts the child's naive spontaneity. There is no "internal­
ized external authority" possible in the subjective mode; 
authority manages to find its way into the being of the 
child only by inducing him— out of fear— to surrender his 
spontaneity and create an objectified conceptual version of 
himself. Such a conscience— it is better perhaps, to call 
it super-ego— is the product of the splitting of the ego 
into subject and object, as Freud has described it. With­
out this splitting the super-ego function cannot be estab­
lished.
What Fromm refers to as humanistic conscience I take 
to be established within the subjective mode. It is con­
science which arises directly out of the feelings of the 
person insofar as they express his relatedness to others.
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It is conscience in the sense of concepts and feelings which 
have been fully integrated into the subjective self and 
which thus become part of the individual's spontaneous feel­
ing and impulse life.
On the matter of self-love, the distinction that 
Fromm notes between his view and that of Freud is, I think, 
a spurious one. He is simply writing about a different 
phenomenon. Freud uses the term self-love (secondary nar­
cissism) in its egotistical sense, as a development within 
the self when the individual is rebuffed by others. It is, 
of course, a caricature of real love, as, no doubt, Freud 
realized. But it seems to me that his use of the term is 
more defensible than is Fromm's for the simple reason that 
it is better grounded empirically. Self-love in the egotis­
tical sense is well known to all.
But Fromm clearly has a different meaning in mind 
when he uses the term. Self-love is of the same order as 
love-of-other and, if anything, is more basic to the produc­
tive personality; for without self-love there can be no 
love-of-other. Exactly what Fromm means by the term using 
it in this way is not at all clear. As far as I can make 
out, his self-love has no experiential referent; it is an 
abstraction, a presumed quality of a certain kind of per­
sonality which he posits for what I suspect are purely 
logical reasons.
But love of self cannot be of the same order as
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love-of-other. This is so because love-of-other requires 
that the ego gives of itself spontaneously; love must be 
experienced in the subjective mode; it cannot be self- 
conscious, or mediated by one's "ideal" of love. But 
clearly one cannot maintain one's subjectivity and love 
one's own self; self-love is by its nature a form of re­
flexiveness. Therefore it makes no sense to take Fromm's 
notion of self-love at face value. As concrete experience, 
or mind process, the only form of self-love that I know of 
is that described by Freud as secondary narcissism.
About spontaneity I have already made passing refer­
ence. Fromm writes of spontaneous activity as the "free ac­
tivity of the self," and he notes that this involves the 
lack of repression, transparency of self (to self), and 
integration of the "different spheres of life." But he 
makes no attempt to describe the structure of the self where­
in these conditions are met. In my view, spontaneity must 
be tied down to a form of self-structure if it is to mean 
anything; and this structure, as I see it, is "subjective," 
or non-reflexive. It is thought and feeling coming up 
through the self to expression, so to speak, without being 
detoured through and being transformed by the ideal concept 
of self. In spontaneity there is no possibility for what 
is called neurotic conflict because there is no splitting 
of the self into opposing camps. Conversely, spontaneity 
is possible only when the self is able to maintain its sub-
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jective unity.
In short, on each of the three ideas I have taken 
from Fromm for comment— conscience, self-love, and spontan­
eity— I feel not so much disagreement in any significant way 
with his position as dissatisfaction with the way that he 
states it. His analysis stops, it seems to me, just at the 
point where sound empirically-based analysis of the person­
ality should begin. In this he does not come up to the very 
high standards set by Freud, who came to terms with his sub­
ject matter in a straightforward and strictly "scientific" 
manner. Compared to Freud, Fromm appears more the philoso­
pher than psychologist.
Sullivan. In a sense, with Sullivan we once again 
return to the intellectual tradition developed by my four 
source writers. Sullivan himself explicitly recognizes his 
indebtedness to Cooley and, especially, to Mead for their 
social theory of the self; and the resemblance between his 
writings and those of the source writers, taken as a group, 
is fairly obvious. Of course he goes far beyond these 
others in working up a theory of self-development that em­
phasizes individual experience and so-called personality 
dynamics, but in certain essential features his ideas can 
be seen as an extension of their self-theory.
Here I do not intend to deal with the full scope of 
Sullivan's theory; rather, my interest centers around certain
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rather circumscribed aspects of it which are relevant to my 
notion of the self-concept. The central idea for my purpose 
— and perhaps the central idea in Sullivan's system as a 
whole— is that of the self-system, or self-dynamism, or, 
simply, the self; three terms which seemingly he uses in­
terchangeably.
To understand the concept of the self-system it is 
necessary first to take account of the social context with­
in which it arises, or what Sullivan designates as inter­
personal relations. The individual cannot be understood 
apart from these relations; indeed, the idea of a self iso­
lated from, or independent of, these relations is, according 
to Sullivan, sheer "illusion." This is to say again, using 
somewhat different terms, what Colley and Mead have repeat­
edly emphasized: i.e., that self implies other.
The self-system grows up as a dynamism within the 
personality as a result of the person's relations with 
others. Sullivan describes in great detail the course that 
these relations more or less typically follow, beginning 
(by inference) with the infant's earliest relations with 
his mother and on through the period of childhood, the ju­
venile era, the preadolescent age, and adolescence— each of 
which offers the growing child an opportunity for certain 
characteristic and unique kinds of interpersonal relations.
The beginnings of the self-system are to be found 
in the person's growing personifications of himself. These
1^4
Sullivan designates as the "good-me," the "bad-me," and the 
"not-me." Naturally, these too have their roots in inter­
personal relations. The good-me is the personification of 
those features of the personality which have elicited a 
"tender" or approving response from the significant others. 
The bad-me personifies those features which arouse the dis­
favor of the significant others and which, consequently, 
evoke anxiety. And the not-me personifies those features 
which have aroused such intense disfavor and, consequently, 
such intense anxiety (or "uncanny emotion") that they are 
"dissociated" from the conscious life.
Good-me and bad-me constitute the basis of the life­
long ingredients of consciousness. Bad-me, it seems, con­
sists in those defects of character which the person is 
fully aware of; it is the unfortunate side of the personal­
ity which still can be appraised in a rational manner.
"There is no person who is not, in the privacy of his own 
covert operations, perfectly clear on the fact that he has 
a number of unsatisfactory and undesirable attributes which 
he is busily engaged in concealing, or excusing" (Sullivan, 
1953b, p. 316). On the other hand, the features of the not- 
me remain out of the person's awareness, except under unus­
ual circumstances. Both the bad-me and the not-me, it should 
be noted, consist of features which have brought, and which 
continue to bring, anxiety to the person. I presume that 
whether a particular feature is accepted as part of the bad-
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me, or "dissociated" as part of the not-me,. depends on the 
intensity of the anxiety it arouses, or, perhaps, on some 
qualitative features of the anxious experience.
The self-system grows out of these personifications. 
It is, according to Sullivan, a more or less clearly defined 
function of the personality. It is not an agency or object 
or mechanism; it is a dynamism. A dynamism is "the relative­
ly enduring patterns of energy transformation which recur­
rently characterize the interpersonal relations. . . which 
make up the distinctly human sort of being" (Sullivan,
1953b, p. 103). Among the dynamisms, the self-system is 
unique in that it is aroused by and serves as a protection 
against anxiety. "It comes into being because of, and can 
be said to have as its goal, the securing of necessary sat­
isfaction without incurring much anxiety" (Sullivan, 1953b, 
p. 169).
Now, anxiety, in Sullivan's scheme of things, has a 
rather unique meaning and a very specific origin. To con­
sider the latter first, anxiety originates in the infant 
through an "emphatic linkage" with the significant older 
person— especially, of course, the mothering one. When the 
older person is anxious, the tension is by some means trans­
mitted to the infant. According to Sullivan, the mysterious 
capacity to "empathize" is pretty much lost to the individual 
beyond infancy. But at about the same time the interpersonal 
relationship comes to be characterized by important novel
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features: what in effect is the approving and disapproving
attitudes of the significant others. Disapproval, of course, 
arouses anxiety; approval (tenderness) leaves one feeling 
"secure" and comfortable. It is a point worth noting that 
punishment itself is said not to have any part in the for­
mation of the self-dynamism. Punishment of itself leads to 
fear, not anxiety. But most parents, Sullivan observes, 
subject their children to pain-with-anxiety because of the 
attitudes they display while meting out punishment.
Anxiety, then, (as opposed to fear) originates in 
the interpersonal relationship either through "empathy," 
originally, or, later, in response to the perceived disap­
proving attitudes of the significant other. But the experi­
ences that cause anxiety also serve to shape and establish 
the personifications of self: good-me, bad-me, and not-me.
And these personifications give anxiety its unique flavor 
by creating a new issue: the issue of self-respect, or
personal worth, or what can be called generically, self­
esteem. Anxiety in this sense is aroused by an experience 
that threatens the self-esteem, and when this happens the 
self-system is called into operation to protect the person 
from the danger. The self-system, aroused by a touch of 
anxiety, moves toward the feeling of personal worth, or 
"security,"
One of the important ways— perhaps the important way 
— in which the dynamism operates is to dismiss the trouble­
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some experience from mind. Sullivan's term for this is 
dissociation, and the elements of experience that are thus 
dismissed from consciousness form the not-me. In effect, 
this kind of self-activity permits the person to disregard 
certain unpleasant aspects of experience; at the same time 
it narrows down the range of experience and makes the per­
son more or less resistant to change— either in the direc­
tion of growth or retrogression. According to the theorem 
of escape, "the self-system from its nature . . . tends to 
escape influence by experience which is incongruous with 
its current organization and functional activity" (Sulli­
van, 1953b, p. 190).
It is not quite clear to me what Sullivan intends 
when he refers to experience which is "incongruous" with 
the "current organization and functional activity" of the 
self-system. But it is most consistent with his over-all 
theory, 1 believe, to take it as experience that is incon­
gruous with the good-me. For it is experience of this kind 
which arouses anxiety and sets the self-system going in its 
defensive operations. And it is this interpretation which 
fits in best with Sullivan's emphasis on self-esteem and on 
the security operations of the self-system. It is hard to 
see how an experience incongruous with the bad-me could have 
such an effect; yet it is possible that Sullivan had this 
in mind too.
Now, one of the serious difficulties that the person
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may get into derives from the fact that the personifications 
of self often, are inadequate and inappropriate. Whether 
this applies to both the good-me and and bad-me, Sullivan 
nowhere states. The only specific reference I can find 
seems to apply in particular to the good-me. "People have 
come to hold views of themselves which are so far from valid 
formulations that these views are eternally catching them in 
situations in which the incongruity and inappropriateness 
are about to become evident, whereupon the person suffers 
the interference of anxiety" (Sullivan, 1953b, p. 300).
This pretty well describes the workings of what I have la­
belled self-concept. In Sullivan's system it is the "autis­
tic, fantastic" side of the good-me, which in addition has 
a side that is reality-bound and objective too.
But I do not think that it is justified to refer in 
this way to two separate aspects of good-me to cover such 
strikingly different processes, for the difference between 
the two is important enough to warrant greater distinction 
in names. Indeed, I do not think that the "realistic" good- 
me exists in the same way that the "fantastic, autistic" 
form does, nor that it has the same repercussions on the 
workings of the mind. I cannot find any empirical referent 
for the former at all, and I question the use of the term, 
while the latter is a familiar occurrence to all. And the 
former seems to have no association whatever with anxiety, 
whereas the latter is thoroughly drenched with it.
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Sullivan further blurs the issue, I feel, by treat­
ing bad-me as exactly correlative with good-me both in ori­
gin and function; they are different only in that the one 
encompasses bad qualities, the other good. Otherwise, in 
their status as concepts they are similar. Both are said 
to arise from interpersonal contacts, from "reflected ap­
praisals" : good-me from such appraisals which are favor­
able, bad-me from such as are unfavorable, much as if the 
self-personification is a direct impression from these ex­
periences.
My view is rather different. To begin with, the 
self-concept is strictly a "positive" personification of 
self. I do not think that there is a negative self-concept; 
therefore I do not propose a term equivalent to Sullivan's 
bad-me. My feeling is that the "bad" side of the self-other 
relationship makes its impression not in the form of a self­
personification (or self-concept) at all, but rather in the 
primitive feeling of humiliation, or negative self-feeling.
It may be argued that such "bad" feeling pre-supposes a "bad" 
personification of self, but this is presumptuous. There 
may be no personification at all, and this I take to be the 
case. As I have remarked above the humiliated person does 
not conceptualize himself as inadequate, worthless, or the 
like. What is in his mind is the awareness that the signif­
icant other persons conceive of him (and judge him) in this 
light. This arouses the negative self-feeling which in turn
l6o
evokes the self-concept as a defense, or réaction-formation.
The closest approach to this statement of the se­
quence of events that I can find in Sullivan's writings is 
a remark he makes about the relative silence with which the 
person with a low self-appraisal (his term) endures his 
fate. One achieves this in part, Sullivan writes, "by pre­
occupation with implicit revery processes that dramatize 
the opposite of one's defects, or protest one's rights, or 
otherwise manifest indirectly one's feeling of unworthiness 
and inferiority" (Sullivan, 1953a, p. 11). This process is 
what I call the process of self-conceptualizing.
It is interesting to note that Sullivan himself, 
when he gets down to the business of writing about the self- 
dynamism as composed of "reflected appraisals," writes only 
of the negative instance (Sullivan, 1953a, p. 10). And, 
incidentally, it is in this context that he makes the state­
ment, cited just above, about the dramatic revery processes, 
providing, in this rather loose way, the same formulation 
that I have proposed. That is, derogatory self-appraisal 
leads to imaginative dramatization of the self as "ideal."
So far as I know, Sullivan does not give the same treatment 
to the opposite instance, in which the "reflected apprais­
als" are laudatory.
Perhaps I can sum up this section with one additional 
point. The act of self-conceptualizing as I have described 
it no doubt would be classified in Sullivan's terms as one
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of the operations of the self-system. I believe that it 
plays a central and perhaps uniquely important role in these 
operations. On the one hand, the act itself is an attempt 
to allay anxiety. But on the other hand, the existence of 
the self-concept, or the established habit of self-conceptu­
alizing, makes the person vulnerable to attacks of anxiety 
in the first place. The sequence thus is cyclical, and 
self-perpetuating,
Horney. In Horney's writings probably no one theme 
is more dominant than that of the ideal image. This theme 
is first propounded in Our Inner Conflicts (19^ 5) as one of 
the various ways employed by the person to resolve conflict. 
Later, however, in Neurosis and Human Growth (1950), it be­
comes of much greater significance. Horney writes: "in
subsequent years the concept of the idealized image became 
the central issue from which new insights evolved. It ac­
tually was the gateway to the whole area of intrapsychic 
processes presented in this book," (Horney, 1950, p. 307).
According to the Horney theory, the ideal image is 
a neurotic production, resorted to by the individual as an 
attempt to achieve harmony among incompatible attitudes: 
compliant, aggressive, and detached; as a device for pro­
tecting himself from his lack of real self-confidence; and 
as a way of overcoming what she calls his "alienation from 
self." There is only one way he can resolve the predicament 
he finds himself in, and that is by way of his imagination.
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"Gradually and unconsciously, the imagination sets to work 
and creates in his mind an idealized image of himself. In 
this process he endows himself with unlimited powers and 
with exalted faculties; he becomes a hero, a genius, a su­
preme lover, a saint, a god" (Horney, 19 5^? p. 22). It 
takes away his feeling of insignificance, gives him a sense 
of meaningfulness and power; it raises his self-esteem.
Thus the ideal image possesses a very definite at­
traction for the person full of anxiety and doubts about 
himself. It offers him certain rather spectacular rewards. 
However, these rewards are not unmixed blessings. "Instead 
of solid self-confidence . . . ^the person/ gets a glitter­
ing gift of most questionable value: neurotic pride"
(Horney, 1950, p. 87). As a device for securing internal 
harmony, then, the ideal image has serious drawbacks. For 
one thing, the person thus afflicted is thereby made "vul­
nerable." "Any questioning or criticism from outside, any 
awareness of his own failure to measure up to the image, 
any real insight into the forces operating within him can 
make it explode or crumble" (Horney, 19^ 5} p. 110). He thus 
becomes hypersensitive to criticism and rejection, and total­
ly dependent upon "endless affirmation from others in the 
form of approval, admiration, flattery— none of which, how­
ever, can give him any more than temporary assurance"
(Horney, 19^ 5? P* HO). His self-evaluation (self-esteem) 
"rises or falls with the attitudes of others toward him"
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(Horney, 19^5j P. 135).
In the second place, the ideal image creates a 
"dangerous rift" in the personality. The person builds up 
his ideal image because he cannot tolerate himself as he 
actually is. This is the original calamity, against which 
the ideal image is set in defense. But "having placed him­
self on a pedestal . . . the person . . . can tolerate his 
real self still less and starts to rage against it, to de­
spise himself and to chafe under the yoke of his own unat­
tainable demands upon himself. He wavers then between self­
adoration and self-contempt" (Horney, 19^ 5» p. 112).
And lastly, his "alienation from self" is therein 
intensified. "Alienation" is a very difficult concept to 
grasp, but it is of paramount importance in Horney's system. 
By alienation, as I understand it, she refers to a state of 
affairs in which the person's "real self"— his would-be 
natural, spontaneous, undisguised thoughts and feelings—  
is denied expression by the compulsive drive to live accord­
ing to the dictates of the ideal image. As Horney puts it, 
the person grows "remote" from his own feelings, wishes, 
beliefs, and energies; he suffers from a kind of deperson­
alization. Spontaneity gives way to compulsion.
Looked at in another way, the ideal image of self 
involves the person in what Horney refers to as the pride 
system and makes him subject to what she calls the tyranny 
of the should. On the issue of pride, Horney notes that
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there are really two different states that we ordinarily 
designate by the term— one healthy, the other neurotic. 
Neurotic pride is the emotional reflection of the fantastic 
and unfounded ideal image of self at such times as the per­
son has convinced himself that he ^  his image. Healthy 
pride, on the other hand, is simply well-founded self-esteem. 
Neurotic pride indicates a need to feel proud and raises the 
spectre of shame and humiliation should the need not be met; 
it is, then, a shaky, insubstantial form of self-esteem and 
it quickly and easily can give way to self-hatred.
It is, in fact, always associated with self-hatred, 
for the simple reason that pride is attached to the ideal 
image— not the self. This image is such that the real self 
must appear shabby and despicable in comparison. Thus, the 
greater the involvement with the ideal image, the greater 
the underlying feeling of self-hatred.
The extent to which the pride system pervades the 
personality may reach impressive proportions. Horney re­
marks that "there is simply nothing that cannot be invested 
with pride" (Horney, 195ü, p. 93). The ideal image can take 
any conceivable form; any quality, and in particular any 
felt weakness or vice, can easily be transformed into a 
strength or virtue. Egocentricity thus may appear as 
strength, vindictiveness as justice, and so on. Or again, 
"compliance becomes goodness, love, saintliness; aggressive­
ness becomes strength, leadership, heroism, omnipotence;
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aloofness becomes wisdom, self-sufficiency, independence. 
What appears as shortcomings or flaws are always dimmed out 
or retouched" (Horney, 1950, p. 22).
The tyranny of the should is closely tied up with 
the pride system. Like the latter it, too, is an expression 
of the ideal image. For the person who reflects on his 
ideal image is telling himself, in effect : "Forget about
the disgraceful creature you actually are; this is how you 
should be; and to be this idealized self is all that mat­
ters" (Horney, 1950, p. 64). Thus every ideal has a should 
— a compulsion— attached to it, a tension created by the 
discrepancy between real and ideal self.
This tension is experienced variously as egotistical 
pride, if the idealized image is accepted as the real self; 
self-derogation, if the focus is on the real self in com­
parison with the ideal; and guilt, if the focus is on the 
discrepancy itself. Whatever the particular form taken, 
the tension creates a drive toward the actualization of the 
idealized self, a drive which in Horney's lexicon must be 
sharply differentiated from geniune self-realization. Ac­
tualization of idealized self is nothing more than the com­
pulsive attempt to prove one's perfection, according to the 
standards one has set up in the ideal. It is thinking, 
feeling, willing according to the way the ideal dictates 
that one should think, feel, and will. In the process it 
forces the person to forego his "real self" and to set him­
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self up as a superhuman being, with capacities that are ut­
terly unattainable, yet which he feels under a compulsion 
to attain. As I understand Horney, it is her contention 
that this development is not in the direction of the matura­
tion of thought, feeling, or impulse, but only in their rigid 
control by the tyrannical should.
It is interesting to note that there is no place in 
Horney's system for a "negative" equivalent of the ideal 
image, I have made the same point with reference to the 
self-concept; it has no "negative" side. There is, of 
course, a negative aspect to the personality. One may feel 
inadequate, worthless, sinful, and the like; and there is a 
temptation to take such feelings as evidence of a negative 
self-concept. But there is none. The self-concept serves 
a very specific function within the total functioning of the 
personality, and this function— the raising or maintaining 
of self-esteem— can be realized only by a concept that re­
flects favorably on the self.
Horney notes that there is "simply nothing" that 
cannot be invested with pride. This is true; for example, 
certain unfortunate individuals may take pride even in being 
fools and ne'er-do-wells, labels that would annoy or humili­
ate the ordinary person. This is indeed an instance of 
"negative" self-concepts, but they are negative only from 
the social, or objective, point of view. To the person 
concerned the values claimed are positive ; they enhance his
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self-esteem. And the status of such a "perverted" self- 
concept within the personality is exactly the same as that 
of the typically glorified one,
Horney locates the crux of neurosis in the ideal 
self; by contrast, she finds mental health in what she calls 
the "real self." The concept of real self is a difficult 
one to grasp, to say the least. Horney defines it as an 
"original force toward individual growth and fulfillment.
. . . ^It is also/ what we refer to when we say that we want 
to find ourselves" (Horney, 195u, p. 158). Such statements 
are hardly descriptive, and to the extent that they give 
the impression of an existing "real" component of the per­
sonality waiting to be discovered (or imcovered), they are 
misleading. I do not subscribe to the concept of a real 
self in the exact sense that Horney proposes. And yet the 
term does have some justification, in that, taken in com­
pany with "ideal self" it at least announces the existence 
of profound differences in possible self-structures. How­
ever, I prefer the concepts of spontaneous and reflexive 
self-structures as being more descriptive, and as present­
ing the distinction between structures in more concrete and 
understandable terms.
Apropos the distinction between real and idealized 
self, I find it interesting that Horney is impelled to dis­
tinguish between two kinds of pride, or self-esteem. There 
is pride and there is neurotic pride— the latter a "glitter­
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ing gift of most questionable value" (Horney, 1950, p. 87), 
Neurotic pride is mediated by the self-concept and it is of 
questionable value because of the inevitable anxiety that 
suffuses it. It is pride-with-anxiety and it is extraordi­
narily sensitive to the attitudes of others, whereas pride 
in the sense of the feeling of a satisfied well-being is 
anxiety-free and "secure."
Neurotic pride is antithetical to humility, "real" 
pride is not. To my knowledge, the concept of humility is 
not incorporated into Korney's system, yet it is clear that 
she could easily find a place for it in her scheme of self- 
realization and growth. A point that she makes over and 
over again is that the ideal image obstructs self-realiza­
tion; that the compulsive actualization of the self-ideal 
achieves nothing more than a kind of behavioral perfection. 
This is the same point that I have raised with regard to the 
functioning of the self-concept, and it creates a very nice 
issue for further analysis; i.e., the nature of "real" 
ideals and of personal growth. In this connection, my only 
remark is on the negative side. Growth is not realized 
through the self-concept or through the ideal image. For 
growth demands humility, and of course pride, in the neu­
rotic sense, is the polar opposite of humility.
Horney makes much the same point, though she does 
not explicitly recognize the role of humility. She points 
out, however, that humility follows from genuine ideals,
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whereas the ideal image evokes its opposite; arrogance. 
"Precisely to the extent that the image is -unrealistic, it 
tends to make the person arrogant, in the original meaning 
of the word; for arrogance . . . means to arrogate to one­
self qualities that one does not have" (Horney, 19^ 5» p. 97). 
And of course, as one's pride becomes attached to the pos­
session of these arrogated qualities, the issue degenerates 
into one, simply, of defending one's image. "The idealized 
image is a decided hindrance to growth because it either 
denies shortcomings or merely condemns them" (Horney, 19^ 5) 
p. 98).
Munroe. With Munroe we can come directly to the 
point. "To my mind," she writes, "there is a major omission 
from Freud's statement of the important dynamic groupings 
(structures, institutions) that come to function more or 
less independently in the mature personality. That is the 
self-image" (Munroe, 1957, p. 273). People, she states, 
build up a rather clear cut picture of themselves— a picture 
which goes beyond conscience and which has definite social 
contours. "This image is surely strongly influenced by the 
superego, but it is also a reflection of what other people 
think of us— as interpreted by ourselves; of what we con­
sider our assets and limitations according to the social 
values we accept; of the role we think we play in our own 
world" (Munroe, 1955, P. 27k),
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The self-image is a developmental construct, and the 
exact form that it takes depends upon the kind of experience 
out of which it arises. With a child-parent relationship 
which is strong and either markedly syntonic or dystonie 
with the general culture pattern, the emerging self-image 
may be almost identical with the Freudian superego. Where 
the child-parent relationship is diffuse and the culture 
pattern strong and unified, the self-image may be more 
closely related to the accepted social role and only slight­
ly related to superego.
Just how the self-image functions as an agency of 
the mind to regulate or influence self-activities, Munroe 
does not make clear. However, she classifies it, dynamical­
ly, as a substructure primarily of the ego, and, like all 
ego structures, she notes, it must "borrow" much of its 
energy from an outside source. This source is said probably 
to be the superego. Self-esteem apparently is in some way 
associated with the self-image, but the nature of this as­
sociation is not specified, nor is the dynamic significance 
of self-esteem or other self-feelings, hinted at.
But the self-image ordinarily is not a single en­
tity, Munroe states, "Typically there are important sub­
images, which may have a high degree of autonomy. Most of 
us have several pictures of ourselves, not always logically 
compatible with one another, which serve as a dynamic focus 
under varying circumstances" (Munroe, 1955» P. 611),
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Presumably, then, the particular form that the self-image 
takes at any given moment depends in part, at least, on the 
features of the social situation as the individual perceives 
it, and in part on his specific needs at that instant. Mo­
mentary self-images need not be brought together into a 
single consistent structure.
There are two features of Munroe's self-image that 
warrant comment in relation to my notion of the self-concept. 
The first of these is her choice of a term; self-image as 
compared with self-concept. The former indicates the visual 
mode, the latter the verbal. To point this out may only be 
to quibble over a trivial verbal distinction; yet on the 
other hand it may well hint at a geniune and basic issue.
My choice of "concept" was deliberate and stems from my be­
lief that the idealized, objectified version of the self is 
carried in conversation. It is an outgrowth of the inter­
nalized conversation of gestures, and though in its devel­
oped form it may have visual components as well as verbal, 
my feeling is that the verbal components give it its essen­
tial structure and carry its deepest meaning. Verbal praise 
and verbal censure, both from within and without, are the 
stuff out of which the self-concept originally arises, and 
these remain the stimuli to which the self-concept is most 
sensitive.
The second feature is that the self-image (Munroe) 
seems to be an agency of both rational and dispassionate
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self-appraisal as well as of distorted idealization. This 
is essentially the same view expressed by Allport (self- 
image) and Sullivan (good-me), but it departs from both 
Freud's notion of the ego-ideal and my own version of the 
self-concept, in both of which the idealization of self in 
imagination is the distinguishing characteristic, I do not 
see how it can be otherwise. For the conditions which arouse 
the self to self-conceptualizing activities are those of 
acute stress, and the resulting conceptual version is shaped 
according to the need of the anguished self for relief.
Munroe seems to associate the self-image with self-esteem, 
but apparently overlooks the fact that the latter can be 
attached only to an image of self that possesses social or 
moral virtue.
No doubt the self does engage in so-called objective 
self-appraisals, in the service of its adaptations to real­
ity. Yet I do not believe that these appraisals have the 
emotional backing ever to attain the status of a more or 
less continuous function, or "agency." And clearly their 
role in the total dynamics of the self is far different 
from that of those fanciful and idealized appraisals that 
constitute the ego ideal or self-concept. Thus, the self- 
concept as I construe it is narrower in scope than Munroe's 
self-image, but it is composed of a more homogeneous set of 
functions and can more properly be designated as a single 
agency.
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Self-Concept Reconsidered
I conclude this chapter with some additional remarks 
about the self-concept and its functioning within the self, 
remarks which have been prompted by the several observations 
and interpretations just presented.
To begin with: it is possible and convenient to
think of the self as a "structure," two more or less sharply 
differentiated kinds of structures can be observed. The 
first of these, chronologically, is what can be called the 
spontaneous structure: it is characterized by mind process­
es which proceed in a straight line, so to speak, from their 
inception in primitive impulse and feeling to their expres­
sion in deed, or their suppression. This is a structure 
that I believe could be described, in analytic terms, as an 
Id-Ego structure. It is the simplest possible self-struc- 
ture,^^ one that would be described as naive (Cooley) or 
subjective (Mead), or as being selfless (Lewis, Fingarette). 
It is non-reflexive.
The second type of structure is reflexive in nature, 
and includes the self-concept (or ego ideal, or ideal image). 
This structure is characterized by mind processes which turn 
around upon the self, which are referred to the idealized
lOgimpie self-structure should not be confused with 
simple self. Within this simple structure enormous complex­
ity of development is possible. In fact, it is probably 
true that the most complex and mature personalities are 
basically of this type.
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version of self on their journey to expression, and which 
are significantly modified in the process. In analytic 
terms, again, this is a self-structure constituted by Id- 
Ego-Superego. The self so formed would be described as 
sophisticated or affected (Cooley), or as self-conscious 
(Lewis, and general usage).
These are the two basic forms that self-structure 
may assume: that is, either with or without a self-concept.
The structures themselves are more or less enduring. Of 
course they are not structural entities at all, but only 
structurings of processes, and the self is not exclusively 
composed of either the one or the other but may swing back 
and forth between them with relative ease. Individuals may 
be characterized as predominantly spontaneous or predomin­
antly reflexive in make-up, but these are only general de­
scriptive terms. At any one time the person is either the 
one or the other, and probably there is no one who does not 
have both in his repertoire.
As I have repeatedly stated, the transformation from 
the spontaneous to the reflexive structure is accomplished 
as a result of a particular kind of self-other relationship. 
It comes about when the person— taking him as in the spontan­
eous mode to begin with— comes into contact with an attitude 
directed toward him by a significant other person, and es­
pecially when that attitude is one of disapproval (as con­
tempt, scorn, etc.). The reaction to the perception of an
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attitude is self-feeling, an affective state which inter­
nalizes the approving or disapproving attitude coming from 
the outside. It is the unique power of self-feeling to turn 
the mind to the self-conceptualizing activity. This is es­
pecially true of negative self-feeling, which is intoler­
able; the self cannot accept it, or "live with it," as we 
say, and as an escape or defensive measure resorts to the 
imagination to create an ideal version of self which in the 
mind's eye draws the favor of the significant others. This 
is the act of self-objectification, which introduces into 
the self a new element (the self-concept) and transforms 
the original spontaneous structure into a reflexive one.
Having arisen in response to self-feeling, the self- 
concept serves in turn to perpetuate it. That is, the per­
son with a self-concept is made "vulnerable," in the sense 
that he is sensitized to the perpetual threat of disapprov­
al, either from without or within. The self-concept thus 
becomes, in effect, an approval-disapproval dynamism, to 
use Sullivan's term. It is the vehicle for anxiety, in the 
deepest and most significant form that anxiety can take.
It also profoundly alters the feeling and impulse- 
life, and raises important new problems of self-control.
For negative self-feeling, especially, is intolerable, and 
makes demands for satisfaction on the self that pure or 
spontaneous feelings do not.^^ The need for self-esteem
^^These demands may have something to do with the
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(the internal reflection of the need for approval from 
other) cannot be appeased or "sublimated"; it is felt as a 
positive threat in a way that an ordinary need, even the 
sexual, cannot approach no matter how intense it may grow. 
Moreover, self-esteem as a need is insatiable and leads to 
compulsive behavior. This derives ultimately from the fact 
that approval implies and is invariably associated with 
disapproval, and therefore that real security can never be 
attained from this source; no matter how much approving sup­
port is given the man with shaky self-esteem, he remains on 
shaky grounds. Furthermore, because he is dominated by his 
need for approval, he cannot understand the meaning of ac­
ceptance^^  and can gain no emotional satisfaction from the 
kind of relationship that, objectively speaking, should of­
fer it to him. He becomes engaged in a continuing struggle 
to prove himself, according to the qualities he has arrogated 
to himself, and is unable to comprehend anything other than 
success (pride, elation) or failure (humiliation, shame) in 
his quest.
problem of ego-strength, A "strong" ego may be nothing more 
than an ego that is subject to few demands of this kind—  
that is, one which is part of a spontaneous self-structure. 
In this view it is a mistake to refer to a strong or weak 
ego in the first place, as the strength and weakness are to 
be found in the total self-structure, not in just one as­
pect of it,
^%orney refers to a compulsive need for acceptance. 
This is a misconception, for the need for acceptance cannot 
be transformed into a compulsion. The compulsive need, 
which no doubt Horney has in mind, is the need for approval, 
which is something else again.
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Finally, the transformation invariably leaves a 
residue of hostility, or as Sullivan would have it, malevo­
lence. The hostility may be disguised, but it is an inex­
tricable aspect of all self-conceptualizing. It is explained 
simply enough. The person resorts to self-conceptualizing 
in the attempt to rid himself of Intolerable self-feeling. 
Disapproval of one kind or another has been shown him. But 
one cannot accept a judgment of this kind without reacting 
with hostility; this I take to be an invariable sequence. 
Probably the self-concept itself is shaped in a way that 
provides, in the imagination, a drain for the hostile im­
pulses that result; but of course expression in this form 
can never relieve the source of the hostility, and it re­
mains as an important moving force within the self and a 
constant threat to self-control. Thus, much of positive 
self-feeling is tinged with arrogant contempt for the other, 
just as the objective of much of self-conceptualizing is the 
domination or the humiliation of an other.
There is very little reference in the psychological 
literature to the workings of the spontaneous self. This 
no doubt is due in part to the inherent difficulty in de­
scribing the subjective state or the processes that charac­
terize it and in part to an implied value judgment that dis­
misses the simple self-structure as primitive and that lo­
cates human value and growth in the reflexive process and 
the ego-ideal. Fingarette (1958) makes this same point
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about the ineffability of "self-less" experience, but at 
the same time makes a very good case for self-lessness as a 
prerequisite for insight and maturity, as contrasted with 
the state of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness, as 
Fingarette uses the term, is to be distinguished sharply 
from self-awareness, and is one expression of "defensive 
character armor."
But however this may be, most of current psychologi­
cal interest is fastened upon the reflexive self-structure. 
For one thing, this structure is easier to talk about; more­
over, it is more intimately involved in the "neurotic," 
"defensive" activities of the self, which have traditionally 
been one of the main concerns of psychological analysis.
It is my contention that all of conflict (in the neurotic 
sense) and all of the ego defenses (in the same sense) take 
place within the reflexive structure ; that the self-concept 
is an integral part of these activities and that, strictly 
speaking, they cannot arise within the spontaneous self­
structure.
There are, of course, conflicts of various sorts, 
and in a sense every problem that the person faces throws 
him into one. However, the conflicts which have greatest 
effect on the workings of the mind are those which impli­
cate self-feelings. And these imply the existence of a 
self-concept. Thus, certain impulses may be denied expres­
sion (suppressed) out of an awareness of consequences: as
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physical danger or financial loss. There is conflict be­
tween the impulses and the forces of denial, but ordinarily 
it is conflict which is easily resolved. On the other hand, 
impulses which conflict with the ideal of self cause a much 
greater reaction within the self. The aroused self-feeling 
is intolerable to the self, and activities designed to de­
fend the self from this feeling are initiated. These are 
activities which no awareness of physical danger, however 
acute, or no expectation of financial loss, however heavy, 
can arouse. Defensiveness in this sense is strictly the 
property of the reflexive self.
The concept of defense is a confused one in the psy­
chological lexicon. The term can, in fact, be used with a 
certain justification to refer to any activity of the self 
that wards off potentially painful experience of any kind. 
But its most widely accepted use is rather specifically 
limited to the kind of defense typified by repression, in 
which an impulse not only is denied expression but somehow 
is prevented from entering into awareness as a conscious 
desire. There can be no defensiveness of this kind in the 
spontaneous self-structure; the spontaneous self cannot 
frown upon or disown its own functioning because it is un­
selfconscious, It is only with the advent of the self- 
concept (ego ideal, ideal-image, good-me) that self-activity 
of this kind can be evoked. The self-concept provides the 
"leverage," so to speak, for the defensive maneuvers of the
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self, by making one part of the self unacceptable to the 
other part. This is the internal state created by the re­
flexive act, and the nature of the tension aroused within 
the self by the functioning of the self-concept. The ex­
istence of self-concept necessarily implies such tension.
CHAPTER V 
SELF CONCEPT AND PSYCHOTHERAPY
The reader should keep in mind that in writing about 
therapy I am presenting a partial and fragmentary account.
I do not claim that the self-concept is the central issue 
in the therapeutic process (nor do I have any idea what is), 
I do feel, however, that there is something to be gained by 
looking at it from this particular point of view and I do 
not think that it requires much of a shift in focus to as­
sume it, taking ordinary clinical parlance as the conceptual 
starting point.
Stated briefly, my position is that in the course 
of successful therapy the self-conceptualizing activities 
of the individual are progressively reduced, and in the 
hypothetically perfect case are eventually eliminated. 
Ideally, then, the self should have no conception of itself 
but should act in a free and un-selfconscious way, and the 
purpose of therapy should be to help it achieve this free­
dom.
Therapeutic effort, however, cannot be directed at 
the self-concept, as such. For the self-concept itself,
I8l
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and all of the activities that go under the label of self­
objectification, are themselves only expressions and symp­
toms of an underlying unrest. This, again, is the appre­
hension stemming from the internalization of attitudes held 
toward the self by significant others. These attitudes, 
then, are the source of the trouble with which the therapist 
must deal, and he must direct his efforts toward unseating 
them from their dominant position in the mind of his client. 
This, I believe, is always the problem in those people who 
are labelled "neurotic." They have internalized a host of 
attitudes, and as protection against these they have sur­
rendered their natural spontaneity and "subjectivity" in 
favor of self-objectification. Neurosis is always the de­
struction of spontaneity, and spontaneity itself is always 
the mark of mental health.
It follows from this, then, that the task of the 
therapist is to help his client find his way back to spon­
taneity. This is simply put, but the task itself is diffi­
cult because, for the person afflicted with the disposition 
always to think about himself, it is literally a terrifying 
experience to give it up and enter into un-selfconscious 
interaction with others. If therapy is to be successful he 
must, and yet it is like giving up one's only secure hold 
on life and venturing blindfolded out into a dangerous and 
uncertain world. Of course the danger and uncertainty stem 
from the attitudes that he himself has internalized and not
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from external sources, but this changes the matter not one 
bit. One loses one's natural spontaneity usually in child­
hood, when one finds that the things one does and the things 
that spontaneity seem to stand for endanger one's position 
with (arouse an attitude in) the others who are important. 
One is literally forced, then, to keep a careful watch over 
one's self as a precaution against catastrophe, and if the 
others are easily disturbed this develops into a constant 
vigil and eventually into an established mode of thought, 
with the self as object. And when this is accomplished, 
exit spontaneity.
For such a person, then, the subjective mode of 
thought (spontaneity) is much too dangerous to be indulged 
in. Occasionally he may break over into this mode, espec­
ially when he is involved in a neutral or trivial matter, 
or one that really absorbs his interest, but he cannot hold 
to it for long and, on his return to the objectified mode, 
is more frightened than ever, even though in retrospect he 
may concede that the experience was delightful while it 
lasted. But to have let one's self gol To have so care­
lessly exposed one's self I It is enough to make one cringe.
It is exactly this kind of reaction that the thera­
pist must work against. To gain anything from therapy the 
client must take a chance, must let himself go, must expose 
himself, however terrifying it may be to do so. And the 
therapist, if he is to be successful, must be able to
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encourage his client to do so. But this takes some doing 
and not everyone is equipped to do it. For of course it's 
not enough just to encourage the client verbally; no doubt 
he already has had enough of that from friends and neighbors 
and would only be exasperated to run into the same kind of 
treatment from the therapist. No, the "ability to encour­
age" carries a different meaning; it means that the thera­
pist must be a person who can serve as a new kind of other 
to his client.
There are two aspects to this encouragement. The 
first is that the therapist must be the kind of other who 
will "call out" the client's fullest self. And the second 
is that he must respond to the client's productions in a 
way that the client may find out that his apprehension, in 
the therapeutic context at least, is unfounded.
Of these, the first is the more basic. Therapy can­
not proceed at all until the client produces something of 
himself, and of course the more he produces, the more varied 
and free his productions, the greater is the chance that it 
will proceed. It is no guarantee, of course, but it is the 
necessary first condition. Now, psychotherapy is always a 
self-other relationship, and as in every other self-other 
relationship the kind of self that is called out in the 
client— his thoughts and feelings— depend to a certain ex­
tent upon the character of his other— in this instance, the 
therapist. This point cannot be stressed too much, Cooley
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remarks that what we would be embarrassed to tell to some 
of our acquaintances we may boast about to others. This 
certainly is a common enough experience, and though it is 
a rather superficial illustration it carries a very clear 
point.
The same sort of thing holds at a much deeper level. 
The very thoughts and feelings that come to us depend in a 
significant way upon how we see our "other." There are some 
people with whom you may never feel inclined to speak out 
about anything of personal importance. They don't invite 
closeness, and when you are with them personal thoughts and 
tender feelings seem strangely foreign and inappropriate.
But their imprint goes deeper than this, for when you are 
with them and let them get a hold on you such thoughts and 
feelings simply don't appear at all. On the other hand, 
there are those with whom you may find yourself indulging 
freely in ideas and feelings of all kinds, who "call out" 
in you a wider and deeper and richer self, one which gives 
expression to its full potentiality. It should be apparent 
that a therapist who calls out only a segment of his client's 
self is a poor therapist for that reason. If the client in 
his so-called free association is constrained from thinking 
about a certain kind of experience or from experiencing a 
certain kind of feeling because of the presence of the 
therapist, the therapeutic process is thereby cut off even 
before it begins. It seems, then, that the most important
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single attribute a therapist can possess is his own "full­
ness" as a person; he must be the kind of person who calls 
out in his client the full range of his experience.
The second aspect of the therapist's task of "en­
couragement" follows from the first. Having called out his 
client's fullest self he must accept it. This is easily 
written but not so easily done, for inevitably in the course 
of therapy the client will get to the seamy side of his life 
and will talk about experiences and express feelings that 
we would call disgusting, shameful, and the like (and that 
disgust and shame him). It cannot be otherwise if therapy 
is to progress at all, for these experiences and feelings 
(self-feelings) are at the very heart of the trouble he 
brings into therapy.
Now, if one thing is clear about therapy it is 
this: the therapist himself cannot show the same attitudes
toward his client as the client had previously suffered, or 
perhaps is still suffering, at the hands of his significant 
others. After all, it is the internalizing of these atti­
tudes that brings him into therapy in the first place, and 
in the therapist he must find someone who feels in a differ­
ent way about him or else he will get no relief. The thera­
pist must be able to face up to what we call "disgusting" 
without being disgusted by it, or to what we call "contemp­
tible" without being contemptuous of it, or to what we call 
weak and foolish without being derisive of it, and so on.
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In short, he must he the kind of person whose own self-feel­
ing is not easily aroused, for only if he remains at peace 
with himself and spontaneous in his response to his client 
can he give him the kind of other that quiets apprehension 
and encourages a free outpouring of the full self.
More than anything else, the client seeks an other 
who can really accept him, hut because he has heen sensi­
tized hy many hlows in the past he is ever on guard for 
signs of disapproval, and his capacity to detect it is tuned 
to an incredible fineness so that little escapes him, how­
ever disguised, subtle, or circumstantial it may be. Sooner 
or later attitudes will out; there is no way to cover them 
up and especially not in a relationship such as therapy 
which demands a free (uncontrolled) response from the thera­
pist, He must be spontaneous if he is to call up spontane­
ity in his client, for spontaneity-in-relationship is the 
only true mark of acceptance.
There is, then, no way out for the therapist.
Either he has worked through his self-feeling and the atti­
tudes it engenders or he is less effective as a therapist. 
And the therapist who harbors these things and deliberately 
tries to cover them over rather than rid himself of them 
only causes his client additional woe. For this is sheer 
pretense, and dishonesty in the strictest personal sense; 
and the only thing it accomplishes is to present to the 
client an other who pretends to accept and yet who really
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does not. For the breeding of insecurity and apprehensive­
ness a better device could hardly be fashioned.
Now there are two further points that should be made 
about this issue of acceptance. The first is that the feel­
ing nature of acceptance must not be lost sight of. I have 
already called attention to this point on the negative side 
(rejection) in the discussion of the destructive force of 
attitudes in therapy. On the positive side, feelings— of 
the therapist for the client— are essential to therapeutic 
progress. This is because in the deepest sense of the term 
acceptance feeling and is carried to the client feel­
ing, and nothing that the therapist could do would be more 
absurd and self-contradictory than to verbalize his accept­
ance of his client and yet relate to him in a cold, indif­
ferent way. Lack of feeling is always rejection, for it 
clearly implies a warding off of the other, a refusal to 
get involved with or close to him. It would be hard to im­
agine more eloquent and forceful testimony that he is not 
wanted.
The second point is that it must be the client's self 
that is accepted and not a false version of it. When we seek 
acceptance it is for what we are, and in order to feel really 
secure in our relationship to any other we must feel that he 
understands us fully, not right down to the tiniest detail 
of our thought and feeling, of course, but to the point of 
an awareness of our weakness as well as of our strong points.
189
Nothing is quite so insecure as the so-called "acceptance" 
accorded to us by an other who can see only good in us and 
who persists in turning away from any thought of us as less 
than perfect. For it is not our real self that he accepts 
at all, but only his private, glorified, but truncated ver­
sion of it, and, by implication which is too clear for even 
the most naive to escape, he will have nothing to do with 
the rest of us. What a frustrating experience to try to 
convey to such a person that we are not really so perfect 
as he thinks I But even more than this, what an insecure 
feeling we carry around with us when he is with us or in 
our mind. And how much better we feel when we are with an 
other who can see us fully— or at least who does not block 
out portions of our self that do not suit him— and who, with 
this, can speak freely about our foibles. Such an other, we 
know, is responding to our full self and seems not at all 
dismayed by some of the un-pretty things he finds there; 
why, then, should we be concerned about exposing ourselves 
if, when we show a bad spot, it makes so little difference? 
This is acceptance and this is security in the deepest sense 
of these terms.
Of course the therapist must work from this second 
point of view. In order to encourage his client to give up 
self-conscious control for spontaneous self-expression he 
must first demonstrate that his acceptance of the client 
takes into account some awareness of the client's full self.
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including its weak, shady, obscene, and foolish sides. 
Otherwise his therapeutic power as an accepting other is 
drastically reduced. For an accepting response is accepting 
of only that portion of the self that it is in response to, 
and as it is the deeper and more hidden portions of the 
client's self that give him the most trouble, and thus are 
most in need of acceptance, a superficial understanding 
simply will not do. This is why the accomplished therapist, 
offering greater understanding, can effect changes in por­
tions of the client's self that even a very close friend, 
without such understanding, cannot touch.
And this is why psychotherapy must be structured as 
it is: with the client talking more or less freely about
his experiences, thoughts, and feelings, past and present.
No matter how good a friend you are, you cannot help a man 
come to terms with an experience that he suffered years ago 
and which since then he has kept hidden within himself. And 
of course neither can the therapist, no matter how wonderful 
a person he may be. If he is to help his client overcome 
the deep self-feelings that attach to a particular happening 
of yesteryear he must actually enter that happening as an 
other. This is why in therapy the client must re-create 
those experiences, for only in this way can they be brought 
into the context of an accepting other. The client must re­
live them; he cannot just talk about them, for unless he is 
involved in them he is only objectifying himself again, and
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his self now is not the self that it was at the time of the 
significant experience. If one cannot enter subjectively 
into one's re-creation the only thing one can gain from the 
therapist's response to it is the knowledge that this old 
experience was indeed the beginning of one's trouble and 
that one really shouldn't feel about it the way one does.
But the self-feeling persists in its original intensity.
Perhaps it is apropos here to remark in passing that 
because acceptance is such a crucial issue one can hardly 
accomplish alone by probing into one's self what one can 
accomplish when this is done in the presence of another.
A self-other relationship must be significantly altered, 
and acceptance-by-other internalized. And, how can one 
achieve this by one's self? It is possible, perhaps— yet 
certainly the change is made a great deal easier and pro­
cured a great deal faster when an other is introduced who, 
by virtue of his training and his qualities as a person, 
serves as a concrete representation of understanding and ac­
ceptance. One can create such an ideal other out of one's 
imagination, perhaps, but it is hard to see how such an im­
agined other could escape the defects that earlier inhered 
in the concrete others of one's experience, and in any event 
it would lack the vividness and power of a real other.
To summarize: I have argued that for therapy to be
successful the therapist must in some way encourage his cli­
ent to give up the security of self-objectification in favor
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of subjectivity. And for this to take place I have stated 
that the therapist must first of all "call up" his client's 
fullest self, and, second, having done this, he must under­
stand and accept it.
All of this takes place within the therapeutic ses­
sions. However, the therapist cannot very well change his­
tory, and he cannot— nor would he want to— persuade his 
client that the others who earlier had heaped derision and 
scorn and contumely upon his head really did love and accept 
him. Nor can he very well change reality, and his client 
must continue to live more or less closely with a host of 
others who are not always accepting of him, not only during 
the course of therapy but, and especially, for years after 
he leaves it. What then does it benefit him to have found 
acceptance in one man?
There are many sides to the answer. In the first 
place, in coming to experience the acceptance of the thera­
pist he at the same time is growing capable of experiencing 
the acceptance of all those others about him who do have 
feelings for him. Even without any changes in the nature of 
his relations with these others, there is real benefit ac­
cruing to him from his new and inherently more satisfying 
orientation toward others.
But the matter does not stop here. For, from having 
experienced the acceptance of the therapist he is a changed 
man. To appreciate this point you must keep in mind that
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this feeling (of being accepted) comes to the client only 
from having re-lived a host of significant experiences in 
the company of the therapist. The acceptance, then, relates 
directly to more or less specific experiences, or, more pre­
cisely, to the self-feeling that had been attached to them. 
To say, then, that the client now can experience the thera­
pist’s acceptance of him means that he no longer is humili­
ated or made guilty by the memory of the experiences in 
question, or, in general terms, that his threatening others 
no longer have their earlier hold on his mind. In short, 
it is to say that he can now accept himself (at least on 
the specific issue involved) or, as we say, that he is at 
peace with himself.
Because of this he is better able to relate to 
others in a spontaneous way. This is a more satisfying 
kind of relationship in its own right, but even more than 
this it presents to them an “other" to which they can in 
turn respond in a more open and geniunely sociable way. 
Spontaneity begets spontaneity: this is the way that it
is in therapy and this is the way that it is in social life. 
Hence, for having changed his own self the client finds that 
the others whom he meets and “calls up" are thereby changed 
for the better. These people are the same people that he 
knew before, but, in response to the changed “other" that 
he presents to them, their selves may be changed, too. It 
is a long and involved cyclical process that presumably has
19^
no ending.
And finally, he benefits from the possession of a 
new set of values for appraising others. In actuality, this 
is a very complex matter, but what the statement means, 
briefly, is that he sees others in a different light than 
he did before and that he no longer is so receptive to— or 
as dependent upon— these others who formerly made such a 
great and disturbing impression upon him. Successful thera­
py, always has this liberating effect on the person. For, 
in the process of re-living earlier humiliating experiences 
within the context of the therapist's acceptance he thereby 
changes his relationship with the others who had been part 
of the original experiences, and, by generalization, with 
all others whom they represent in his mind. Those others 
said, by implication if not explicitly, that he was very 
bad, in one way or another; his therapist now says, by im­
plication if not explicitly, that he wasn't so bad, after 
all. His progress in therapy is measured by the success 
that the therapist has in gaining his respect, and in usurp­
ing the place that these threatening others have previously 
held in his mind as an active and significant force. But 
in becoming a significant other the therapist does more than 
just usurp an established power; he also and at the same 
time establishes new criteria for significance. By this I 
mean that to the extent that the person is influenced by his 
therapist— that is, accepts him as an ascendant other— to
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that extent is he accepting of the personal values that the 
therapist stands for, and rejecting of those that the thera­
pist stands opposed to. As I have stated, for therapy to 
proceed at all, the person must show humility, and take what 
Baldwin would call a "receptive" position in relation to the 
therapist. There is nothing "weak" about this and nothing 
surreptitious; it is only an honest awareness of one's own 
limitations in relation to one's other, and in order to put 
oneself in this position one naturally must first of all 
see to one's satisfaction that the qualities of the other 
are in fact admirable.
But however this may be, when the therapeutic rela­
tionship is ended, the person emerges with changed values.
He does not feel the same way about things any more, and his 
relationship with people is different. Here the important 
thing is that certain others, or certain qualities in others, 
that heretofore had called up his receptive self and aroused 
humiliation, or other negative self-feelings, no longer carry 
this power. They do not carry it because he does not find
them so impressive any more. They no longer get his respect
or deference, and even though they may continue to abuse, 
belittle, manipulate, or otherwise reject him, they have 
lost some of their effectiveness with him because they have
lost some of their significance to him.
In writing about the therapeutic relationship I 
have made no direct reference, to this point, of the self-
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concept. I have contended that in successful therapy the 
self-concept is progressively weakened, and that the ideal 
(hypothetical) self has none at all. But though ridding 
the self of its self-concept is essential to success, this 
work cannot be accomplished by direct attack. Clearly, it 
would be a foolish waste of time to try to dissuade a person 
from such activity, for it is not subject to his will and so 
long as the underlying feelings persist so long will he feel 
compelled to indulge in it. And it would be even worse than 
foolish to take a "rational" approach and try to demonstrate 
to him that his particular self-concept is the product of 
ill-founded or misguided beliefs, because— his needs remain­
ing unchanged— if you have any influence over him at all he 
will respond only by taking on another self-concept in its 
place— one more in keeping with the values implied in your 
argument. There is, in fact, considerable danger in this 
sort of thing, in that he may eventually re-orient his over­
all concept of self according to the values he reads into 
his therapist, and in so doing effectively protect himself 
against any real therapeutic change. I suspect that the 
number of people who have gained this and nothing else from 
therapy is not inconsiderable. These are the people who can 
talk about themselves and their problems with great facility 
and ease (and who do a good job of it!), but who nonetheless 
give the impression that their problems remain unchanged or 
that they have even been compounded by this intellectual 
counterfeit of true therapy.
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